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COUNT ?IVg

WAR GRII^:ES AND CRIMES AGAI-IST HUMANITY:
ATROCITIES AND OFFENSES COI^'^ITTED AOAINST
CIVILIAN POPULATIONS

The Indlotment alleges that the aefendants WEIZSAECKSR,
STEENG-RACHT, KEPPLER, BOHLE, WOSRMANN, RITTER, ERDMANNSDOHFF,
V^ESENMAYER, LAMICiRS, STUCICART, DARRE, MEI3SNER, DIETRICH,
BERGER, SCHi.LLi.NBERG, SCHWERIN-KRCSIGK, RASGHE, KEHRL ana

PUHL, from March 1938 to May 1945, committed war crimes and
crimes against humanity, in that they participated in atro
cities and offenses, including murder, extermination,-

enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, killing of hostages,

torture, persecutions en political, racial and religious
grounds, and other inhumane and criminal acts against German
nationals and. members of the civilian populations of coun

tries and territories under belligerent occupation of, or

otherwise controlled by Germany, and in the plunder of nublio

and "oriva.te "property, wanton destruction of cities, tovns '^nd
villages, anc' devastation not Justified by military neoea^lty.
It Is alleged that the Thir-^ Reloh embarhed uoon a svstematio program of genocide, a.imed at the destruction of

nations and ethnic groups within the (German sphere of influ
ence, in part by murdrrous extermination, and in part by elim

ination and suppression of national characteristics, with intent
to strengthen the German nation and the so-called "aryan" race
at the expense of such other nations and groups, by imposing
Nazi and German characteristics upon individuals selected.

therefrom, ^nd by the extermination of. "undeeir^ble reoial

elements*^ —th^^t portions of the civilian porulations of

ocou"nie(3 coantriep, erpeoially in "^olend and the occupied

Sastern territories, vjere compelled, by force, to evacuate

their homesteads, which were sequestered and confiscated by
the Reich, and their properties, real and personal, were
treated as revenue of the Reich and the so-called ^♦ethnio

Germans*' v\;ere resettled in such lands, —that German racial

registers were established and legislation enacted defining
these classes of "ethnic Germans" and other nationals of

occupied territories and the puppet and satellite governments
eligible for Germanizetion, —that subsequent acquisition,
in some instances of German citizenship, was compelled, and
individuals vjho were forced to accept such citizenship or

upon whom such citizenship was conferred by decree, became
»

amenable to military conscription, service in the armed

forces, and other obligations of citizenship, --that failure
to fulfill these obligations resulted in imprisonment or

death, and the forced Germanization constituted the basis for
such punishment, —that those classes of persons deemed
ineligible and those individuals who refused Geimanization
were deported to forced labor, confined in concentration camns,
and in many instances liquidated, —that in the occu led terri
tories the use of judicial mechanisms was a powerful weapon
for the suppression and extermination of all opponents of

the Nazi occupation and for the persecution and extermination
of "races," ^-special Police tribunals and other summary courts
were created in Germany ard ih the occupied territories, and
sufejeoted civilians of .these occupied countries to criminal
abu^e, and denial of judicial and penal process, —that

special legislation was enacte<^ •provi'-''Ing sum^iary trial "by
these special courts ano invoking the c^eath oenalty or '
Imprisonment in concentration camps for all members of the

civilian population of the ocouoieci territories suspected
of opposing any of the policies of the German oocu-Dation

f

authorities, — that persons who committed offenses against
the Reich or the German forces in the occupied territories

were handed over to the police and. taken secretly to Germany

for trial and punishment, without notification to t^elr
relatives of the diaposition of the case, — that certain
classes of civilians in the occupied territories, deemed •
politically, racially, or religiously undesirable, if sus
pected of having committed a crime, were d.eprlved of all

legal remedy and turned over to the Gestapo for summary
treatment, all for the purpose of creating a reign of Judi
cial terror in the occupied countries in order to suppress

all resistance and exterminate undesirable elements, — that

in the Reich program of "pacification" of t^e occuoled iBrrl-

4

torles, through terrorism, the arrest, imprisonment, deporta
tion and murder of so-called hostages was ef-^^ected, and tews,
alleged Communists, "asocials," an'"' other innocent members of

^

the civilian population not connected with any acts against
the occupying power, wer-; taken as hostages and, without t^e

benefit of investigation or trial, were summarily deported,

^

hanged or shot, — that they wer executed or deported at
arbitrarily established ratios for attacks by persons unknown
on German Installations and German personnel in the occupied

territories, — that through recruitment drives in the occupied
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territories and puppet and satellite governinents, SS- units
were organized ano SS recruits obtained, often by com'oulqion,
from among prisoners of war and the nationals of t>^ose coun

tries and assigned to the Waffen SS military divisions, t^e
administretion ,pf the SS concentration camo system, and s"oecia.lly-constituted penal battalions, -— that t.^ese units

f.

engaged In the commission of atrocities and o-f-^enses ag^»inst
the civilian populations of occupied and satellite countries,

— that anti-Jev/is^ activities with eac^ a^ggression were
r

extended to the incorporated,

occupied, or ot^er-ise con-

fe

trolled G-erman dominated countries, —
Gzechoslovakian,
k

that Austrian,

Polish and. other nationals of Jevjlsh evtrac-

tion, were deprived of their civil rights an'' their property
confisoe>.ted,

tens of thousands thrown into concentration

camps and tortured.,

and many of t.hem murdered, —

that these

measures were followed by barbarous mass killings of people

of Jewish extraction a.nd other foreign nationals in the occu
pied. territories,
women and

^

in which hundreds of thousands of men,

children were exterminated, —

that the early pro-

gram for driving out the Jews as pauper emigres was supplanted
in 1942 by a program for the evacuation of eleven million

*

European Jews to camps in Eastern Europe, for ultimate exterm
ination, —

'

that they were to be transported to these areas

in .huge labor ga.ngs, and there the weak w^ere to be hnied
iiTiiediately and the able-bodied worked to death, and thus

f-

millions of people of Jewish extraction from Austria,
Czechoslova.kia, Poland, ^'rance, .Belgium, the Netherlands,

Denmark, Norway, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yucoslavia; Rumania, the
Baltic btates, t^e Soviet Union, Greece, Italy, and also from
Germany were deported to the Eastern extermination areas and
murdered..
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In addition to these general charges, the Indictment
alleges the comn-ission of certain specific acts connected

with the general program which, it is alleged, were com
mitted by various of the defendants as "rinci-oals, aiders,

coooerators or abettors,

"^hese we wi'^l deal with later.

Persecution of the Jews.

No chapters in the history of the

world are more blac'-^ and bloodstained than those which por

tray the fate of the Jews of Germany, and of all EuroiDe which

came within the vsphere of ^erma.n dominatir^n.
all dictators is a selection of some nation,

The storv of
some class,

some

id.eology u ^on whose shoulders all the woes, ali.eged an'' real,
may be lo'^ged.

Invariably those «?elected are less able to

combat the propaganda of hate, 'promises of tetter con'^ihions
are never alone sufficient to arouse the masses to the neces

sary emotional pitch which will make them the willinar subjects
>

,

of the dictator s will.
to such ic eas and

Not only must they become reoeotive

themselves feel the flames of hate tovrards

someone or soi.e class, but the

.ropaganda and incitement nust

ever '-/low t):e fli-mes higher, whiter and hotter.
It makes little difference whether the subject of 'nass

^ate be a political party, re.G^ , religion, class or another

nation.

T^g technique is the same, the results are identical,

an-' the hgte thus engendered inevitably brings on -resistance
an" in the end ruin u ^on those who start and partioi-oate in
it.

Hitler mad.e the ;^ewish persecution one o:^ the

sub,^ects of ^"is policy to gain and retain cower.
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-primary

As the

years went by the more intensely did he and his adherents
throw fuel upon the fire„
down.

It was never permitted to die

It infected the high sind the low; it made itself

felt in the minds and hearts of men who should and did Imow

better.

It would, of course, be a mistake to say that every

Gei'man became a convert to this doctrine.

p

*l'he record is

clear that many did not, but unfortunately the^^ were compa
ratively few and the5.r voices were not heard or heeded.
Some who knew better and who were not swept away by propa-

A

r

ganda, were alive to the possibilities of increasing their

f

own fortunes and enhancing their position by taking advan

tage of this horrible persecution, and calmly and callously
I

gave lip service to these pogroms and sought to enrich
themselves from the

misfortunes

of i t s victims.

The persecution of Jews went on steadily from step

to step and finally to death in foul form.

The Jews of

Germany were first deprived of the rights of citizenship.

They were then deprived of the ri^t to teach, to practice
professions, to obtain education, to engage in ousiness

f

enterprises;

they were forbidden to marry, except among

themselves and those of their own religion; they were sub

ject to arrest and confinement in concentration ca'rps, to
^

beatings, mutilation and torture; their property v/as confis

cated; they v/ere herded into ghettos; they were forced to

emigrate and to buy leave to do so; they were deported to

the East v/here they worked to exhaustion and death; they
became slave laborers and finally, over six million v/ere
murdered•

As country after country fell under German occupation
or control, or was forcedto do the v/ill of the Third xieich,
its Jewish citizens became subject to the same measures

of horror.

It's a record of shame and degradation to every

German and to the German nation.
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These crimes were planned

by Germans, ordered by Germans, committed by Germane, under
e government vhioh the German r^eonle v^illingly chose and

which, to a large degree, they enthusiastically supported, —at
least as long ap it was crowned with success.

The property of which the Third Eeich robbed the Jews

was used,

and was planned to be used, for the purpose of

rearmament and aggression,

VJhen the rearmament program and

the other financial measures had practically bankrupted the

Third Feich, the start of a disastrous inflation was in
sight and Goering, at a conference, stated:

"Physical Ta^ks.
raise

the

level of

The assignment 'is to

armament from a

current index

of 100" to one of 300.
*'This. goal is confronted by almost insuperable
obstacles because already now there is a scarcity

of labor, because factory capacity is fully utilized,
because

the tasks of last

summer exhausted our re

serves of foreign currency, and because the financial
situation of the Feich is serious

a deficit.
solved

.

.

In s^ite of this,

and even npw shows

the problem must be

.

'"Finances.
"Very critical situation of the
Feich Exchequer. Felief initially through the

billion (milliards) imposed on lewry, and through
profits accruing to the Feich in the aryanization
of Jewish enterprises,"

A mad race ensued in which people of every class of

German society joined:

Farmers, bankers, big and little

business-men eagerly sought to pick up Jewish rronerty at a
fraction of its value.

The German people looked on with

general complacence uoon all of these measures which finally

ended in the deportation of the victims and their being

herded into the camps of death.

There is no excuse or justi

fication for any man who took a conscious or consenting part
in the measures which constituted these abominable and

atrocious crimes, and it is immaterial whether they originated

or executed them, or merely implemented them, justified them
to the world or gave aid and comfort to their perpetrators.
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The very Immensity ot t^is maps murder sta^e-ers the

imagination anf' ten^s to blunt a rea''iza.tion o'^ its hnrror.
But we can gain some Idea, of i t from the fact thpt from the
one camp of -Auschwitz over thirty-three tons of ffold from the

teeth of the victims an*^ rings from their fi'erers were sent
to

the Reichsbank.

Foreign Office Knowledge of the Fate of the Jews in the Bast.

Viith typical G-erman thoroughness, not only wss the campaign
of murder 'and. extermination of ^ews in Poland and hugsia car

ried on, but detailed reports were made of these horrible

measures.

"^he Foreign Office regularly received reports of

the x:^insatzgrup!.>en operations in the occupied, territories.

Many of these were initialled by WPIZSAE0K2R and VOSRMAN^I.

They .revealed the cle ring of entire areas of the ^ewish Pop
ulation by mass murder, and the bloody butchery of the ho^p-

less .and innocent, the shooting of hostages in numbers wholly

disproportionate to the alleged offenses against G-erman armed

forces; the murder of captured -"^ussian '^f'^icirls and g reign
of terrorism carried on with calculated farocity, all told in

the crisp, unimaginative la,nguage of military reports.
All this is d8=^o.ribed in detail in the .Judgment ren

dered in Case IX (Tye United States vs. Chlendorf et al), and
it is unnecessary to repeat them again.

It suf'^'ices to say

that many hundreds of thousands of Innocent people were mur
dered iMthout reason or excuse, without trial or opportunity

to establish their intiocenoe, and beyond Question the Jewish

population i as the particular object of these murder campaigns.
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i

The prosecution, however, does not contend that the

defendants implemented or initiated the crimes committed by
the -i^insatzgrupDen but that they had •knowledge
they made no objections to t^eir com. ission.

of t^em and
Here the Foreign

Office had no Jurisdiction or power to intervene,

were"

in the most oart c-rried on in an area w^^ic^ was «tilT
the

lurisdiction of the "ehrmac^t.

continue to hold office under a

under

How a decent man could

regime whic^ carried'^ut.

planned and wholesale barbarities of t'-^is hind ig di-p-fiou^t

to understand, but there is no evidence of particioati'^n on
theoart of the defendants WcZRlviAHH and t-Riz3A:^CKRR.

^*hat is of imp.ortance in this case, howf-ver, is that

the facts disclosed by the reoord.s of these crimes, disposes

of toe claim of ignorance of fina.l solution, and of the our•pose

of the deportation of the Jews to the East.

Knowing as

they did what happened to the Jews when they c^me under the
control of the SS, Gestapo and Police, we find ourselves

unable to believe that these defendants had any ifd.ea that

these deportations ended in anything but the death of t^ese
deportees through exhaustion from overwork, starvation or mis
treatment, and by mass murder.

The defendants are not men

onlv oT'^inary intelligence and understanding.
>

They are edu

cated and trained to offici^'l life and exnerienced in the

r

evaluation of policy,

the motives and acts of oarties,

officialdom, and of nations, and wholl'"" accustomed to r^a.d
between the lines of restrained, or spparontlv innocuous isngua.ge, and from it extract the meaning lying behind t^e words.
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lil'liiii

I II

inlV>fiT*r.Tt-*jfcj.T iiw'1-i-i 11 •

• •- .

The defenaant Wi.I3SA-C-v£:R'S statement that he thought

Auschwitz was merely a can.p where laborers were internea, we

believe tells only part of what he knew, ana what he '^aa good,
reason to beHeve.

He had access to what was publicly broa.a-

cast by the outside world, of what.was going on there.

He was

kept informed by his contacts with the '^ehrmacht ana the

opposition, and with the'office of -^^dmiral '^anaris, ana '-^e
knew wha.t: happened to the Jews of Polanc, of the laltic

States, and of the occuoied territories of Hussia.

-•n"'e.qs ^e

thought t^at ravening wolves had oVernig^t become meek lambs,
he must have realized what t^e end would be.

It is possible, but we think unli^^elv, that he was not

informed of the exquisite techniques of murder developed in

V'is camp, but that he knew t^e deported were marked for

slave labor a.nd d.eath we h.*=ve no doubt.

I'his is clearly indi-

Gated by the testimony of his own son, Karl von '"eizsaecker,

and by t.he testimony of a number of other of his own wit

nesses, and particularly a^monp those of '-"is Foreign 0:efiQe
associates who with him claim that they were members of the

und.erground mov.ment ag'^inst the Hitler regime.

¥e may men

tion Schlabrendorff, Bruns, von Htzdorf and von Bargen.
Karl von WeizSc'.ecker testified as follows •

Durint; the war did you also talk to your

f"the^ about the deportation of Jews an''"" other atro
cities?

"A.

Yes, partly we talked about it gener^ally

an^ partly we discussed specific cases.

Did you and your fa.thar know t^-en that

the Jews were being killed.?
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"A,

Of coarse, one knew that,

'^he big diffi

culty was that i t was known that such t>^ings were
happening but that one did not know w^ere an^'' how
i t happened

*

i-'id your father never consider helping"
the Jews by open contradiction, that is, by protes

ting publicly against Hitler's anti-Semitic policy?
"A.

b'ell, we discussed that,

too, and i

can

tell you exactly what my fr"ther's opinion was on
that point, xie said, 'If one fid that one would
become a martyr but one would certs.inly not help
the ^ews by doing it.'"
An exarnple of what happened to t'^e Jews is o-raphlcally

portrayed In the testimony of Jeanette k'olfe.

Her husband

vras sent to Buchenwald, never agein to be heard
ohi"!-ren,

Of >^er

t^.e son was shot in t^^e concentration cemo Htutthof;

her third daughter v/as sent to Hs-vensbruc^ an^ vpnle^ed;
secon^' •'auchter

adopted

has survived but with shattered health; her

a mere child, v/as

of a shipment of

2,000 children who, in 1941^, were loaded in open trucks in
weather 40^ below zero, never again to be heard of-

In

Auschwitz her brother, his v/ife, one dsuchter, two sons-in-

law, anr f eir three children, nine cousins, one uncle and
one aunt, were exterminated..

Mrs. %*olfe'o husband was first

sent to a concentration camp after the Gj-yatal ''eek pogrom
in 19L8, and she herself, with l,^^5f- other Jev/s from

Dortmunc; area, v/as deported to the J^ast in the beginning of
1942, anf with «Jews from Latvia, Poland ,Hungary, 97.eohoslova"'''la
and ilelov ""'useia, was sent to a concentrsticn camp at Riga.

The food t'-ere was barely sufficient to maintain life, but
not enough to enable the victims to work.

If the sufferers
I

became too week for labor, they were sent awpp'- In "Ascension"
squads,

together with the old and the chii'^ren,
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T^p men were

worifed to oeath in the stone quarries;

t>»e women were s^orn

of their hair which was clipoed from t^eir ^eac^s an(^

ship-oefl

away to be made, alleget^ly, into ropes.

'•'••he

witness •t'hilip Auerbach, a Jewish-German .chemist,

fled from G-ermany to Belgium in IG-M, but when that country
was overrun,

fled to

ranee.

On its fall he was captured and

sent, by the G-estapo, to Berlin,

tion ca.iips, anc finally,

thence to va.ri'^us concentra

in 1943, to -"-u.schwitz.

He testified

thet i t was comaion knowledge that th'^se who were tra.nsported

there, would oe sent to the "ovens."
as 1941 in Berlin.

^his was known as early

He did not become a victim because of his

chemical knowledge, but was branded with the number 188869
and put to work in t>"e camp combatting vermin and deloueing

the buildings in the camp.

This camp was used largely for

foreign Jews, and the Hunga^rians commenced to arrive toward

t^e end of 1943 and early 1944; of over 50,000 Jews 'Reported
from GT:»eece, less than 100 survived; transports came from
4

i'Va.nce, -elgium, Holland and other countries, wherever, to

use his own language, the "G-erman boot" was planted; on arri-.

val the question was asked, "•vhich of you osnnot w^ork?";
those v/ho said they could not were iimTiediately thrown, like
Crttle, into trucks and hauled away to the gas chambers;
that an S3 Oberfuehrer took little children and dashed tv^eir

brains out against the walls of the station,

^he victims'

clothes wer^ sent t® the VOMI; the gold fillings in the
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j

teeth of the dead were extracted anc' sent to t^e Reichgbank;

'

ever thirtj'-three tons of gold teeth and rings in four j^ears;
those fit for vjork were employed as long as they lasted in

the Buna ^Corhs of the I. C3-. Farhen anrt in the armament works.
"%e workers left the camp at 5:00 in the morning an^ returned

at 6:00 in the evening carrying t^eir c^eaf^, who ha<? dief^ of
exhaustion or been shot; once every four weeks ther'^ was a

^election among the viorkers on a purely arbitrary basis and

^

the selectees extermlnatecl; that on arrival at thp osrap all
Jews were compelled to disrobe and, as they cassed the guards,

^

were directed to go to the right or to the left; left meant
to the ovens and right meant to the slave labor camos.

It la unnecessary to go further into detail.

It suf

fices to say that nearly 6,000,000 European Jews were thus
extermlnatec",

ye have stated that the Foreign Office played an impor

tant part in these horrors. Through it the arrangements were
made whereby the Vichy 0-overnmcnt of France and the govern

^

ments of Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Humanla and Croatia
consented to the deportation of Jews id those territories.
Consent was not necessary in occupied France, the Low

^
f

Countries, Poland, the Baltic ^tatcs, Denmark and the occu
pied Russian territories. fhere the Jews werr merely seized,
and sent to their deaths.

Hut even here the Foreign

ffioe

played an essential part.

Among its duties was to Ignore,

or attempt to quiet or give evasive and often false answers
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to the protests or Inquiries of other powers.

All those

who implemented, aided, assisted or consciously partici
pated in these things bear part of the responsibility for
the criminal programo

WEIZSA^CKER, WOERimNN AND STIiSNGRAGKT

The defendant ERNST VON TiTEIZSAECKER,

after service in

the German Na;vy, entered the Foreign Office in 1920 and was
thereafter transferred to the Consulate at Basel,Switzerland,

and thereafter to the t'erman legation at Copenhagen where he

served until 1927 when he was transferred to. Berlin as Senior

Legation Councillor, and remained there until the summer of
19.'^1.

Ke was then appointed Minister to Norway and rj^mainod

there until the summer of 19.'*':^ when he was appointed vinister

to Switzerland, which post he held until the sprinc

Prom "^'^ay 19until March 1938 he was director of the politi

cal division of the Foreign Office, and in Anril of that year

was appointed ^tate Secretary, w^i ch post he held until epproX'?

imate^y May 1, 1943,-when he was appointed Ambassador to the
Vatican, where ho served until the collapse.
The defendant ERNST v;cERMANN entered the Foreign Office

in 1919, served as Secretary of Legation at the G-erman
Embassy in i'aris from 1920 to 1923; was Councillor of Lega
tion

at Vienna

from 1925 to

1929;

was called back

to the Foreign Office as Councillor of Legation First
Class,

and served as head of
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the

International Law

Division of the Legal Department until 19"6, when he heoame
head of the European Section in the Politio8.1 Department.

He served there until he wa.s appointed Councillor of Embassy
Minister First Class — in London, where he s-rvp'^ until

1938, when Ribbentrop appointed, him Ministerial Director with
the title of Undersecretary of State an'^ head of the Politi

cal Department.

He served in that capacity until 1943 when

he was named Ambassador in Nanking, China,

The defendant CUSTAV ADOLF STEENC-PACHT VON MOYLAND, in

1936, was appointed Agricultural Attache with the G-erma-n
li'mbassy in London, und.or Ribbentrop, who was then Ambassador,
In September 1938 he was transferred, to Scrlin and appointed

Legation Secretary and promoted to Le-ga-tion Councillor in
April 1939.

In the middle of May 1940, Ribbentrop entrusted

him with the technical direction of his local headquarters,

and he thus became a member of the Foreign Minister's per

sonal staff.

In 1941 he became Ribbentrop's Chief Adjutant

and served in that capacity until May 1943, when he was
appointed State Secretary.

We now proceed to analyse the evidence in this c^se to

determine whet .part, if any at all, the defrndants WEIZSASCKER^
UCERMANN,

ejrid STEENCRACHT had in this program.
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That the Foreign Offiee had

interest in this progra-m

of liquidating the ews of Europe is conclusively shown by
the documentary eviaenoe. That Ribbentrop, Luther (Undersec
retary of State in charge of department Deutschland), Abetz

(S-erman -^mbassaaor to

aris), Rademacher (of Luther's "Depart

ment), an*? Wagner (of Inlanc? H of the Foreign Office), as
well as divers Q-erms-n diplomatic representatives, particu

larly in the satellite states, were deeply involved, is like
wise clear.

This is particularly true with respect to Luther

ajid Rademacher^

It is insisted, on behalf of VOH WEIZSAECKSR, that
although Luther was normally suborainated to the State Secre

tary, and in many activities should, have been subordinated or

at lea.st have obtained the approval -of the Undersecretary of

State in charge of the Political -division, he was in fact a
creature of Ribbentrop's, and acted under his direct instruc
tions, bypassing his nominal superiors in many important mat
ters, and these defendants were, in many instsjices, kept in

ignorf'nce of the -proposed action and either never learned of
them or only after they h.ad been completed,

Ribbentrop and

Luther arc dead, and Rademacher was not called, a.s a witness,
either by the defense or the prosecution, which is quite

understandable as his position was such that he could not

testify v/ithout incriminating himself, and if called by the

defense his natural tendency to avoid responsibility and cast
it upon others -- a tendency which the Tribunal has noted in

many instances of this c^ase — may well have impelled the
defense to refrain from calling him.

The Tribunal is compelled, therefore, to unravel this

tangled skein without the testimony of some of the principal
actors.

^*e are not unmindful of the temptation to a defen

dant to evade responsibility, place it on others, and deny

his own knowledge and participation.

There has been a not

able reluctajice to testify about, and a lack of memory on

the part of the-defendants, with regard to matters which we
find difficult to believe could have left no impression on

their minOs or memories, and an insistence that they could

not testify unless the prosecution faced them with documents
concerning the matter in question.

Such a disposition

deprives their testimony of much of its weight and we are

therefore obliged to approach w^itb caution denials of know
ledge of matters which, in the ordinary course of business,
should and would have come to their attention.

In October and November

the British and American

Ambassadors approached the defend.ants ¥EIZ3AECKSR and

I'vOERMaNN, asking that Rublee, the American Ohairman of the
International Relief Committee, be permitted to travel to

Berlin to confer on plans for the emigration of refugees from
Germany . IwEIZSAECKER was directed by Ribbentrop, on 21
October, not to answer the J^ritish inquiries; but he had

already informed the British Embassy, on 18 October, that in
his opinion, the plan was futile; that it was by no means

clear which countries were prepared to accept Jews and the

committee's efforts had proved to be sterile and his belief
that it was its intention to prove its worth by entering into

discussions v/ith. Grrmajtiy which would result in the establish
ment of the fpct that Germany, for obvious reasons, was

unwilling to provide Jews with foreign currency and thus the
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ultimate object would be reached, namely, to crove that it

was a§,ain the German obstinacy which was responsible for the
misery of the Jews; that merely for the act of making Germany

the scapegoat he was unable to recommend Rublee's plan, but
V

that he would pass the memorandum on to the competent office.
In this memorandum he states that his answer to the American

Ambassador was more placatory, but of the same tenor.

As stated, he was directed by Ribbentrop to make no

reply to the British memorandum,

British and Americans,

from time to time, attempted to renew the matter, but

WEIZSA3CKSR and WOERMANN put them off with vague promises. '
The defendants claim that finally, through their exclusive
efforts, Rublee was permitted to visit Berlin and engaged in
various conferences.

There can be no question whatsoever that here neither

WEIZSAECKER nor WOERMANN were in a position to control the

matter,

"^eir superior had given express orders as to the

nature of the conversation they might conduct with the for

eign representatives in question,

^hey derived, t^feir powers

only from and through him, and. they merely repeated his deci

sion.

They did not execute or implement a policy of wrong

doing.
WannsGw Conference and the Part Played by the Foreign Office.
The mass deportation of Jews to the East, which resulted in

the extermination of many millions of them, found its expres
sion in the celebrated Wannsee Conference of 20 January 194^.

The Foreign Office played an important part in these negotia
tions and in the actions thereafter taken to implrment and.

assist the program.

WEIZSAECKER or WOERMANN neither origi

nated. it, gave it enthusiastic support, nor in t^eir hearts

approved of it.

The question is whether they knew of the
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proi^ram anc' whether in 9ny p.ubstantial manner they
abcttea or Implemented it.

That both Ribbentrop ?.n^ Luther

did, there can be no possible question.
On 8 December 1941, a. memorgndum wap oropared by

Luther's Department "Deutsohland" in preparation for a con
ference with heydrich to set up the wishes and ideas of

Foreign Office concerning the "Total Solution" of the Jewish
question in Furope,

I'he document does not show on its face

that it was su^omltted to WEIZSASCKFR or WOERIMW and ordinar^

ily this woud indicate that it was not.

But on 4 December 1941 Luther prepared a memorandum
which wrs submitted to WEIZSAECKER and initlplled by him

regarding a proposal or suggestion made by Poroie-n Minister
Popoff of Bulgaria, on or about the 26th of J^ov.^mber of that

year, regarding Bulgaria's attitude toward deportation of
Bulgarian Jews, in which he suggested that the opportunity
rendered by the war must be utilized to settle finally the

Jewish question In Europe, and that the most practicable
method would be that all European states introduce G'erman

legislation on Jews and agree that Jews, regardless oftheir
nationality, should be subject to the mcasureb -...xen

country of roaidcnce, while their property would be at --vo
"disposal" of tbe final solution; that a half-way consistent
enactment of the German laws for.^^ws in European countries
would break the back of '-.ll elements hostile to Germany, and

particularly in Hungary; that whether the political situa
tion, in View of the inner resistance of Hungary, Italy and

Spain, ws already ripe for such a solution could not be
judged from the viewpoint of Department Deutsohland, and
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suggested that an agreement be reached between European
powers allied by the Anti-Comintern ^act that Jews of the
nationality of these countries are to fall under Jewish mea

sures of the country of their residence, an.^ that Jews of

Norway, Luxembourg, Serbian and Hussian nationality, includ

ing those of the former Baltic ^tates, would automatically
fall under the

settlement.

WEIZSAECKER considered the matter very urgent, and,
accorcing to his own testimony,

likewise submitted i t to the

Iwgal division for opinion.
*

On 23 December 1941 Albrecht of the Legal -division
(which was indubitably subordinate to WEIZSA^CKER) submitted

a memorandum which bears the legend, " Submitted to the ^tate

Secretary," and which refers to some of thv? issues raised, by
the Luther memorandum Just mentioned.

It is to be remembered

that the ^ivannsee Conference took place on 20 January 1942,
legal opinion expressed two possibilities:

(1)

'•^'hat the states which pursued Jpwls^ policies

similar to those of Germany agree on new bilnteral treaties not to use the rights ensuing

from the existing trade and residence tr'^atics
for the benefit of their Jewish citizens.

(2)

That the states in question also arrange a collec

tive treaty, providing that their Jewish citizens
in the territory of the other

"

parties

should be subject to their legislation on Jrws

without regard to existing regulations a.nd. trea
ties, but concluded th'-'t the suggestion of
Department Deutsc.hlr.nd to propose a collective
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treaty between the signatories of the Anti-

Comintern Pact might meet with the obstacle
that Italy, Spain and Hungary would not agree
at that time to be tied down by such an

approach to the Jewish question, and there

fore that the collective treaty must, for

the time being, be confined to tho sm'^ller

circle of such states as Slovalfia, Rumania,
Bulgaria, and possibly Croatia.

The opinion emphasizes the fact that a collective
treaty confining these states would not be an easy matter to
accomplish, largely because of difficulties w^ich bad arisen
primarily from economic conditions, and because the extent .

of the assets of Jewish citizens of the individual potential

parties to the collective treaty existing in the territories

of other treaty partners was bound to bo quite different, and
the potential partners would fear to suffer loss by denounc

ing, protection of the assets of their ^cwish citizens because

it might not be balanced by the assets of "^ewish citizens
resid.ing in their own territories,

"^ecause of these diffi

culties the legal department thought that the question could
be bettor solved by bilateral treaties.

It is to be observed,

that this solution of bilateral treaties of agreement was the

one which was actua.lly employed.

The defendant WEIZSAECKER suggests that the legal

department, "oresumably at his insistence, ^sought to delay
these deportations.

If so, it was not only inept but its

opinion is couched in language which is hardly reconcilable
to the objectives sought.

¥hqn one who seeks to kill a pro

ject gives one solution which it
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states

is

presently

impractical, and recommends another solution having the same
end and that solution is the one accepted, it is difficult to
see how such a technique is one of sabotage or delay.

It is

true that the opinion warns against G-erman action or that of

satellite countries against Jews who are citizens of coun

tries not parties to the agreement;'nevertheless the only
effect of this warning was to avoid foreign politic^^l diffi
culties which were patently inherent.

It is not without interest to note Luther's draft of

the ideas-and wishes of the Fort?ign Office, dated 8 December
1941.

They are:

(1)

Deportation to the East of all J^ws residing in
the Reich, including those living in Croatia,
Slovakia and Rumania.

(2)

Deportation of all Oerman Jews living in occu
pied territories, who had lost their citizen

ship and were then stateless, in accordance

with the Reich Citizenship Law,

(3)

Deportation of all Serbian Jews.

(4)

Deportation of the Jews handed over to Germany
by the Hungarian government.

(5)

A declaration to the Rumanian, ^lovakian,
Croatian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian governments

of G-erman readiness to deport to the East Jews
living in those countries.

(6)

Influencing the Bulgarian and Hunge.rlan govern
ments to issue laws similar to the Nurnberg
Laws.

('7)

To exert influence on the rGmaining European
gbvernments to issue laws conceriling JewSj and,

(8) Xhe execution of these ne asures as hitherto
in "voluntary cooperation" with the Gestapo.

Ihls program was adopted, and the puppet and satellite states,
In some instances reluctantly, entered into bilateral agree- ^
ments permitting Germany to deport their Jewish citizens to
the East,

Foreign Office exerted its influence and pres

sure to achieve these agreements.

On SO January 1942 the Wannsce Conference on the final

^

solution of the Jewish problem was held and, in addition to
Heydrioh, the defendant 3TUCKART, representing the Ministry

^

of Interior, Luther, representing the Foreign Office, and
Kritzinger, representing the Reich Chancellory, were present.
There also were representatives af the Government Generol,

the Reich Ministry of Justice, Commissioner of the Four ^ear
Plan, and the Ministry for the ^ocupird Eastern Territories.
Heydrioh addressed the meeting, reported his appointment by

Goering to serve as "Commissioner for the Rreparatlon of the
Final Solution of the European Jewish Problem," and. stated
that the problem of the conference was to clear up the fund?
mental problems; that the primary responsibility for the

^

administrp.tive handling of the final solution rested, in
Hlmmlcr, the Security Police and the SD, regardless of geo-

^

graphic boundaries. He reviewed the previous steps talcen
against the --ews and said that the early progrnm had emlgra-

^

tlon for its object, notvjithst^^nding certain inherent dis

advantages such as financial difficulties, lack of shlppli^g
space, emigration taxes, limitations of emigration and the
Xike — that, nevertheless, over JGOjOOO Jews had thus be^n
eliminated
and

?0,000

from
from

Germany,

and

the
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147,000

from Austria,

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, — that the financing of

this emigration was accomplished by requiring Jews or Jewish
political organizations to meet the bill and to provide, from
abroad the necessary foreign exchange and thnt the "gift's"

from foreign Jews up to 30 October 1941 amounted to approxi
mately $9,500,000, but the war had put a stop to this and
that the emigration program was to be replaced by the evacua
tion of the Jews to the ^ast in accord.ance with Hitler's
authorization, —

that these ^^ctions wer: to be regarded only

as a temporary substitute; that in the final solution of" the
•European

Jewish problem, approximately 11,000,000 Jews were

involved, of whom only 131,800 were in original Reich Terri
tory, 43,700 in Austria, and 74,200 in t^^e Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia,- —

that under the proper direction the

Jews should now be brought to the East in the course of the
final solution to be used as labor,

and th^t in utilizing

them in big gangs and. w ith s epor" tion of the sexes, —

that a

great part would fall out through natural diminution and the
remainder finally able to survive must be given treatment
accordingly because if permitted to go free

germ cell of new Jewish development;

they would be a

that i t was proposed

that the Porolgn 'Office should confer with competent special•k

ists of the Security Police and SD in handling the final solu

tion in the r^uropean areas occupied and influenced by
Germany; that in Slovakia and Croatia the problem was no

longer difficult, and ^umanla had likewise pppointed a Com
missioner for Jewish affairs, but,in Hungary, it would be
necessary, in the near future, to force upon that government

acceptance of an advisor on Jewish problems.

the question with regard to Italy and France.
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He discussed

Luther sai(^ there woulc^ "be some aifficulties In the
Northern countries ^.nd suggester' that the ev-'^cuption there

be postponea for the time being, but thnt the Forelem Office
s'^w no /'.ifficulties for the southeast ana west of Europe,

The conference then proceeaed to aiscuss the treatment

of Mischlings, i.e., persons who were of mixea blooa., A
first degree Mischling was one who had two Jewish grandpar
ents,

^ second degree Mischling w?.s one hs.ving only one

Jewish grandparent.

A first degree Mischling was considered

a Jew -subject to all of the mecasures onscted by the Third
Reich if he bc3pnged to a Jewish religious community then or
after the enactment of the Nurnberg Laws, or if he was mar

ried to a Jewish person at the time or after the enactment of
the Laws, or if he was the offspring of a marriage of s Jew
after the'enactment of those laws, or if he was an offspring

of a Jew and born out of wedlock after ?1 Jul^^ 19?6. Heydrlch
stated that a first degree Mischling w^is to be treated as a
Jew, so f"r as the fin^l solution was concerned, unless ho was

married to a person of Germon blood and had issue or had been

excepted or was accepted by the highest authorities of Party
and State.

Nevertheless, these first degree ^'^Ischllngs wore

to be sterilized (which sterilizations

would tnke place on a

voluntary basis) in order to prevent offspring.

A second degree Mischling was to be treated as a person
of German blood unless he was a bastard of parents both

Mischlings, or if hie appearance was unfavorable, i.e.,
looked like a Jew or if he hsd a bad police and political

record, showing theit he felt a.nd conducted himself like a Jew,

-267-

Hoffmann of the SS expressed the opinion that extensive
use must bo made of sterilization,

since the Mischlinp;, .when

confronted with the choice of evacuation or sterilization,

would

prefer the latter.

The defendant STUCKART stated that the -practical execu
tion discussed' for settling mixed marriages and the Hischling
problem would, entail an endless administrative tssk an^ recom
mended

that compulsory sterilization be undertaken,

Buehler of the C^overnment G-eneral welcomed the initia
tion of the final

solution for his district becsusc the

transport problem played no important part and the Jews had
to be removed and of approximately two an"^ nnc-half million
Jews there,

the ma.lority were unfit for work.

A second conference on the final solution was held on

6 March 1942.

This was attended by -^ademacher of Department

Deutschland of the Foreign Office, and ^eldscher of the

Ministry of the Interior, and Boley of the Reich Chancellory.
Also present were representatives of the.Goebbels' Minitry,

the Ministry of Justice, Ministry for the Eastern Territories,

the <arty Chancellory, the G-overnment G-eneral, Commissioner

,

for the Four ^ear Plan, and the ^^oce and Settlement Main
Office (RiiSHA).

Much of the meeting was taken uo with the question of
sterilization a.nd the dissolution

mixed marriages.

STUCKART'S representative, Feldscher, stated thst STUCKART'S
recommendation for sterilization W'^s intended only for tirst

degree Mischlings, It was agreed that sterilization' by law
expressly or explicitly was untenable and it/proposed, to make
legal provisions "to regulate the living conditions of Misch
lings, but doubt was expressed as to whether this would suf
was

fice as a legal basis.
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It was further agreed that even if sterilizations
were practicable, which, by reason of the expense,

the

shortage of doctors and hospital beds seemed impossible,
to permit these sterilized Mischlings to remain in the

Reich Was to raise constant administrative problems and

that compulsory sterilizations would not solve the

Mischling problem nor bring about administrative relief

I

but rather increase the difficulties, and that should

Hitler, nevertheless, for political reasons, consider
general compulsory sterilization suitable, first degree

Mischlings, even after sterilizations, must be brought
in one place in a special city similar to the present

treatment of the old Jews today ('^heresienstadt),
Following this conference, Rademacher, on 11 June
1942, submitted a resume' of the results of the confer

ence of 20 January 1942 and that of 6 March to the defen

dant WEIZSASCKER via Luther, G-aus and WOERMANN, evidently
transmitting also the letter of Schlegelberger, acting
Minister of Justice, who concurred in STUCKART'S idea
with regard to sterilizations and was against the depor

tation of half-Jews, and a copy of STUCKART'S letter of

16 March 1942 in which he point'^out both political and
social objections to deporting half-Jews and again referred
to the suggestion he made, that Mischlings of the first
degree not ^alread.y sterile be sterilized.

•269-

On 21 August 1942 Luther,reported to Hlhhentrop, giving
a review of the anti-Jewish measures and the proposals for
final solution.

It stated that Hitler intended to evacuate

all Jews from Europe and that this intention was known to him
as early as August 1940.

It continued with the detailed

statement of the steps which had been taken in other coun
tries such as ^rance, Netherlands and -Belgium, the orotests

made by foreign powers, including the United States, with

regard to the measures in France; it mentioned the Wannsee
Conference of 2Q January 1942, and stated "State Secretary
WEIZSAECKER had been informed on the conference" but that

Ribbentrop had not because Heydrich had intended to call a
later conference which was never held because of his appoint

ment as Reich Protector of Bohemia and. Moravia and his later

death — that Heydrich had agreed that in all questions con

cerning questions outside Germany the Foreign Office must be
first consulted.

It recited the inquiries made of Slovakia,

Croatia and Rumania with regard to their Jewish nationals liv

ing in Germany, and that this was done upon agreement with
"WEIZSAECKiLR, the State Secretary, ^and UOERI^ANM, the Undersec
retary of State, before the Instructions were dispatched to
the German Embassies in those countries.

It related the con

sent given by Rumania, Croatia and Slovakia,and that the RSHA
had been informed that Jewish nationals of those countries

could be deported and that the director of the political divi
sion and other divisions in the Foreign Office had co-signed the

dispatches;that the Legation at Pressburg had been instructed by
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the State Secretary VON WEt^SAEdJKER hrid WOERMANN, the Under
secretary of State, to ash the Slovak gpvernment to make

20,000 youhg, strong, Slovak Jews from Slovakia available for
deportation to the £iast and the favorable results from this

request which followed; that thereafter Himmler proposed that
the rest of the Slovakian Jews be deported to the East and

Slovakia freed of them, and the German Legation was provided

with proper instructions, the draft of which was signed by

WEIZSAECKER and after dispatch was submitted to the Ribbentrop
bureau and to TOERMANN; that difficulties had arisen because
the Slovakian Episcopacy had raised objections, but that
Minister President Tuka desired the removals continued and

asked for support through diplomatic pressure from the Reich,
and the Ambassador had been instructed to state to President

"^iso that the exclusion of the .*^5,000 Jews was a surprise to
Germany and more so since the cooperation of Slovakia, up to

that time, in the Jewish problem, had been highly appreciated

by Germany; that this instruction had been co-signed by
WOERMANN and WEIZSASCKER.
Luther reviews the situation in Croatia and the diffi

culties had with the Italians over the removal of L^oatian

Jews in their military area and that %'EIZSAECKER had ordered
the matter held up until inquiry could be made of the Embassy
in Rome,

He discusses the suggestion made by Popoff of Bulgaria
to Hipoentrop for the evacuation of Bulgarian Jews and other
Jews in Bulgaria, and the fact that WEIZSAECKER had asked for

the opinion of the legal division with respect to this matter;

that the ^erman Legation in Sofia had been instructed that if
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the question of deportation came from the Bulgarian sif^e a.s

to whether Germany was rea(3y to deport Bulgarian Jews to the
East, that it should be answered, in the affirmative but as

to the time it sliould be ajaswered evasively;' that "this w«^s

co-signed, by WEIZSASCKER and WOERMANN — that the Legation
had exchanged notes with the Bulgarian Ck)vernment and ordered
it to be prepared to sign an agreement as to the evacuation,
rie reviewed the situation in Hungary and. stated that the sta

tus of Hungarian legislation at that time did not promise a
sufficient success.

He related the steps which had been

taken in Humania and the difficulties which had arisen there,

Throughout this document he refers to telegrams and
/

communications originating in his department and we have
carefully checked these references to ascertain as fa.r as

possible their accuracy. Both WERKANN and ^aEIZSA^GKER
strenuously assert tha.t they never saw this report and that
the statements therein contained regarding t^eir cooperation
therewith are not true.

In rebuttal the Prosecution offered Exhibit .'^601, which

is a copy of the report, and has various markings in brown
pencil which, according to previous evidence, was the color

prescribed by Ribbentrop to be used, by .^EIZSAECKER.

ifhen

faced with this the defendant filed a surrebuttal affidavit

that this rule did not prevent these various colors being

used for other persons' purposes by other people, and. he had
come across many documents underlined or marked in colors,
including brown, which did not originate with the official to
v/hom the color had been assigned, and states that to the best
of his recollection Luther did not bring this evhtbit

}li-s atteation. His statement regarding the brown pencil is
contradicted by the affidavit of H^ns Schroeder.
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We believe that the defendant Is in error in his state
ment that he never saw this document, an(^ we have been able

to trace out many of the documents to which he refers in this

exhibit.

It is admitted that it was prepared by Luther for

the purpose of Justifying his activities to Ribbentrop, and
i t is unlikely that a document prepared with such evident

care would be submitted, and that reference^ would be made to

conferences and agreements with specified persons unless it

was substantially accurate,

^'he hazards of making such state

ments if not true would be such as to make even as reckless a
person as Luther hesitate,

'»ifO£RMANN insists 4;hnt Document 169 demonstrates that he

had no knowledge of the Wannsee Conference.

It discloses

that on 10 February 1942 Rademacher informed Bielfeld of the
Political j^ivision that the i%dagasoar Plan had been abandoned,
and that Hitler planned to deport the Jews to the East, where
upon

WOERMNN

inquired into the source from which the state

ment was d.erived.

On 24 February Rademacher wrote Luther, his chief,
requesting him to inform WOSRMANN of the conference had with

Heydrioh,

These documents establish that up to 24 February

WOERMANN had not known, or at least seen, the minutes of the

Wannsee Conference, and it is also clear thsJt he was to be
informed of, it by Luther, and in view of what he himself
terms the "importance of the decision," it is highly .unlikely

that if Luther did not voluntarily give full details he would
have, taken the necessary steps to ascertain precrisely what
hac taken placed

The question involved an entire change of

policy and involved foreign political problems of first

importance,

WOERMANN had -the right to know precisely what

was involved and to examine the minutes, and there can be no
doubt that IvEIZSAECKER would have given the necessary order
that they be produced had Luther refused to do so.

Unless we

are to believe that an Undersecretary of State was unable to
fulfill intelligently the functions of his office, we must
assume that his request for information was complied with and
that he actually obtained it.

.Both WEIZSAECKER and WERMANN

were advised and knew of the slaughter of the Jews by the

Einsatzgruppen in Roland, the Baltic States, and in the East,
and we do not believe that they thought these Jews had been

killed in action in connection with the fighting there, or
that several hundred thousand Jews thus murdered were killed

by reason bf either military operation or because of partici
pation in partisan fighting.

No man of even ordinary intelli

gence could have thought sn.
On 7 March 1942 Rademacher wrote a memorandum on the

conference of March 6th which, as he states, was to clarify

the general directives of the Wannsee Conference of 80 January
in which he describes that the proposal to sterilize the

70,000 first degree Misohlings had been found impracticable
because of war conditions and, therefore, it had been sugI

gested to postpone this action until after the war and, in
the meantime, to assemble these unfortunate oeople in a

single city either in G-ermany or the Government G-ener^l and
also that a simplified procedure for the deportation of

German Mlsphlings had been agreed upon.

This was submitted

to WOERMANN,

Klingenfuss of the Foreign Office submitted a memoran

dum of the conference

of 27 October 1942 .which he had attended.

wherein it is said that in view of the experience and know

ledge gained in the field of sterilizations and the develop
ment of a simpler form and shorter procedare, it is agreed
upon that first-degree Misohlings should be sterilized on a

"voluntary basis" as a prerequisite to their remaining in the
Reich:

that they would have the choice of deportation,

severe measure in comparison with sterilization,

a

and for this

reason sterilization was to be considered a gracious fevor.

On 31 May 1938 WSIZSAECKER wrote the Ministry of Econ

omics,

The Prosecution insists thpt WEIZSAECKER took part in

an attempt to subject Jews of foreign nationality to the

effects of the R gistratlon and Utilization Decree of 86

April 19^8 and those supplementary thereto.
contrary is true.

We think the

Rewrote the Ministry of Economics regard

ing protests made and to be apprehended from a number of for
eign nations, saying:
"In the meantime further inquiries here of
foreign representatives have confirmed us in the
opinion that indlscriminatory implementation of

the decree and its provisions in the case of
foreign nationals would have serious political
consequences disproportionate to any advantages

gained, especieilly if Jewish property subject to
compulsory registration should be used for the

G-erman economy in accordance with Article 7 of
the decree in question. The anti-G-erman propa
ganda campaign abroad which has been caused by

the decree would increase in vehemence and any
stratlon of property belonging to Jews

living abroad would bring grist to the mill of
those responsible for the campaign.

- Diplnmatic relations might tecorae strained,,
export might suffer even more, counter measures

against German oroperty abroad might perhaps be
taken in consequence, -^bove all, the oosalbllity
would hpve to be reckoned with that Britain,

America, and France particularly, in view of the
trade and. settlement agreements concluded with
those countries, will not submit without voicing
their objections to the treatment of their
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nationals of Jewish race in accordance with ^erman
laws contrary to those agreements,

"I can see no reason why foreign Jews should

be exempted completely from the orovisions of tbe
decree dated 26 April 1968, especially since the

decree stipulates^in principle that foreign Jews,

too, should, be subject to registration. I should,
however, like to make the following suggestions

designed to mitigate the effect of the probable
repercussions abroad:

n*

*With rega.rd to the use to be made later

of property liable to registration belonging to
foreign nationals, I suggest that no use be made
in principle of property belonging to foreigners

living abroad or in Germany."

This is not the language of a man who supported or

implemented a measure with which, by the way, he had no part
in drafting or enacting.

It clearly evidences not only dis—

a^'proval but is a carefully worded attack designed to point
out the dangers in it and his suggestion, or even an insis
tence, that in the field for which the Foreign Office was
competent it should not be applied.

It is to be noted, however, that its recommendations

are really limited to those foreign Jewish nationals of coun
tries which were likely to object, which we will discuss
later.

On 12 November 1938 C^oering called a conference to

w^ich WEIZSA^OKER was invited, but which WOSRMANN attoided in

his place. Exhibit 1441 constitutes the minutes of this con
ference. It arises out of the Crystal Neek riots in which
Jewish stores were smashed and looted, synagogues burned,

Jews beaten, murdered, or thrown into concentration camps.

These riots were organized by the Party. The conference dis
closed that there was an Intention to rob the Jews of their

property rights and there is even mention here of the final
solution" in the event of wa^J* with foreign powers.

/
/

There can he no question that H'OiLRblANN fully understood
what had been done and what was proposed and that he. informed
WEIZSAECKER about it.

Nevertheless, so far as his part.in

the conference is concerned, it is likewise clear that he

insisted that any action against ^ews of foreign nations was
a matter about which the Foreign Office must be consulted and

this, notwithstanding Goering's reluctance.

Neiti^er his

position nor that of WEXZSAECKSR was of such a character that
it could influence or control Goering or the other cabinet

officials who were present.

It is true that he reported to

•'^ibbentrop by telephone the results of the meeting and that
he had thus announced the position of the Foreign Office, and
also that "our starting point is that foreign nations are

only to be taken into consideration if the prevailing inter—
ests of the Reich compel us to do so."
Assuredly, this is not a stand which discloses any

decent, moral concepts, or any sympathy for the persecuted,
but,so far as his,acts or advice is concerned, he spoke in
behalf of those Jews over which his Ministry had .Jurisdic
tion.

On 25 January 1959 ^'Jlehl of the Foreie-n Office prepared

a memorandum which was sent to all Foreign Missions and Con
sulates.

It stages that the purpose of the 1958 legislation

was to ascertain the influence of Jewry through sn accurate

survey of the number of Jewish enterprises, the amount of

Jewish property, and to prevent Jews from increasing their pro
perty within the German economy, and to confisc=^te property
Jewish hands; that the setting up of registers and the threat

of public characterization of them as Jews had, as an aim, to

cause the Jews to dispose of their enterprises in a speedy way;

that by April 1938 the registrations showed that 155,750 Jews
, -277-

G-erman

nationality owned property valued at 7,000,000,000 "R}4;

9,567 foreign Jews owned property valued at 415,000,000
ana e,:'69 stateless Jews owned oroperty valued at 73,500,000
RI^,

and by these measures the expansion of the economic ^ife

of the Jews was prevented, and their elimination from economic
life initiated.

He then described the second group of measures insti

gated by the decree of 19 November 1938 which Increased the

number of activities forbidden to Jews.

As to "'^oreign Jews,

his report recited that the Ministry of Economics had, on 30
December 1938, directed Reich a£:encies to refrain provision
ally from foreclosures of retail business's and craftsmen's

workshops if owned by Jewish foreign nationals, but that an
inventory of these businesses should, be ordered and when car

ried out the Ministry of Economics would give further orders

as to how the cases were to be dealt with; that all ^erman
stateless Jew® were required to deposit their securities and

forbidden to sell them without approval of the German Ministry
of Economics; that Jewish sellers, instead of receiving the

payments fixed in the selling agreement, would be order-d to
receive Reich debentures, and that German economic life would
be oomnletcly dejudafled in the year 1939,

"The report concludes with the statement that the oro—

tepts of foreign countries with respect to the Jewish nation
als had not been met by a general assurance that their nation

als would not be sub.leoted to discriminatory treatment, but,

nevertheless, promises-had been made that individual cases
would be examined in the light of existing treaties.
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On 25 --"'•anuary

19.?9 Schaumberp* of the ^oreie:n Office, a

c'e'^ense witness, preparet^ a monograph entitled "The Jewish
QrUestion as a Factor in German Foreign Policy in IPr^S."

This

was distributed to all German diplomatic and consular repre

sentatives and discussed, among other things, the typical

hysteria of i'J'azi Germany towards the Jews,

It states that

the influence of Jewry on Austrian economy bad become so

great under the Schuschnigg regime that immediate measures
t

had to be

taken to exclude the Jews from the economy and

utilize Jewish

roperty in the Interest of the community;

that the reprisal acts adopted because of the von Rath murder

^

so accelerated this process that Jewish shops,with the exoep-.
tion of foreign businesses, had disappeared from the streets

completely, and that limitations of the Jewish wholesale and

manufacturing trades and of houses and real estate in the
hands of the Jews would reach a point where, in a conceivable

time, there would rlo longer be any talk of Jewish property
in Germany; that Germany was interested in the dispersal of
Jewry; the calculation that as a consequence boycott groups

and anti-German centers would be formed all over the world

,

disregards the fact, already apparent, that the influx of

^

Jews in all parts of the world invokes the opposition of the
native population and thereby forms the best propsganda for

the Gorman Jewish policy; that there is a visible increase in
anti-Semitism and that it must be the task of the German for-

^

eign policy to increase this wave; that expectations have
been confirmed that the criticism of anti-Jewish measures
would only be temporary and. would swing over the other way
the moment the population learned of the Jewish danger, and
that therefore the poorer and more burdensome the Jewish

immigrant is to the country absorbing him, the stronger the
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country will react; that the object of this action should

be the future international solution of the Jewish question
dictated not by false compassion for the united religious

Jev/ish minority, but by the full consciousness of all people

of the danger which it represents to the racial composition
of the nations.

It further suggests the advisability and

necessity of increasing this anti-Semitic feeling through
out the vijorld.

On 31 January 1939 Hitler spoke to the Keichstag, the

defendants WOERMN, MEISSHER, SCHVi/ERIN-KROSIGK, KEIPLER and
DIETRICH being present.

Hitler there said;

"I believe that this proDlem will De solved,
the sooner the better, for -^urope cannot rest again
before the Jewish problem has been eliminated.

"If international finance Jev/ry in and out
side Europe should succeed in plunging the peoples

of Europe into another v/orld war, then the result
will not be the BolsheVization of the world and

a victory for world Jewry, but the annihilation of
the Jewish race in Europe."
Those are not idle words, nor, in view of the brutal tac

tics which he had already adopted against opponents, both real

and fancied, could any of his listeners or readers have any
reason to deem them to be mere rhetorical froth.

He made

similar public announcements during the subsequent years.
On 30 October 1940 the Foreign Office received a memoran»

dum relating to the forced evacuation of the Jews from Raden

and the Saar, 7,400 in number, to Southern France.

J-he vic

tims were given only one half to two hours notice.

They were

allowed to take personal belongings up to 50 kilograms in
weight, and money varyinp- from 10 to 100 RM per person.

Old

people in homes for the aged v/ere included, even where it
was necessary to have them carried to the trains in stretchers.
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It was the then intention to have them shipped to ''^adpgapcpr.
•/JOERVANN received a cony of these reports, as did ^^EIZSAECKSR,

Ihe French objected an'^ informe<^ G-ermany that they *
could not receive these refugees because of lacV of food and
a.cco'Tj. ooa.tions.

I^ie -Armistice ^o.'Ti'''is9ion further renorted

that the G-erman authorities in Lorraine had given tha French
speaking inhabitants the choice of departine* for unoccuiDied

France or being tff'ansferred to ?oland., and t^ese pennle had

been falsely informed that this was in compliance with an
agreement between the Vicljy and '^erman ^ov-ernments.

"^he For

eign Offioe was also advised of G-eneral Stuelpnagel's request
for* directions as to what answer should be given the ^^rench.
On 21 November 1940 hademacher of •'-'epartment peutschland.

of the Foreign *^ffice wrote his chief, Luther, that in his

opinion Abetz, the G-erman -^.nbassador to the Vichy Government,
should,

-e instructed to tell the ^'rench to settle the matter

quietly and not mention it again in !fiesbaden (site of the

Arrfiistice Commission), and that the G-erman Comroission should,
tell the French that the matter would be settled in Paris.
On 22 November Hibbentrop's office gave instructions
via •''•21ZSAECKER and *vOSRM.4NN that the note of the French

should be treated, in a dilatory manner, and saying further,
"these persons are not to be readmitted, under any circum
stances."

Luther, on 25 November, asked. Kramarz, of Politi

cal Division 1, to instruct Hencko td inform General

Steulpnagcl of Hibbentrop's decision, and that the operation
was carried out with the approval of hitler.
On the same date, by WEIZSaECKLR'S order, '.vOEHIl.^N
prepared a memorandum for -t^ibbentrop's use in a conference

which the latter expected to hold with Laval of the Vichy
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Goverament.

It ^ealt with a number of suggestions, inclu'^ing

tbe transfer of the two French departments from the commana

of the ^lilitary Commandei "'iis^.&rus^els to the yilitary Commanrer in France, objections to the transfer of the site of the

Vichy o-Qvernment from Vichy to Versailles or ^aris, and t'^e
matter of the deportation of the Jews from ^^aden and t^e Saar
to Southern France.

With regard to this latter question,

WObRFIAKN says:

"Since the return of the Jews to ^aden cannot

take place, this question also fhouli^ not be ^Isoussed.

In any cose, here L^val sbouia be Informed

that further transports of this nature a.re not to

be expected,

which case,-however, the Heiohs-

fuehrer 53 is first to be consulted.

'•'EIZSASCKIR'S explanation is th=t when he Viea.rd of t>ie

transporta.tion of these Jews to France he flnst "^a.d t e feel

ing that theV might have a more lenient fate than f^ey would
have received, in Germany, and then t^e reoorts came in about
abuses they suffered in camos in the Pyrenees; that wv.en he
first heard about the transport to the East he th-uvht they

would be better off there than in the Pyrenees because if

they were used for labor they would be treated decently, but
it finally turned out that the Jews would, have been better
off in Prance anyhow and that with the modest means of
Foreign Office Influerloe within the scope of diplomatic pos
sibilities, he was not absolutely able to determine were the
lesser evil was and where he could best Interv

' OEPlAAI\NiS defense is that these measures were taken

without his knowledge and the decision that these unfortunate
people would not be permitted to return to 'ermany
alrra<?.y. been f'eclt^ec' by his guperlore»
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It is clear from the evidence that this brutal action

was initiated by the local G-auleiters, not only without the

knowledge of the Foreign O^ffioe, but without the knowledge of
the Ministry of the Interior.

No criminality, t^eretore, can

be charged against the defendants WEIZSA'ICKSR and 70SRMANN so

far as the initiation of this deportation is concerned,

"^he

I decision to refuse the French demand, that they be returned
was Ribbentrop'B.

Having neither originated nor implemented this crime,
they should be and are AC'^UITTiCD with respect to it,
The defendant WrJIZSA^CKHR has

referred to Exhibit 1688

as evidencing his efforts to sabotage, or at least minimize,

the effect of the anti-Jewish measures proposed in France,

•This correspondence started, in August 1940 by a communication
from Abetz, G-erman ambassador to the Vichy Government, in
which he requested ap^oroval to certain proposed anti—Jewish
, measures,

(1)

which were:

A ban on the re-immigration of Jews into the
occupied territory;

(2)

Registration of all Jews in the occupied por
tions of France;

(5)

Marking Jewish places of business; and,

(4)

Appointing of trustees for Jewish enterprises.

He ends with the statement:
"These measures can be explained by reason of

the fact that they lie within the interest of
security for the occupying forces and are to be
executed, by the French authorities,"

Luther asked the SS for an opinion and Heydrich
expressed no objection other than thp.t the measures should be
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carried out by the Security Police in conjunction with the
French. " Luther then wrote -"-betz and expressed

c

doubt as

to whether or not the opposite of the desired effect might

not result unless ideological preparations first "•"ooh Dlace,
and that i t would be desirable that the intended measures be

first carried out by the Vichy Government w^ich would then
haT^e to bear the responsibility in the event of failure.
On 9 October Schleier of the Embassy reported that the

Military Oomraander in France had issued the necessary regula
tions which applied to all Jews of whatever nationality, but
that the field offices had been directed to exempt American
Jews, and that a number of foreign nations had inquired as to
the effect upon their nationals.

Schleier asked for immed.iate

instructions and especially as to how foreign Jews in the
diplomatic and consular offices were to be treated.

On 12

December Rademacher, in a memorandum, stated that inquiry ha.d
been made of Abetz as to whether all these measures would

affect foreign Jewish diplomatic representatives and that the

latter had. replied that if Jews belong to the diplomatic corns

they were exempt, but if they were employees of diplomatic
representatives the contrary was true, and that the Sta'^e
•Secretary VEIZSAECXER, at a conference in the Foreign Of-Pice
Directors'

was in agreement with this ruliner, particu

larly since the diplomatic representatives concerned were
accredited to France and not to the German Reich.

Almost immediately thereafter (19 December 1940),
Riboentrop made a decision that the American notes of protest
against rffeasure's. affeeting- Jewaibf
if again submitted.
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should be answered by stating that the measures were a'^ooted

for reasons of security, and disapprove the G-erman Field Com

mander's Instructions to exempt American 'Jews from tbe apnlication of the ordinances,

and stated:

"It would be a mistake to reject the orotests

of frien<?ly na,tions, such as Spain and Hungary,
anr" to show weakness, on the other han(?, towards
America."

It is somewhat difficult to understand h'SIZSAlCKIR'3
claim that in this instance he had a'^ooted an attitude favor
ing the Jews,

What then did h'HIZSAliCKhR'S concurrence inAbetz'e sug

gestion actually amount to?

Without ouestinn, unless Germany

in 1940 desired or intended, to run t^'e ^rlsk

of p final

break of relations with the United States, it was bound to

accord to American diplomatic representatives the immunity to

which, under international law, they were entitled,
time, at least,

^t that

is would have been catastrophic from the

German political standpoint.

...i^IZSAlCK^R'S position is

merely a concurrence in the obvious.

But it is to be noted

that he did not either recognize or recomiend that It should
be extended 'to ^ewlsh employees of Anerlcan diplomptlo repre
sentatives.

doubtful..

^t is a decision w-^lch was, at best, exceedingly

Ee concurred in limiting d.ipl'^matiG immunity to

Jewish members of the diplomatic coros.

In addition, he

offered, as Justification a pure sophistry, namely, thst V-ese

diplomats were accredited to France and not +^0 Germany.
It has never been claimed by the defense that Germany
had annexed France or any part of it, other t^an Alsace—

LorrAlne.

It merely had military nossession of part of the

country; the Reich had never suggested that t^e nresence of
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foreign diplomats, in occupied ?r?nce was improper, nor had .it
asked for their r<^call.

The German embassy received and

answered Inquiries made by t^ese (diplomats with respect to
the treatment of their own ^Jewish nationals.

If these (docu

ments prove'anything, then it was the fact that at the time
the defendant '/viilZSAhCiCER was not attempting to help or miti
gate the conditions of the Jews,

so far as foreign nationals

were concernet?, but he was engaged in aggraveting their lot.
his then intentions been those which he now claims,

an(3

hacd he felt that any appeal to Rlbbentrop on humanitarian

grounds was useless, the way was open to him to h?ve used
the very avenue of approach to which, he comolains, he wa.e

sffi often compelled, namel^r,

to cell at'^ention to the fnot

that the proposed action was contrary to the Hague Convention
that it was extremel?'" doubtful whether Germany had the right

to abrogate the usual immunities to which the employees of

diplomatic representatives were entitled, and a.lso to Point

out the foreign political repercussions which would arise if

they were not exempted from the proposed measures. He did
nothing.

As early as 27 April 1937 the defendant VON ":::iZSASCKEH
laid down rules for the future handling of the •'Palestine

ques

tion:

'1.

A splittlng-up of world Jewry Is to be
p2;»^f0pr0d to the establishment of a
State in Palestine.

^2.

If German foreign policy should become
actively concerned with this Question,
direct pressure on t^e British mandatory
power would., at least for the present,
seem inadvisable.

"These rules, however, did not^orevent the
^'orelgn Office from informing the (domestic German

*

.

...tj

aeiencies of its attitude,

so thot in measures nf

domestic policy for ^ewis^" emigrption, considera
tion "s'^ould be riven to the ffct that Jewish emi
gration to Palestine should not be encouraged at
all cos1:s, but rather that their emigration to

any other place in the world is to be preferred.
*

and

*

*. "

: t' -

%

that

# •«'G-erman

authorities stationed abroad are

to be given instructions concerning the attitude
to be adopted by them towa.rds the Palestine ques•t*^
n
II
tion,

With respect to Luther's alleged independence of action,
the defendant V:LIZSALC.v:i-R testified that at the end of August

1942 ^iboentrop ordered Luther that in the event of further

steps concerning the d.eportatlon of Jews and similar matters,
it should, be brought to the attention of State Secretary
WRIZSAx^ClCLRj that up to that time the rule bed not been •

enforced.

Ke further says that in t^^is dreadful and tragic

Jewish question he had to let many things "pass t>^rough my
^ands UDon instruction from higher agencies that were oblectionp.ble to me.

I a-^ralt that."

On 11 August 1942 Luther prepared a me.morandum w^ioh
was -distributed to "'EIZSA/.CKJR,

and ERD'^ANN^DOR^F

relative to the discussions he had had with the Hune*.^rian

Minister regarding the treatment of Hungarian Jews in France,
an" the Minister's protest against this Action,

On 6 October 1942 Luther again reported a conference

with the Hungarian Minister about Hungarian Jews in the terri

tories occupied by Ogrman troops, hiungarian Jews in the Reich,
and the evfcuation of all Jews from Hungary Itself, ^-la was
sent to Ribbentrop via XLIZSApCK;.R and was distributed to and.
initialled by VOLRi^iANK,

On 14 October 1942 WKIZSAi^GKLR himself received the

Hungarian Minister and dlsouseed the Jewish problem with hi.m
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ann reminc^ed him of Ribjentrop s comment thpt the recent air

rai<^ s on ^^adapest were evidence that the Jews there contri-^^

buted to spreading panic and that the G-erman I^inister at
Budapest would have carried out his instructions regarding

the ^ewish oroblem before the Hungarian Minister arrived
there.

^ copy of this went to "^OSRMANN and at the bottom

appears a note to make sure that the G-erman Minister called

on the Hungarian foreign Minister as per his instructions

prior to •^ztoja.y's

arrival.

On 9 March 1942 Eichmann of the SS v/rote the Foreign

Office that it was intended to
French and stateless •'^ews

deport to Auschwitz 1,000

who had been arrested in France in

1941, asking if there was any objection.

On 11 March the S3 again wrote the Foreign Office that
it was • esired to include 5,000 more Jews from France. On

the same c.ay Luther wiredL the German Embassy in -^aris, for

warding the reciuest and asking for comment, and ^aris replied
"No objection."

On 20 March Rademaoher, by order, informed the SS that

the Foreign Office had no objections to these

being '-•Reporter.

Jews

%ls was initialled by WOERiyU^N and

kXIZSAECKER, and contains the letter's comment; "To be
selected by the police."

There remains no shadow of '^oubt that both ^^OjiRMANN and
VrfXXZSAEGK-.R were informed of this nefarious plan and that it

received their official approval,

-^here is nothine- in the

record to show that they questioned its propriety, objected

to or protested against it or availed themselves of the
opportunity to suggest to Rib:entrop that even from the view
point

of

German

foreign

policy
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its

execution

would

be a catastrophic mistake in that it woul(?. not only alienate

public sentiment in France, but would arouse a wave of horror

ano resentment throughout the world.

i^'either claims that

there f-as any legal justification for this c'eportation or

suggests it was other than a flagrant violation of Interna

tional law and of the provisions of the ^ague Convention.
•fOZ]Rl^:ANN' S excuse is that he was not able to do any

thing and that his oo-signature meant t>^at ^-^e saw no valid
no lAtical r ea'='on vrhich could be urged against it and that the

reason that the Foreign Office communication was signed by

the ^ta^e Secretary and. by two other State Secretaries, inclu
ding himself, was that it was an Impor't'ant matter.

However,

his own witness, hehraann, an old civil servant in tVie Forelen

Office, called as an expert on •foreign
not Dear him out.

Office practice, does

He testified, somewhat reluctantly, that

w^'.en a Foreign Office official initia.lled a draft he thereby
outwardly approved it, even though he may have had mental
reservations as to its propriety,
,

'%e defendant WOERi'^ANN knew that there were cogent rea

sons of a political nature why the measure should be dis
approved; he knew that it was in violation of every principle

of international law and in direct contradiction of the Hae-ue
Conventi-^n.

bElZSA-;CKliR asserts that this occurred at a time of

repeated attemp^-ed attacks on members of the WeVirmaoht and

Hitler had ordered frequent shootings of hostages in France;
that these Jews were already Interned and were in danger,

and one could very easily come to the conclusion that t^e
deportations to t'-e East mierht Involve less '^'anger to them
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than remaining where they were; that the name Auschwitz c'id
not mean anything to anybody at that time.

He '^oes not state

that this Was, in fact, his reason for not ob.lectirg, but

that it was probably his reason.

He further asserts that the

Foreign Office did not instigate or execute these measures

and its point of view or opinion could not prevent them.

Ihe

latter contention, however, is hardly tenable, in view of the
fact thot Hichmann of the SS made specific inquiries as to
whether the Foreign Office had objections,

tvhile we are ready and anxious to accord to every defen

dant the benefit of any reasonable doubt, to v^^-ich he may be
entitled, it is difficult to find any such doubt here, even

though we assume that neither defendant, at that hime, had

knowledge that Auschwitz was a death camp.

Nevertheless they

knew and were well informed of the fate of any Jew who came
Into the tender hands of the SS and ^estspo; they ^new -rfhat

had been the fate of the Jews of Poland and the Baltic States
an'' Russia; they knew what had been the horrible fete of
G-erman ^ews.

While admitting that many things Pessed over his desk
and received his initials of ppproval as to which ^e harbored,
mentel reservations and objections, he states he remained, in
office for two reasons: first, that he might t ereby continue
to be, at least a cohesive factor in the underground opposi
tion to Hitler by occupying en important listening post,

maintaining members of the oppoBitlon in strategic PositlcJns,
distributing information between opposition groups in the
Vehrm^cht, t.he ve rious governmental repertments, and in civil

life; and, second, that he might be in a position to initiste

or aid in attempts to nea-otlate peace.

"^e believe him, but
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this, while it nipy arn^ shoulf^ he cnnsl'^.ered In mitigation,
cannot constitute

a defense tQ charges of War Crimes or

Crimes against Humanity.

One cannot give consent to or

Implement the commission of murder because by so i^oing he

hopes eventually to be able to rid society of the chief
murderer,

Ihe first is a crime of imminent actuality while

the second is but a future hope.

When the SS Inquired whether the Foreign Office

!

had any objections, it was the defendant's duty to point them
out.

That is the function of a Political Department and a

State secretary of a Foreign Office,

^

by saying or doing nothing.

It is not performed

Even the defendant's witness,

Schlabrendorff, himself an active leader in the resistance

movement, and a participant in the plot of 20 July 1944,

testified that being a member of that movement t^id not Justify
one in becoming a party to the program of the murder of
Jews.

As to these and like Instances, we find the defen

dants WEXZSAECKER and WOERMANN GUILTY.

On 28 August 1942 a conference was held m the Office
of the RSHA at which were outlined the plans for the im-

I
c

mediate evacuation of Jews from occupied and foreign coun
tries to Auschwitz, in which it was said that only stateless

Jews could be deported for the time being, in view of foreign

protests, and that with regard to the foreign Jews, negotia

tions were still in progress with the Foreign office and
had not yet been concluded; that under no circumstances was
it desirable to repatriate foreign Jews to their country
and the request of Switzerland for the return of Swiss Jews
could not be granted.
It Was not criminal for the defendants WEIZ3AECKER or

WOERMANN to have been present at or to have received minutes
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of t'-is meeting.

But on 24 September 1942 Luther wrote

T^SIZSA^CiLR that Hibbentroo ha^ given instructions tn hurry

as much as oossiole t^e evacuation of Jews from the various
countries of ^-urope and that orders had been eriven to contact

the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Henmarh, w^ith the
object of starting the evacuation from those countries; that
with rfspect to Italy, Ribbentrop had reserved this for him
self and it would be discussed either between Hitler and
Mussolini or between Ribbentrop and Giano.
Luther stated:

"All steps tphen by us will be submitted to
you at the time for your approval."
A copy of this communication went to VORHMANN.
On 20 ^ctober 1942 WK'iZSAbCKjjft wrote to Ribbentrop,

with copy to h^OSRI^lANN an^ to Luther, that he had a^Ved the

Hungarian Minister, on his return from Hungary, to report on
what the people of Buc^apest thought of the G-erman oro^-osals
concerning the treatment of Jews. He also reportea on t^e

same date t'e result of a conversation which he

had with

the Hungarian Minister in which he stated!
"The way Hungary treated tbe
problem
has, so f'r,^not been in accorc'^nce with our
principles,"

On 6 October Luther reportea to Ribbentrop, through.
WLXZSA-.CLLR (It was initialled by him), regarding a confer
ence which he haa had. with the ^^ungarian Minister, in w.. ich

he haa informed Sztojay that nungary was either to take oack
its Jews or permit Germany to aeport them to the East, that
the latter had, in an attempt to avoid the matter, inquired
whether Italy had agreed to like measures an^ was assured
that it had;

that

Luther then brought
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up the matter

of a settlement of the Jev/ish j^roblem in Hungary v/hich the

Hungarian Minister attempted to avoid by the same technique.
It was tbis memorandum v;hich led to ViiEIZSAECTCER'S conference
heretofore

mentioned.

The actual deportation of Hungarian Jews did not com
mence until the late spring of 1944 and ViEIZSAECKEK took his
post as Ambassador to the Vatican in May 1943, so he had no

further connection with the Hungarian-Jewish question.

^*hile

there can be no doubt that his conference with the Hungarian

Minister in fall of 1942 was designed to^implement Jewish
persecution and deportation, it v/as abortive and the
Hungarians could not be induced or compelled to adopt the

German anti-Jewish campaign vintil, in 1944, the German troops
marched in, VEFSENMYER took up his duties as German Minister
and tienii-otentiary, overthrew the ivalxay Caoinet, put in
German puppets who cooperated in the concentration of and
deportation of the Jews.

•EIZSA'^C-^EE'S connection wit^ t^ese deportations is so

slight and insignificant that we ACQRIT him with respect
thereto.

Holland and Belgium.

That both hEIZSAEGHEK and Vi/OEIlMANN had

knov^ledge of tie deportation and subsequent death of Dutch

Jews deported to the rLeicii is beyond doubt.

do we find

that either took any action or made any objection to the use

lessly cruel procedure.

Sweden, as the Protecting Power for

Holland, called attention to the fact that of 600 Dutch Jews
deported from Amsterdam to Mauthausen, 400 had died and it

appeared from the list that deaths occurred on specified days
tnat tne prisoners in question were nearly all younger
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men; that the Swedish legation had repeatedly applied to the
Foreign Office for permission to visit Dutch Jews in the
camps which applications had "been refused.

Luther, in writing to the HSKA, recommended ti-at when
deaths occurred it should never appear that they occurred on

fixed days.

It is significant th^t WOERMANN, in reporting to

t-;EISSAEC?:ER and Ribhentrop regarding the report eriven to him
by Minister Bene at the Hague, stated:
"As to results of the slaying of a MA man

I,

bv an unidentified Jewish assassin, 400 Jews
. .have been brought from the Netherlands to

-•

are iiOERMANN ' S) •.

/

Oermany to 'work here,'"

(The quotation marks

On 28 June 1942 Eichmann of the SS wrote Rsdemacher of

the "-'oreign Office that provisions had been made to run daily

^

trains, with a capacity of 1,000 persons each, starting in the
middle of July, in order to deport to Auschwitz 40,000 Je:«;s
from occupied French territory, 400,000 from the Netherlands,

and 10,000 from -:'elgium. I^his was to Include able-bodied
Jews not living in mixed marriages or not citizens of the
Brltis?- Empire, the United States, ^^^exlco, tv^e enemy states

of Central South America, or of neutral and .allied states.

"

He requested that note be made of the proposals and asking if
there w-^r-r any objections against the matter on the part of

R

the Foreign Office.

On 28 June Luther wired the Embassy in Paris, the

Foreign Office representative at Brussels and Bene, transmit-.
ting the i^ichmann message a,nd_ requesting an earl, reply.
i

This was subnltted to WEIZSA^CKER and dCERi-eANN and Section
POL II before d.ispatch.

On 2 July Abetz replied that there was no ob.jpotion providlng the measure was carried out in such a manner as to add

to

the

anti-Semitic

sentiment,
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but

that

it

should

be first applied to foreign ^ews and to French Jews onlj^ if
there were not sufficient foreign Jews to fill the quota.
(

On

I

10 July Luther wired ^betz it was not possible to give prior

ity in

eoortation to foreign '^ews; that further orders relat

ing to expulsion of foreign Jews were oent^ing; that t^e evacu
ation proposed was to be carried out vjithout <^6lay.
On or about the IJth of July, Bene, at the Hague,

reported that the first two trains, each contpining 1,080
Jews, had left, and that the R3HA had sugp-ested that tvie

deported Jews should be deprived of DutdK nationality in
order to avoid intervention by Sweden, the Protective Power,
— that as a result of a conference held that day, the Reich

GoJi.t.issioner was prepared to issue a decree depriving Dutch
Jews of Dutch nationality on the ground that all Jews are

enemies of '^ermany and if no objections were raised by the

Foreign i^ffioe this deprivation of Dutch nationality would
then apply to all Jews of Dutch nationality and not only to
those who had. been d.eported, and Aesked for the Foreign Office
opinion.

On 80 July Rademacher submitted a memorandum to
V.'LIZSALCKLR and WOLRMNN with the request for Instructi-^ns,

suggesting thet Bene' s proposal seemed, too fer-reaching, but
the D-III of Department Deutschland considered it ^edrable
L

tviat Dutch legislation concerning Jews be a'^ justed to tViat of
the Reich so that Immediately all Dutch Jews resident abroad,

or who had transferred

residence sbroad, would lose

their nationality as ^ad German Jews under the ssme clrcum-

etances through the Citizenship Law of S5 November 1941,
On 89 July Luther submitted 'to ^'SIZSALGICLR and ^^OERl'i/VNN
a draft of a letter to iilchmann that the Foreign Office had
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no objeotion, in principle, to the deportation, but in view

of thd psycholo0'ical effect, requested that first stateless
Jews be ceported, thus including a large number of foreign

Jews w" o had emigrated to the West, of whom there were neprly
£5,000 in the Netherlands, and that for the same reasons

-orus^s would first select only Polish, G?ech, ^us'^lan and
other Jews, but that Jews of hungarian and Rumanian nation—
'

alities could be deported but thbir property must be secured
in

^

each case.

D-III prepared a second memorandum conccrnlne- Bene 's
proposal that aH Dutch Jews be deprived of Dutch natlonfllity,
stating t^at it was irrelevant whether Jews ^ad left t^^e

country voluntarily or by deportation, and t>^.at w^ere Jews
wer

deported to Eastern territories not lncorpora"^ed into

the Reich, the Protective Power was as little competent as

to those areas and territories as it was in the i^'etherlands

— that frequent !ly it could not be determined whether resi
dence outside the country was due to voluntary emigration or

deportation and, on principle, no information whatsoever
would be given to the outside world by the police regarding

*'

persons who had been deported to iiiastern territories, and
thus visits to the camps, etc., were absolu+^ely prohibited;

»

that the deportations from the Netherlands were proceeding
without incident, and the Christian Jews were being interned
temporarily in Holland itself.

WEIZSAECKER submitted this memorandum to the legal divi

sion for .opinion, w'^i ch was render" d on 51 Julv 194£, and
called attention to the fsct that Sv/eden was still "f^scoe-nized
as the Protective Power for t^e Netherlands because If
her

functions

were

withdrawn,
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the

Dutch

a.uthorities

in Dutch colonies wouia cesse to ••:'Ccognize

Switzerland as

Protective ^ovjer for G-ermans residing in those places.

He

pointed out that Sweden's authority related to the G-erman
Reich and the occupied territories, and not to Holland dir

ectly, and therefore the Foreign Office had repeatedly sug

gested that, in case internment measur's were taken against
Dutch citizens, they should be undertaken in Holland, in order
9

. to prevent the Swedish delegation from requesting permission
to visit the internees; that if Jews were deported from
Holland it could be assumed that international Jewish circles

I

would endeavor to persuade Bweden to intervene on behalf of
these Jews and Germany could not reject such attempts on the

V

ground that the Jews had been deprived of Dutch oltizenshin
by German authority; therefore the regulations suggested by
B^ne would not achieve their purpose.

The opinion called attention to the fact that after
several hundred Dutch Jews had been taken to Mauthausen the
Police had turned down Sweden's request to inspect the camp

but had currently forwarded death oertificptes to the rela
tives of those Jews in the Netherlands, from which it could
i

, be seen that "gradually" all had died; th,at if the deoorta-

1

tion of Dutch Jews was to be carried out, it would be neces-

U

sary to determine whether the police should continue to fur

nish interested parties with material from wioh they could

^

authentically determine the result of the measures taken,

that as long as Jewish internees were present in Mauthausen,
the Swe'^ish delegation made renewed requests to visit the
camp whenever further death certificates arrived, and If

the deportation, of Dutch Jews was unavoidable, it would be

expedient if the police would not allow any information to
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leak out

with regard to the wbereabouts or, In po«!«ible

oases of death —

and It would be oresumably -ooscible to turn

down Sweden's request to visit the oamp but in tViat event it

would be impossible to avoid the risk that .Germans in "Dutch

colonies might experience worse treatment because of the mea

sures "aken against Dutch Jews.
referred this matter, on 1 August, to

Department Deutschland for final opinion, and on 10 August
it reported to v;x.ISSA:.CiCmR-and

that it adhered, to

the oroposals which had been mad.e on 20 July, whereupon
VvRIZS^i^Chi^R recommended that cene be asked if the matter was

still of importance and that the Ptasons stated by him at the
time were not sufficient for the measures planned, and there

fore they could be -foregone altogether if no new motives v^ere
available.

It may we H he, and we think if likely, that
MjlZSAICK^R'S request for the legality of the ooeration was

designed to hamper and, if possible, to orevcnt t^ese deporta
tion measures, at least so far as Jews of Dutch nationality

were concerned.

It is significant, however, that

no sugges

tion is made as to the illegality or impropriety of the depor

tation of foreign ^ews living in Holland and that the opinion
of the legal department suggests the means whereby, if depor
tations were carried out, Sweden, as the Protective Power,
would be unable to exercise its functions.

No explanation is

offered by the defendants hlilZSAiCCKAR or WOPRF-ANN as to why
these offensive suggestions were not eliminated from the legal
division's opinion.

Nevertheless, the opinion served to orevcnt the pro
posed decree from being enacted, so we therefore hold that
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neither '.'ElSSA^CKxiiR nor TOijRKANN can be held criminally lia
ble with respect to this incident.

On 17 December 194S the Swedish I^inister enf^eayored

to

open a conversation with h'DlZSAllCKi^R on the matter of

Sweden's willingness to accept Norwegian «^ews; and wp.s
informed by him that he would not enter into any official

discussion on the subject; and if the ^edish Minister was

J

commissioned by his government to transmit this information,
v."i:iIZS.-.i:jCKAR would, predict failure from the outset,

I

technically "^weden had no legal right to intervene, and
undoubtedly itrjlZSA^CKbR'S prediction of failure in the event
it did so was accurate.

other than he did.

Here he owed no official duty to do

We must,

therefore, exonerate him with

respect thereto.

I'riiZSAxjCKijR and 'JOhRI^iANN in France,

On 15 September 1941

Rpd.emacher reported to '.CZIZSAICKLZR, with request for direc

tions, the request of the bv,Tedla^ Legation in France, acting
as G-ermany's Protecting Power, for the issuance of •Dasaocrts,
j

olioe certificates, birth, marriage and dea.th certificates

and other identification oapers for German Jews interned In
unoccunled France so that the individuals involved could emi

grate abroad.

Radema.cher states that in agreement with the

Ministry of the Interior and the Chief of the Security Police,

it was determined that the emigration was undesirable as it

vjould thereby d.ecrease the already small chare e, in view of

foreign immigration quotas, to get passage abroad for Reich
Jews; that Department Deutsohland intended to request the

Swedish Legg^-^ion, as representative to *lermany, to refrain
from accepting more applications of German Jevjs living in
unoccupied France,
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TO,
:

On 19 September 1941 he reported that in accordance
with directions he had consulted Albrecht concerning this

matter, Virho proposed that no decision be taken at the time
but that it be treated dilatorily and then resubmitted in
four weeks because in the meantime it vjas likely that Grerman
Consulates would be installed in the wnoxe ol irance, in
vrhich case Svjeden's functions as the trotective tower
become

w^uld

ineffectual.

kll this occurre'^ before t^e a-^option of a definite

program of deportation of Jews to the East and the Reich was

1

still toying with the idea of forcing, all Reich Jev;s to emi

grate.

Ihe discrimination here is only between Jews of

German nationality residing in Germany and Jevv^s of German

nationality residing in trance.

We find no criminality in

this transaction.

On 30 October 1941 Schleier of the Embassy in taris

req^iested directions from the Foreign Office regarding the

f

disposition to be made of foreign Jews v;ho had been arrested
by the military commanders in x^rance in connection vJith

alleged participation in uornmonist and de -^aaliisi: plots xor
the assassination oi' wehruiacht members,

r^e states tnat for

eign consulates bad req^''estod the Embassy to assist in ] aving
their Jewish nationals so arrested, freed,

REIZSAECREii, on 1 November, answered, statins that

there vi/ere no objections against the arrest of Jews of

European nationality and no diplomatic complications were
expected, but tie arrest of Jews of American nationality
created a dangerous situation and it must be expected with
certainty that the North American government, as well as
those of the Spanish-American states v/ould make these
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1
arrests the object of diploraatio intervention, and if
G-ernany refused to release Jev.'s of ""Bierican nationality, it

yras to be expected that the governi.ents affeotQ<-^ v;ould take
retaliatory neasures agoinst ^"-eich citizens , ana thereby

Gor; any could get the o'orst of it; that it v^as intended to
instruct the -embassy in laris to request the reilitary corx.ander and the d:_ief of the SD to release •'haericen ^ev/s provided

they were not liable to crininal prosecution.

Ribbentrop approved this suggestion,

VJlZSi-i.20KW. fur-

ther stated that it should be considered as a Liatter of pre-

caution, ^nd it night be v/ell, to expel all de^.^'s vho were
•anerican

^

citizens fron occupied territories in order to elin-

inate friction,

'do this Ribbentrop. said ''Ro.'"

It was, of

course, as nuch a breach of international law to arrest ^ews
of European nationality as it was those of •'huericcin nation•. lity, and the reasons •i./hich

gave for exen;pting

anerican iTevjs from unlawful arrest are not based on any high

f

moral plane.

Koyrever, we are interested in vjhat he advised

and not the reasons he gave, and we do not overlook th^e fact

^

that he v^as not addressing his recomnendations to a nan who
had any conception of international or other morals.

*"'e do

not believe in this instance *r3l2SAjCEl® w^as subject to any

criticism.

He prob..bly v-ient as far as he thought i/vas practl-

cr.ble,

19 May 1942 TojilPii.l'N, on orders from hlZSAiilGKiiE to
settle with ^Jepartment -^eutsohland the question of whether
American and Hritlsh Jev/s in trance should be exempted from

anti-Jewish neasures v/hioh v-zere being taken there, reported
that he had come to the conclusion that they should not be

given any preferential treatment, and called attention to the
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fact that Bene had reported that in Holland all foreign Jews,

had been exempted; that he thought it expedient that a uni
form policy should be followed in all occupied countries.

E©

recommended that Abetz be requested to give his opinion as to

the possibility of Inducing t^ French government to' issue a

simultaneous, adequate decree for both unoccupied and occupied
France. It is quite apparent from this document that WOERtlANK
was making no attempt to accord to British and American Jews

tho rights to which they were entitled under International
Lavj •

Italy, On 24 July 1942 Luther prepared notes for a report on
the deportation of Jews. This was submitted to VffilZS/LECKER,
who initialled it,

Luther states that Ambassador Abetz had

expressed disappointment that all foreign Jews had not been
evacuated from France, and that, if this could not be done at

once, at least the Italians should be induced to call their
Jews back from France, or at least agree to their evacmtion

i

to the East.

Luther suggested that the Italian government be

approached on the subject,

On 27 November VffilZSAECKER and \?^OERMANN co-si.gned with

Luther a telegrams sent to the Embassy at Rome directing that

the suggestion be made to the Italian government that, if it
could not consent to the application to its own Jews in

^

Prance of the measures proposed, it withdraw them from that

country by the end of that year. The instruction was carried
«

out and the matter was tai® n up on several occasions with the
Italian government.

Luther had complained that the attitude of the Italians
tovmrd

the

Jewish

question

was

entirely unsatisfactory.
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•

and that it interfered abroad on behalf of Italian Jews;
that a clear solution of this problem must be had because

it vjas impossible that, in Germany and areas controlled by
it, the Italian attitude should be followed or permitted,

and suggested a strong note be sent to Italy on the subject.
Thereafter Ribbentrop instructed the German Ambassador

in Rome to inform Foreign Minister Ciano that as a special
favor Italian Jevi/s could remain in German controlled terri

tories only until 31 March 1943, after vhich Germany reserved
the right of free action a^-ainst all Jews In Reich occupied

territories, and Italian Jev;s could not be excepted.
Luther ordered the Paris Embassy to instruct the mili

tary commander In France that in negotiating with the
Italian commander to state that cooperation was absolutely

necessary, and that Germany was surprised to learn from the
Vichy Government that the Italian Armistice Commission had

made protests against the order.

Both l/VEIZSAECKER and V/OER-

MANN saw and initialled these instructions before they were
dispat ched,

In February 1943 the Foreign Office instructed its
Ambassador at Rome to endeavor to persuade the Italian
government not to recognize as lull-fledged Italian citi
zens those Jews who had obtained citizenship after a certain
deadline; that the Italians should revoke citizenship granted

to Jews \h 0 were not residing in territories.under Italian
sovereignty at the time of Italy^s entrance Into the war.
This was submitted to and initialled by

patch.

before dis

It is quite apparent from the documents that Italy,

while free v/ith promises, failed to fulfill them.
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V^hile i t is nlear that "both XhlZSAhCKER and

participated in this mat"^er, the recor<? dees liot disclose
that their efforts Bver reached fruition,
was consumniated.
are

or that the crime

Under these circumstances they must be and

exonerated.

Croatia,

In October 1941 Rfeidemacher requested UEIZSAECKEH

to decide whether Slovaklan and Croatian Jews could be
included in the deportations to the East, and sta'^cd t^a"^, in

his opinion, no objections would be raised hr cause t^e
Slovakian and Croatian states >-'ad tv^emselves te>en measures
of extremely severe

nature against Jews, but it wps suerarested

that, as a matter of diplomatic courtesy,

the governments In

.question should be informed and strong suggestions made t^at

they recall their Jewish nationals from Germany or that they

permit Germany to deport them to the East;
Ui^jlZSA^CKiuR'and '•OEhJ^ilNU

initialled this, and the lega

tions in Pressburg, Agram and. Bucharest were so advised.

It

is clear that "..i^IZS--iiL.CK^R at least must have ap-jroved

Re^demacher'E suggestion.

However, there could be no crime in

giving those countries an opportunity to repatriate their
Jews .and a failure to have done so would have been criminal.

Here, therefore, ''j:jIZSA-.CK_^H and UCE:R:/iANM did precisely w^at
should have been done, namely, left some o'^eniner for tViese

Jews to e scape deportation to the East.
•Exhibit 1715 an-^ the docum-^nts following relate to

German efforts to deport all Croatian "^ews and recite the
difficulties encountered by the unwillinerness of ti-e It.^tlians
to cooperate.

Kasche, German Vlnister, and the <3=5 proposed

to arre'^t Jev^s even in "territories occupied by Italian t^-ooos
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but '.^jiilZarxECKER insisted on waltinK until the G-erman Ambassa
dor in Borne could be heard from.

The matter was delayed over

a considerable period and the -i-talians played a double

me of

agreeing in Borne that their troops would cooperate but, in

the field, failing to give such cooperation*
After a long lapse some, but not complete,

success was

achieved but we find nothing in the record to Indicate t^.at
mjXZS.-w-jC*ujB or

aided the campaign and., in f^ct,

there arc strong ind.ioaticns that tend to shovj the oppositei

^is Was a matter in which not only Hlmmler and the gg, but
also Rlbbentrop and Hitler, took a direct interest and Partj
Inasmuch as bZIZSAECKBR and 'j^OiiRI'fiANN did. not substantial.ly
participate in the matter they should be and are c-^roneratdd
with respect thereto.

Serbia.

V.hlle hEIZSAECIGi-R and AOERI^ANM were informed q-p t^ie

proposals to shoot all male Serbian Jews and to assemble the
women, old peoole and children in loca 1 concentr='tion camps

and the desire nf uenzler and the defendant VE£gEI":AXER to

make a quick, draconic disposition of tho'^erbian Jews, it is
certain that ..i..IZSA£iGKBH endeavored to keep clear of this mat
ter.

He declared that because of the Hitler Order the

Foreign Office was competent to deal with the deportation of
-V

Serbian 'Jews to other countries, but that neither Benzler nor

jT

the Foreign Office had any competency to take an active part
in the manner In which the competent military and internal

authorities "'"ackled the JevJlsh problem within tho' boardories

of Serbia; that t^oBe agencies received t'^eir ln<struotlons
from other sources rather than the Foreign Office, be so
advised Benzler.

•505-

To this Luther (^isagree(?, cplling attention •'^o

the

fact that he ha.(? been authorized by Ribhentrop to diccuss

matter with heydrich, but by t^is time it appeared t^«t tVie
military authorities in Serbia had shot the Jews in ouestion
and thus the matter had been settled, and ^OIZSA^CKLR said he

w,as no longer interested in issuing any directions to Benzler.
Under these facts neither w£ilZSA_iCXLR nor

can be

held guilty of :.articipation in t^e crimes in question, and
as to them they should be and are exonerated.
Bulgaria.

The evidence does not disclose that ^f£IZS.^C7.SR or

WOEiUyBiliw took any part in the d.eportations from BuI^^bei^,,

other than Luther's report which contains the sta ement that
♦

the legation at Sofia was instructed by a note signed by

'VEIZS--iLCii^R, TvOxaRHANN and ERD1>JINNSDCRFF that "if the question

is put from the Bulgarian side as to whether Germany is ready
to deport '^ews from Bulgaria to the ^ast, the question Khoul.d
be answered in th- ?f irmativc; but in respect to t^e time of

deporta'-ion, it should be answered evasively."
The measures against Bulgaria's tc-vjs actual"!y took place
dur:.n&- STSErG-RACBT'S incumbency as State S«cT"eterv,

"^fhiie he

was informed of the infamous things proposed and done, and

while it is evident that Bulgaria's actions were in a measure

encouraged by the Legation at Sofia, acting under orders, the
record, is not sufficiently clear a.nd it is not likely that

STiji:..^^GrUCHT ..articipatod in the matter.

•^ibbentrop's direct intervention in matters of t^ig
kind, occurred so often that we cannot say with. rea.sonable

n-.n

certainty that the actions of the Legation at Sofia can be
charged to STEENGRACHT rather than to orders given by
Ribbentrop.

There are also indieations that the German Minis

ter at Sofia endeavored

to divert or at least delay the mat

ter by suggesting that everything that could be done had been
done and that in due course Bulgaria vjould take the action
desired by the KSHA.

In this respect STEENGRACHT should be and is exonerated.

Rumania,

*

Y/ith regard to the measures against Rumanian Jev^s,

it does not appear that, with the exception of a note to
Rumania, which Vi/EXZSAECKER initialled and approved, giving it
an opportunity to repatriate its Jewish nationals or to per
mit them to be deported to the East, he or WOERMA.NN took any
part in the Rumanian deportations although, of course, they
were informed of its progress.

Exhibit 1781, however, clearly establishes that
miZSAEGKER and YiOERMANN knew of the murder of Rumanian Jews
on arrival

in the East.

On 19 August 1942 Rintelen of Ribbentrop*s office wired
the Foreign Office and reported that evacuation transports
from Rumania would be started on 10 September and the Jews
would be removed to the Lublin Ghetto where those fit for
/

work v/ould be allocated for that purpose, and the remainder

given "special treatment," and that arrangements had been
made for the Jews to lose their nationality upon crossing the

Rumanian border -- that negotiations with the Rumanian For
eign Office had been under way for some time and could be

considered entirely favorable.
to carry out the deportation.
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He ends by asking approval

This was a special telegram, and it is our opinion and
we so find that it came to VffilZSAECKEK^S attention as, accord

ing to practice, the distribution of such telegrams was
determined by his office.
1

"Special treatment," in the phraseology of the Third
Reich, meant death.

On 20 August 1942 Klingenfuss of the Foreign Office
wrote Eichmann of the RSHA that, follov/ing protests from var

ious Rumanian representatives in Germany against the inclusion
of Rumanian Jews in the deportations, discussions had been had
between the German Legation and the Rumanian government which

resulted in the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs giving
assurances that he would informRumanian authorities not only

in the Protectorate, but generally, that his government would
permit the Reich to submit Rumanian Jews to these measures,
and consequently the Foreign Office had no doubt that the

deportation which, to some extent, had been interrupted,
would be resumed and Rumanian Jews in the Reich and in Occu

pied Territories would be included in these anti-Jewi^ mea
sures •

This was submitted, before dispatch, to the political
division and i t is a

reasonable inference that both WOERJVIANN

and his chief, V/EIZSAECKER, were informed of this development,
STEENGiiiiCRT

Late in 1945 or early in 1944 STEENGivACHT organized, at

Ribbentrop*s request, an "Office for Anti-Jewish Action

Abroad," and in April a conference of specialists for the
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Je' irh au^Ftion

held at ^'^rummhuebel j at vhich "^r. "' ix,

ficiba'pacor ""chleier, von Thacden, Pallenriefin of the *"3^ and
many others

^rioke.

At the clore of the ppeechea the follov'-

ing reaaeata v-?ere niade of the re'^reF entativea of the miFPiona:

(1) To FQ-opreFS all propaganda, even if csmouflsged
aa anti-JewiPh, liable to alo"''- do^'n or handicap
the German executive meapurep;

(?) To make ^•rerarptionF for « comprehend ion among
ell nptiona of the ejecntive mea'-urep

agpinst

Jewry;

(3) To make reneatec re~ortd Fpout the pod^ibility
of carrying out more aevere mearure? againrt Jev-ry
in the vorioua countries

by uaing diplomatic

mean?; and, finally

(4) That 8F to the detaila of the atate of the execu
tive mea^ure*^, in variour countiie'* , •'•-hich

are to

♦

be k^-'t •"ecret,

it har been decided not to enter

them in the minutea of the meeting.

On 25 July 1944 •'^'chleier

of the Foreign Office reported

that an extensive card index, com'^riaing 40,000 namea of Jevs
of all time^ and all countrier, had been made available for

the anti-Jewish campaign abroad "fo aa to aerve our purnoaes,"
and that the^e inde^ carda of the moat important living Jews
of all countries would be avoii^bie and that the Information

Bureau^ woult^ shortly be in a ^o^-ition to deal "ith inquiries
as to the origin and kinfolk of Je^'-s- or ^eraona au^rected to
be JewF,
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STEJiNGliACHT Insists that this whole scheme was a wild

idea of iiibbentrop's and that nothing of substance ever
arose from it, and explains the card index as oeing a

mechanism to prevent persons v^rho were not Jews from being
charged as such,

Vife.cannot accept either explanation.

The record discloses that the Office for Anti-Jewish Action

Auroad embarked upon and conducted these f-unctions.
organized by and was subordinated to STEENGIJ CET,

It was
ilis

.explanation of the Jev^ish card index is v/ithout merit.

It

did not purpoift to De a list of all Jev/s and assurealy it
was not a list of non-Jews,

It is

perfectly clear that

its proposed use was to identify Jews and their kinfolk in
<4

'

order to c^^rrv ort the p'trposes of t>ie office Ti^hlch he
organized.

On 1 June 1944 STE: NG-xAUHT received a memor^indum

regarding the major action of deportation against the Jews
of Budapest \7hose deportation up to that time had been

delayed and defeated because of Admiral Horthy^s attitude,
in which it was said that this would arouse greater atten

tion abroad and cause violent reactioni that Germany*s
enemies would cry out and talk of manhunts and by the use
•

•

of atrocity reports try to stir up hatred at home and in
neutral countries.

It was therefore sugested that tj ese

untoward events could be averted by creating external ^.rovocations and reasons s^cn as ti±e. discovery oi explosives

in Jewish homes and synagogv^es, the unearthing of sabotage

organizations, revolutionary plots, attacks on the police,
and illegal transactions aimed at undermJ.ninn- the

Hungarian monetary systems, which could then become the
occasion for the great raid.
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STEENaRACHT requested that VEESENMAYER be Informed of

these situations and his opinion obtained.

This vjas done.

On 6 June VEESEM'i/^YER reported that this

important

Budapest action had been fixed and the date arranged; that he

thought the propagandistic preparatory measures v;ould be
futile since it v/as 'f?ell known that for v/eeks already Jewish
community houses and synagogues had been under close observa

tion and that Jewish property had either been confiscated or
blocked, and that the Jews themselves were very much restricted
in moving about.

That the proposed deportation finally took place is
vi/ell knowm.

There was nothing in STEEITGRACHT *S action to

show disapproval or any attempt to stop, hamper or mitigate
any operation.

He consciously participated in the program.

The activities w hich he displayed in the Krummhuebel

anti-Jewish propaganda mission indicate a state of feeling
and intention which does not coincide with his present pro

testations,

Although he did not originate the measures, he

used his official position to Implement them and carry them

out, and we find him GUILTY with

respect to the Hungarian

deportation progrn m.

On 4 October 1943 STEEMGKACHT reported on an interview

he had had v/ith the Swedish Envoy concerning Sv/eden's willing
ness to receive the children of Danish Jews,

The Swedish

Envoy stated that he had learned from his government that the

action against the Jews in Denmark had started and that large
scale actions vifere being carried out In which children were

bound to be Included, and

the Swedish
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government

v/as

prepared to accept these little children; that t^'ls sugges
tion vfas made in order to limit, as far as pps^lble, the

psychological repercussions to toe ppprehendcd in vien of the
close connccticiis lx1n:ccn Sweden and i^enmark.
STUlNCrhACHT stated that Sweden wav=; not properly author

ized to take care of -^anish interests and the Swedish Envoy

replied, that thoy made no such clcim but that the step Tiuas
taken in order to exclude everything which might possibly

have a psychological effect on the public.

STEENGHACKT states

that ho then sharply criticized the £H;edish press and said
that he could not imagine what further reactions could be

^

possible in Sweden after the newspapers had taken such an
unheard-of tone, an attitude which might force Germany to
answer in an unmistakable manner.

STJErCilACHT'S explanation is that this was the only

m.-thod av-iiablc to bring this matter to Rlbbentrop's atten
tion and that his purpose was to inform the Foreign Hlnlstor

of Swedish public opinion and its possible cf"Poct on Gi.rraanSwedish r-lati-ns. If

h^d been the fact, it is diffi

cult to undcrstanr why some word or hint would not h-vc been

included to t'^e effect that it might be to Germany's interest
to accede to -^edcn's desires anc to improve such rolati^ns,

even t^.ough -^v.cdcn wore not the Protecting Power. Germany at
that time was dependent on ^cdon for most important raw

materials, and, too, her military position w^s markedly on
the- decline.

'Jo find it impossible to accord to this communication
the objects which STEENGHACHT claims. The communicntion contahns not the slightest semblance of sympathy for or any
desire to accede to ^edcn*s wishes, or a suggestion that
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• I -Tn'llifa-"

1

sounr'.,forci.2:n policy should load to a serious consideration
of it-,

ST2ENGRACHT took office on 5 May 1943, and he testifies
that Hihhentroo had told him his tasks included throe thino-s:

(1)

^hat he must handle contacts with the diplomats
in Derlin;

(2)

Tliat he must, in time, discipline the Foreign
Office;

(3)

and,

That he must protect with ruthless energy the com

petency of the Foreign Office against all agencies
Ho says he told Rlbbentrop that he presumed that in

political a.spects ho would have a voice, which Rlbbentrop

rejected, saying that that had been the old battle with
WEIZS.-^hG.CHR, who always tried to interfere in politics, which

wcrt oxc3.usively the concern of Hitler and himself, and that

the Foreign Office ajid 3EHENG-RACKT as its State Secretary would
simply c-rry out such orders as might be rocelvcd.
On 29 Aoril 1943 von ^haddon of Inland II prenarcd a

raomorandum rcgar''ing the deportation of "^cws from the South
east, and Particularly in Salonika, which was aoorovod by
STEEHOrACHT on 8 May.

The memorandum states t^ at on

April

1943 Inatructiwis wore issued to the German J-egnti^ns at Homo,

Ankara, --aPi'id, bt.rn, Budapest, Sofia, and Lisbon, to inform

the respective governments there of the extension of general
measures a"a.inst the Jews in the Salonlk*^ zone, and suggcstI

ing that they be recalled by 15 June.

Hu recites the attempts mndo by the Italians to prevent

these measures being taken against Jews of Italian citizenship,
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and those who had lost their citizenship, but who were

attempting to be repatriated

as Italians, and Italy demanded

that it be left to Italian authorities to ascertain Italian

citizenship; that Inland II considered it inadmissable to
comply with the Italian request unless political reasons
should necessitate it; that tne rdnns and i:5\.'edes v^ere also

trying to help some Jews in their endeavor to leave the
lerman sphere of power by .granting t^-em citizenship, and the
Swedes h^d been notified that by the end of March recently

acquired citizensiip would no longer be recognized,

there

fore, compliance vjith the Italian request would establish a
precedent to v/t. ich other states might refer.
Inland II therefore proposed that the Italians be
informed that the question of wiether Jews who were pre

sently in possession of Italian citizenship would, of
course, be left to Italian authorities, but that, as a
matter of principle and to avoid setting a precedent,
•those

Jews could not be granted exemptions from the gen

eral measures against the Jews who at present did not

possess Italian citizensnip, even an c^^ses wnere peti
tions for restoration of citizenship -were pending.

in defense, states that this is one of

*

t^-e first reports rendered to him and he assumes f'^at at
that time he based his action upon the decisions thereto

fore m.ade, and that it was only euoseqiiently, as he
became better informed., that he attempted to take measures
to alleviate this and similar situations.

This question is best resolved, however, by examining
his subsequent attitude and acts.
The record contains correspondence running from early

May 1945 to the end of May 1944.
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A proposal lad been m.ade

that Rumania permit the emigration of 70,000 Jewish chilriren

up to the age of eight to -Palestine,

^^arshal Antonescu

asserted that he had "been informed at the Fuehrer Headquar

ter? that G-ermany agreed, in principle, to this emigration.
Killinger, German Minister atBuch^rest, requested a definite
decision.

Inland II stated that permitting this emigration

would be contrary to the policy strictly adhered to, i.e.,

not to permit Jews to emigrate from any state under German
control or those of her allies; that the political department

considered such emigration objectionable in view of the
Arabian policy and therefore Inland II suggested that

Ribbentrop instruct Killinger to point out that no fundamen

tal approval had ever been given, and that it v/as merely

intended to investigate whether this emigration of Jewish
children could be approved.
The matter was also submitted to Eichmann of the RBHA

who answered that this emigration of •Jewish children must be
opposed on principle, but if, in solte of his views,

the emi

gration of 5,000 Jews (children) from the nocupied Eastern
territories was to be permitted, they should be exchanged, for
Germans interned abroad at the rate of four to one —

that

Germany did not v:ant 20,000 old people, but those capable of
reproduction and under forty years of age, and that these
negotiations must be concluded quickly since the time was
approaching when, as a result "of our Jewish measures," the
emigration of 5,000 Jewish children from the Eastern terri

tories would be technically impossible.

Eichmann'B words "technically impossible" meant but one
thing;

that 1he unfortunate little ones shortly would

-315-

be dead.

In the latter part of May 1943, Swiss Minister

Feldscher submitted to the head of the Legal

Department,

Albrecht, the hope of the British Government that Germany

might agree to the emigration of 5,000 Jev/ish people, 85^
children and

adults, from Poland, Lithuania and Latvia to

Palestine, and inquired about Germany's attitude on the emi

gration of Jewish children from Germany-, Denmark, and the

Occupied Territories of Ililland, Belgium, Greece and Serbia.
Wagner of Inland II stated this was obviously part of

the plan reported in the press to allow 30,000 to 50,000
Jevi/ish children to emigrate to Palestine, "thus saving them
from the extermination with vjhich they are allegedly threat

ened"; he further states that the Bulgarian government had

given approval, for humanitarian reasons since refusal seemed
impossible, but had informed the Gorman Legation that it
intended to comply with the German wish that Jewish emigra
tion be not permitted and v^iould frustrate the Jewish emigra

tion by creating technical difficulties.

He further refers

to the Rumanian situation and to Eimmler's statement that

Germany could not agree to the emigration of Jewish children
from the Gorman sphere of power and from friendly states

gs young, interned Germans be permitted to return to

Germany at an exchange figure not yet arrived at, but sug
gested the ratio of one Jew to four Gorraans; that the legal
department w6uld be pleased if the British inquiry could be
used to resume discussions about returning interned Germans

•from Palestine and Australia, and to arrange for the safe
conduct from the neutral territories, such as the Portugese

colonies, Argentina, etc., and perhaps for the return of
Ethnic and Reich Germans from Paraguay and Uruguay.
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Vvagner proceeds to state that Inland II is of the opin

ion that tne etiilgration ol Jevi^ cirixldren is out oi'the
question and, in view ol Germany's ii.rab?-an policy, apxrovsl

of tbeir transfer to Palestine could not he .o-iven, and sug
gests that a counter inquiry be propounded to the "•ritlsh

as

to whether its government, would allov/ interned Germans to

return under safe conduct in return for exchange of Jewish

children, and if exchange negotiations occurred Germany would,
at least formally, express the wish that the emigrating
I

Jev/ish children be sent not to Palestine but elsev/here; that

the British inquiries be answered by all of the Tripartite
States in the same manner.

Von Thadden, on 1 June, prepared a note for an oral

report on ^riiiinger' s wire that representatives of the Inter
national Red Cross had asked iintonescu vjheiher the Rumanian

Government would supj,.ort tae emigi-ation or Jews from

Transnistria on ued Cross ships; that ^ntonescu disapproved
of the concentration of Jew? t>^ere and obsolutelv wanted to

get rid of them, but replied that it wou.M be a new situation

for him if the emigration would not be in Rumanian s'-'ips but
those supplied by the Red Cross.

Inland II suggested that Killinger be asked to urge
, Rumania to prevent the emigration even if the fied Cross sup
plied the necessary space and that the v/llllngness of

Germany to take the unwanted Jews off Rumanian hands and put
them to work in the East should he expressed.

On 27 June 1943 Sonnlelther of Ribbentrop's Office for

warded to Inland II via STEFilGRACHT Ribbentrop's request that

the question of emigration of Jewish children to Argentina,
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together with other pen?ilng questions of emigration of Jews
from Germany's sphere of power, -be investigated and that sug

gestions be made to Ribbentrop about the further handling of
the

matter. •

On 25 June von Thadden prepared a memorandum v;hich was

signed by vvagner, which ccntained a proposal, worthy of
Hachiavelli, "whereby the emigration be prevented by imposing
impossible conditions, viz., that i^nplcnd agree to take the

Jews into England instead of Palestine, a hd such willingness
should be evidenced by a resolution of the House of Commons;

that it .v/as to be expected that the British v/ould not accept
the demands, in v:hich case the responsibility should lie on

her Shoulders, and if, contrary to expectations,she should
comply, this suggestion should be made available for propa-

gandistic uses and would give Germany an opportunity to sug
gest that Jews be exchanged for interned Germans.
Inland II prepared a proposed ansv;er to the Sv/iss Lega

tion, carrying out this idea and asked for comment.

The

political department approved Wagner's suggestion regarding
%

the propagandistic value of the proj.osed reply to the Swiss

"Legation, but one of its divisions suggested that the phrase
"in accordance with democratic, parliamentary practice" con
tained in the reply be omitted, as its presence would betray
Germany's purpose to utilize the matter for propaganda.
Minister Ruehle of the press and Propaganda Section of

the Foreign Office offered the comment that the matter must

be treated very carefully so that the propaganda offices of
Germany's enemies would not be given any opportunity of mak
ing the German proposal look like a brutal attempt to black
mail or a cynical maneuver by vi/hich it was attempting to obtain
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indemnification for further measures against Jews under

German rule,'and that it must De taken into consideration
that many anti-Semites abroad are having o-nsiderable misgiv
ings about harsh treatment of the Jqws, ant^ ^^hether it would
not be wise to refrain from insisting that the Jews be taken
into England, but only that they should not be transferred to

F'".lestine or any other Arabian territory, and, finally, that a
more favorable impression would be given abroad if the demand

for a resolution by the House of Commons v/as abandoned in

favor of a guarantee by the British Government.

On 10 July Albrecht of the Legal Division pointed out
that the British should be obliged not only to grant these

Jews an entrance permit into England, but grant them perma
nent residence, and that it v;ould not do to demand the pas

sage of a resolution by the House of Commons because the Bri

tish Government would point out that the Home Department, and
not the House of Commons, was authorized to deal with the mat-

^

tor, as it Yjould then appear that Germany, in order to make
the plan fall, had made the request knowing It could not be

^

complied with according to English law, and thus the propagandlstic effect which the Germans desired to achieve would
be jeopardized.

On 21 July von Thadden prepared a note vjhich v/as signed

^

by Wagner and

v;ent

to

Ribbentrop

via

STEENGRACHT

in

which the entire situation was reviewed and the views of the

^

various divisions of the Foreign Office noted, and the tech
nique of handling the matter prescribed.

There is also the

statement that "although one must count on the British Govern

ment's refusing to comply with the German demands, the
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Reichsfuehrer SS should be requested to state what barter

objects might, under given circumstances, be required should
they be evacuated to the Eastern territories for the time

being.
On 12 October Wagner submitted another meraorandun

regarding a renewed French inquiry concerning G"erinany's atti
tude regarding the Argentine suggestions to ts^ke over'1,000

Jewish children, comments^on the situation in Rumania and
Bulgaria, and requested the Foreign minister's opinion v/ith
regard to the previous memorandum.

This was submitted via

STEEuGRACHT and initialled by him.
On 28 October Vjagner submitted a further inenorandum
which included a proposed ansv/er to i.iiiiiater Peldscher, vi^hich

was the result of a discussion with STEEiiGRj-CIIT, and, finally,
Ribbentrop determined that Feldscher should bo given an oral
reply and not

a written one; that, although the British had

not made clear vjhat i t v;as prepared to offer in return,

the

Reich was not averse to entering into negotiations, but i t

could not "lend itself^' to permit the noble and gallant Arabs
to be pushed out of Palestine and, as a condition precedent

to negotiations, the British must agree to take the Jews into
Great Britain add guarantee thera permanent residence there.
STEEi:!GR.iCHT took an active part in the efforts to block

those plans.

He wired the Legation at Bucharest to inform

Marshal Antonescu that the emigration of Jev;s to Palestine

would greatly displease the friendly -irabs; that it v;as
expedient for the Rumanian government to conform to the atti
tude of the Reich on the question of the emigration of Jews,
end asked that the permission which had been granted by the
Rumanian Government

be rescinded.

.4,
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On 29 March 1944 Y'DH Thadden reports on ^'eiascber's
answer, w^ich was that the chili^ren were to be tsVen to

England but thst an exchange was out of t^e question since

t^e British government was of the opinion

Crermans could

only be exchanged against sub.iects of tbe Britis'- Empire,

He

commented that the British hac* only declarcf^ t^oir readiness

to accept the'se children without making any statements con-'

corning the length of their stay; therefore, itraust be assumed

that England desired only a temporary acceptance an^ intended
to send them to Palestine later, and it must be concluaed

that Britain had r.Jeotod the ^ermsn offer 9.nd that ^"eldscher
should oe informed orally, among other things, that "^ermany
considers the Jews as asocial elements and since the British
are interested in these asocial elements,

the Reich govern

ment could imagine a thirc^ offer in t'^e following manner: an

exchange of Jews against persons not of G-crman nationality
but in w' om Germany is interested, such as Irish nationalists,
Indian 6j -^rabs and Egyptians who were arrested in the British
sphirc of influfncG.

On 2 Mav 1944 Ecldschcr again approached the head of

the legal department concernlne' the cmigrati'^n of 5,0^0 Jpv;ish children and

stated that t^e British government wants to

receive these Jewish child.rcn viithin the British Empire, out
side of Palestine and the near -^ast.

Von lhaddcn comments

that the G.„rTnan government must decide whether they are

ready to give up these children under any circumstances with
out any compensation; that Germany had demanded a reception
in England, in order,

in

a

positive

way,

should

to

the

promote
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matter

be

settled

anti-Semitism

in

iiiHgland as a result of the immigration of the Jews, and the
RSriA had given confidential information that the only place
where 5,000 Jev/ish children consider'd. for emigration can

still be found is the ghetto of Litzmannstadt, but that this
ghetto would soon he liquidated under Himmler's direction.

This memorandum went to Ribocntrop via ST2ENG-RACHT.

How any one reading this correspon^eno© and having
taken part in these confeyences, and particularly being

aware of the passages here .lust referred to could have had

f

any doubt tt^at tho Jews, as a race, were being exterfflinatcd,
is beyond our comprehension.

Finally, on May 27, 1944, Ribbentrop ordered that at
present nothing further be done in the Fcldscher matter.
It would be difficult to conceive of more flagrant bad
frith than that which was carried out in these negotiations.

Hcr^ at least is one occasion where Ribbentrop, as Forr^ign

Minister, asked for advice of his Foreign Office; here was
the opportunity for the Foreign 'Office and its State Secre
tary to giVc good advice instead of bad; to point out how the

'

improvement in German foreign relations and its rehabilita
tion in the eyes of the world would be possible by at least

permitting children to be saved from extermination.

But

every step which the Foreign Office took, every recommonda-

f

a

tion that it made, was directed to blocv- efforts made by
leading countries of the world, neutral as well as enemy

«

states, to permit little children to come unto them and to
defeat the efforts of the Good Samaritans and. turn tv>eir

offers into Naz^ Propaganda•
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PTEETJaRJ^CHT war a party to this; he muet bear the

responsibility^

He rhould be and is held auiLTY under Count

Five.

Danish Jews.

on 1 October 1943 Beet, Minister and Plenipo

tentiary to Denmark:, telegraphed the Foreign Office, for
immediate tranamittal to Ribbentror, th^t the Danish Pe^ws
v-ould be evacuated and vould be arrested on the nights of

the first and second and ^ent to Germany^

Upon receipt,

this telegram vas delivered to and initialled by STF'UN'^ORACHT.
^

He had therefore been informed of the project.

His defense takes two courses:

first, that Best, in

addition to being Minister to Copenhagen, was also Reich
"•Plenipotentiary, and in that latter capacity he was not

subject to the Foreign Office and his actions against the

Jews were in his capacity as Reich Dlenipotentiary; and,
secondly, that Best himself opposed and endeavored to prevent

the deportation from taking place,
'm

Plenipotentiary powers, vhen attached to those holding

^

dir^lomatic positions, pre not unusual. They indioa-te that
the diplomatic representative has direct power to bind his
government and that his decisions do not require approval by
his department before becoming effective.
The record does not disclose, other than by the claims

f

of the defendants involved, that Best had split official
powers and divided loyalties end responsibilities.

He was

not a Reich Commissar, th^t is, one w^ho wres the responsible

governing head of the territory, such, for instance, as
Rosenberg in the East or Frank in the Government General,
and he had neither tactical nor operational command over

-3^3-.

the iifchrmacht, but he was theorctloally the highest political
voice in occupied -i^cniTiark.
'/vhethcr to strengthen his own position or cloak himself
against attacks made on his policy, i t was he who suggoated
and planned and executed the deportation of the Danish Jews.

He kept the Foreign.'Office and ST^ENG-RACHT advised, and ti-'er-e
is no ob.lcctive proof that hig superior,

STEENGRACHT,

dis

approved or ob.lected. to the planned ovacuatinn, notT,«rithstand

ing the fact tha.t the foreign political po'ilcy so involved
was unquestionably one as to w^ich
able objections, which might

and readily avail

11 have been -''ppr-^^ended ajid

understood by Hitler, Himmlor a.nd Ribbcntrop,

existed.

clearly

^at Host's heart was not in his work is evidenced

by the fact that with his knowledge,

and. at loa.st tacit con

sent, warnings were given by ^erniran officials, to Dp.nish Gov
ernmental circles, and also to the Juws,

and thus the vast

majority of them escaped deportation.
STu^i^KGRAChT'S fault,

if any,

arises from the fact that

it does not aopear that ho took any stops to prevent whot vras

obviously a flpgrant and a nsupportablo violation of intcrnptional law.

However,

we are not prepared, to spy,

in ^

situa

tion as opaque as this, that he gave pny affirmative suppert

to the program, and it may be the fact that Best was acting
on orders from Hitler and Himmlcr which SEEENGRAGHT could not

overcome.

^his is not so unreasonable as to bo rejected.

Under these circumstances, he mu°t bo given the benefit
of the doubt and. as to this charge wo find that hig e-uilt is

not proven beyond r^ asonflblc doubt and therofor- he must be
and is exonerated..
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3lova.kla.

In July 194."^ the defendant VIESiiiNI-^AYER was author

ized, on his next trip to Pressburg, to discuss with $iso
G-ermany's interest in the final solution for the remaining
Slovakian Jews.

While STEENGHAGHT saw tv-is document and was

directed by Ribbentrop to inform Minister Ludin about
S proposed trip, it does not appear that he did

anything more than transmit Ribbentrop's message to the German
Minister.

He did not originate, implement, execute or other

wise further the deportation of Slovakian Jews and should be
and is exonerated with respect to this incident,

Hungary.

STEENGRACHT had nothing to do with VEESEN^^^AYSR'S

appointment as Minister and Reich Plenipotentiary to Hungary,
nor with his early assignment to make inveatigatiens and.

report on the po Htical s ituation there.

0-^ course, he knew

what VEESENMYER'S mission was and he knew of the terrible

mass deportations which took place, but VESSSNHAYER was act
ing partly under Ribbentrop's orders and, except insofar as
STEENGRACHT took an affirmative part in the matter, he should

not be held responsible.

There is, however, at least one instance where this
occurred.

On 29 June 1944 VEESENMAYER requested, instructions

as to proposals made by the Swedish, Swiss and American gov

ernments that certain groups of Jews be permitted to emigrate.

The first, covering 400 Jews, was the Swedish request to per

mit thoir emigration either to ^eden or Palestine.

There

wa.s e Swiss requ. st involving 10,000 children plus 10,^^
adults to act as escorts,

smaller

numbers.

and three other request^! involving

The American
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War

Refugee

Board

•requested that Jewish children under ten years oi' age oe

permitted to.emigrate to talestine,
accept the American proposal.

Hungary desirea to

Inland II recommended that

VEESFM'TAYER request the Hunfrarian government to reply to

the Swiss and Americans that the emigration to lalcstine
could not be agreed to since Palestine was in Arabian

territory and Hungary could not be a party to pushing the
Arabs from their ovm homes.

It v;as further suggested that

such a reply v/ould delay the matter for two or three weeks,

and by that time the Jewish action — that is the completion
of the deportations from Hungary — would have been finished
and intervention would thus be useless.

STEENGRACET sav/ and initialled this, yet apparently
made no effort to combat this cruel and unnecessary measure.

The excuse, given from time to time, of Germany*s fear of
displeasing the Arabs, was not made in good faith, Out was
a mere blind behind which the campr.ign ol deportation,
slave labor and. murder could be carried on,

I

Swiss and

Swedish proposals vjerc made in August 1943 and a.e-aln Inldhd

II of the foreign Office made the same recommendation which
was submitted to STEENGRACHT, and then through him trans
mitted to Ribbentrop,

Inland II was subordinated to STEEHGRACHT.

Vvhen, v/ith-

out comment or objection, he transmitted this to Ribbentrop,

he thereby adopted these recommendations.

He is responsible,

therefore, for its actions which implemented the deporta

tion and extermination of the Hungarian Jews.
matter, he must be and is found GUILTY.
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As to this

catholic Church, That the Nazi reglmo early embarked on a
campaign of persecution of the Catholic Churchy Its dignitar
ies, priests, nuns and communicants. Is established beyond a
doubt.

It did not

consist of isolated acts,of individual

citizens, but v^as a definite governmental plan.

Its purpose

so far as German Catholics were concernod, was to separate

the v/orshippers from the Church and its priests, destroy its

leadership-, to the end that communicants should become sub

servient to Nazi principles and obedient only to 'the commands
of Hitler, as is shown by Hermann's Decree of Juno 1Q40.
In the occupied territories the plan had an additional
feature, namely, that of removing priests and thus depriving

them of any opportunity to give any rullgious comfort and

teaching to the peoples of those countries.
ment of wha.t occurred is

A general state

to be found in the announcement of

the Pope made in 1945.
"There was

the dissolution of Catholic organ

izations 5 the gradual suppression of the flourish
ing Catholic schools, both public and private; the
enforced weaning of youth from-fauilly and Church;

the pressure brought to boar on the conscience of
citizens, and especially of civil servants; the
systematic defamation by means of a clever, closelyorganized propaganda of the Church, the clergy, the
faithful, 'the Church's institutions, teaching and
history; the clos-ing, dissolution, confiscation of
religious houses and other eoclosiastical institu
tions; the complete suppression of th^ Catholic

1

press and publishing houses.

"w
the Holy See itself multiplied its
roprosontations and protests to governing authori

ties in Germany, reminding tlem, in clear and
energetic language, of their duty to respect and
fulfill the obligations of the natural law itself
that wore confirmed by the Concordat
-'S-"

A more graphic plcturo Is found in the testimony of
Father Sludzlnski, -a Polish priest, and of Father Thoma,

llflir Tn^imifti.iir'i.iiiiH.in iMfllMiiiirn ||
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a (jerman priest.

No attempt was made by the defense to ques-

tioh the accuracy of t^eir testimony.

Father Siudzineki lived and performed his priestly

functions at Bromberg in the Warthegau,

On 2 November 1939

he was called to the Regional Council Office where he and
thirty other priests were arrested an'^ taken to the concen

tration camp at Stutthof.

No chprges were preferred against

them and they were never told the reason for their arrest.

In April 1940 he was transferred to the concentration

camp Sachsenhausen and in December 1942 to that of Dachau,

At the latter place from 1,500 to 1,600 priests were confined^
of whom 860 or 860 died; during the time he was in

Sachsenhausen 80 to 100 died, partly by reason of brutal
treatment administered by the guards, while some 300 were
exterminated in the gas chambers and the furnaces which were
used for the purpose of extermination.

In 1942, throughout the ten days of the Easter Church

Holy Days, they were sibjeoted to punitive exercises and
those who were physically unable to continue this torture

were beaten and many died.

In these c^mps were Roman

Catholic priests not only from G-ermany and. Poland, but from
Prance, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslavokia.

^^ather Thoma was a ^erman priest who, because he per
mitted several Polish agricultural workers to attend divine
services, was arrested in 1941 and thrown into the Dachau

concentration camp where there were already confined many
Catholic and. Protestant Priests,

Sarly in this -^arty program the Poles deported to, or
working in,, the Reich were permitted to attend religious ser

vices.

Later they were only permitted to occupy certain

benches in the church and, finally, not permitted to enter

the church at all.

Those Polos wore not voluntary workers

but had,been sent to the Reich and distributed all over the
country.

About 2,500 priests were Interned at Dachau between the

date of T!-o)v.a's ontr-nncG In 1941 and the end of the war,
Apnroiciraatoly 200 died of starvation and the witness ^imsclf

lost 65 pounds In le.ight; 500 "ore wore exterminated in the

gas chambers, and many priests, who bcccamc old and sickly,
were loaded into the "Ascontion" transports and never hoard

from again; 400 more died of diseases, deprivations and mis-

trcntmont.
their lives.

At least 40^ of the priests in the camp lost
In addition to Poles and Germans, there were

French, Dutch, Belgian, Luxembourgian, Hungarian, Italian,
Swiss, Danish and Yugoslavian priests,

^he Austrian "oriests

were brought there as early as Hnroh]956 and were most atro

ciously cand abominably treated, and so terrified were they
that, vmencvcr an order came from the 33, they would suffer
complct; physical collapse. Hew <^8 told, by a Polish priest
in th. c^inp that vrithin a few weeks of the w^r over 2,000
Polish orios'cs were executed In Poland,
Even if there wore no Hague Convention, wc would have
no question in docl^^rlng thnt the persecution of churches and

clergy constitute a crime against humanity, but Articles 46
and 56 of th.c "lague Convention of 1907, Laws and Conditions

of War on Land, specifically provided:
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"Family honor and the rights and lives of per
sons and private propertj^, as well as religious
convictions and practicos, must be respected.
Pri

vate property cannot be confiscated."

Art. 46

"The property municipality and that of insti
tutions dedicated to religion,

charity, and educa

tion, the arts and scioncos, oven when State Pro
perty, shall be treated as private property.
"All seizures of, destruction or.willful dam

age done to institutions
of this character, his
toric monuments, works of arts and science, is
forbidden and should be made the subject of legal
proceedings."
Art. 56
Wo hold that crimes against humanity v;ero committed on

{

a largo scale, that they were planned and v/ero a part of the
program adopted as a matter of policy by the Ihird Reigh,
The real question involved is whether,

and if so to

vi/hat extent, those defendants were a. party to, aided or

r

abetted, or took a consenting part therein, or were connected

in the plans

or entorprisos involving their eommission.

on 23 July ^938 Korrl, Minister for Ecclesiastical
Affairs, wrote the Defendant ilEISSilER that Sproll, Archbishop
of Rothcnburg, was the only German Bishop who did not take

part in the plebcscite of 10 April, and that ho had delivered
a scries of "damaging" sermons, by reason of which demonstra
tions were made in front of his Palace and the government of

Wuerttonborg concluded that the Bishop could no lengor remain
in office and desired him to leave the Gau and would see to

it that all personal and official contacts between him and
the State, Party offices and the Armed Forces would bo denied;
that Korrl had taken the matter up with the Foreign Office

which, on 18 May, had directed the Gorman Embassy at
the Vatican to urge the Holy See to persuade
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the Bishop to resign; thnt no answer

yet been received

and-the ^ishop had returned to his fplace and, accordingly,
a great demonstrf^tion had been- made ag^iinst him^
In passing i t may be remarked that these d.emonstrations

were staged by the hazl Part??- and were greatly resented by
the people of Rothenburg,.
Kerrl further stated th"t,if the Vatican refused to con-^

sent to the Bishop's resignation, he would have to be exiled,
or suffer a complete boycott,

Horac did not react favorably, and the ^arty then organ
ized a mob wh.i.ch ssckcd the Bishop's oalnco and. mistakenly

laid violent hends on Bishop G-robor who, with Bishop Sproll,
was engaged in religious services in the cbrpel.

The inhabi

tants of Rothenburg were quite hostile pnd the Crovernor pro

posed. taking measures to prevent any demonstr'^tions of Ipyelty
to the Bishop,

On 15 August ".70BRAA1^N reported to ^^ibbcntrop, via

'jiilZSABGA^R, the results of a conference had with Minister

Kcrrl and others regarding the matter, in which it was unani
mously a,grced to have t.he 0-estapo expel the Bishop from
Wuorttenbcrg if he did not voluntarily withdraw.

^^OERMANN

requested that Ribbcntrop, if he did not agree to this proce
dure, should confer with Kerrl,

On 27 October V.'OERiiANN filed a memorandum reg^irding the

position and functions of the G-crmnn -Embassy to the Vatican,
mentioning the Sproll Case, -nnd said;

"P

not yet been decided by what method

the intolerable situation resulting from the con
tinued existence of the Reich Concordat and of

t.ic hacnder, Concordets, with their stipulations
v/'"j.ch are, to a large extent, unsuitable to
National Sociniist G-crmany, is to be llcviated,.
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This i">robleni will hr.ve to be solved sooner or
later.
It will involve important duties for the

G-crnojL Ai.ioassador to the Vatican even though the
Cfconcordats are set aside and an autonomous
G-ermoJi solution is substituted.

Had. the Ambassa

dor .tehien part in Mr, von Papen^s negotiations
in connection with the Concordat i t is certain

that fewer concessions would have been made."

A£ter the outbreak of the war three Polish Bishops,
including Carcinal Hlond, left Poland, and when the church

requested, that they be permitted to be returned, WOERMANN

informed the G'erman Embassy at ^ome that the authorities
could not possibly permit any of them to return because of

their anti-German attitud.c, or to oermit them again to ful
f i l l the position of a Bishop.

The G-eriuan Ambassador transmitted this message to th.e

Vatican, which asked for reconsideration.
On 22 October 1939 WEIZSAEGKER wired the Ambassador to

the Vatican thot thc= return of the Cardinal was out of the
question even at a later dpte, nor could the former Nuncio
Cortczi ar;-'.in

ua his ch^>ritable*.work or Bishop
"V

RoAkomshy be returned, to his diocese.

On 29 November 1939 VOERMANN submitted, to WEIZSAECKER
a memora.ndum of hn.s conversation with the Nuncio who ha.d

given ihforma.tion regarding atrocities in Poland.

^aOERMANN

advised him not to go to high-r^'^nking G-orman personalities,

who would, not perhaps listen to him as calmly as he, i^OERHANN,
had, and. further informed him that a.s Nuncio he had no offi

cial right to d-iscuss such matters.

He further stated that

he had. informed, the Nuncio thst he believed the reports to be

false, which the latter contested by emphasizing his cf'ution

in evalua.ting r- ports, and requested WOERMANN to consult with
WEIZSAEGKSR.
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On 11 December 1939 ^ergen, German Ambassac'or to the

Vs.tican, reported the criticisms being inr>,de of the G'orman
church policy and mentioned the reports of pcrsocuti-^ns of

clergymen in Poland and the prohibitions of the ceremony of
the J-^hass and the difficulties of the churches in Poland,
h'ElZSAIiCKjijR received a copy.
On 6 June 1940 Ribbentrop asked W0ERI4ANN to report and

tborcaftor confer with '-^im on the present sta^'O of Gorman-

Vatican relations.

'-^'hc latter reported on 6 jEinu°ry that

secretly "wc" regar'^ the Reich Cnncordpt an^^ t^o Racndv-^r Con

cordat as antiquated; that many of the fundamental principles

are fundamentally opposed, to the basic principles of National
Socialism such as schooling and. other e ducRtlon, and. thn, t the

Laender Concordat, which conformed with the Reich Concordat,
weru incompatible with the '^crraan political structure since

the

aonder had lost their sovereignty and both the Reich and

Laender Concordets could no longer be regarded as the legal
norm in d.om.. stlc .po licy, but thr't an explicit declaration of

"our" attitude to them had not as yet been given to the Vati
can; that the re-incorporetcd terrltorlts, such as Danzig,

t^c Sudetc-nland and the "'arthegau were without a Concordat,
and in these areas "wc" were not bound to the Vatican end

"we" d.ocllno an extension of the v-lidlty of the Concordat to
th.esi- "tcrrl tori I. s; th-*^t the ^^ticj^n hr^s submi"''ted the follow
ing complaints: alleged violation of the Concordats, -spoclally on the question of ed.uc=^tl'^n, procedure on the appoint

ment of Bishops and Apostolic Administrators, the case of indl-

vldual Bishops such as Sproll, actions against the ohurchGs
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of Austria, compulsory evacuati'-ns,
tutions,

closurr of church Insti

arrest of oriosts and membrrs of orders,

snd,

since

tho occupation of Poland, representations against the arrests
and sentencing of church dignitaries.

Ifli'OERlANN'S final conclusions were that the upshot would

prooaoly be breaking off the Concordat and regul^^ting the
legal position of the Catholic Church in G-ermany, but that as
long as the war continued the time was not ripe; that a cer
tain degree of compromise, at least for the duration of the

^

war, should be made for reasons of foreign policy and that
the radical policy agrinst the church, particulnrly in

V

Austria, should be stopped; th^^t measures against the clergy
in Poland were unavoidable because 1eading members of the

clergy, as well as other leading personalities in the former
Poland, must be eliminated, but that they could be moderated

in form; that the Vatican's contribution must consist in

i

changing the attitude of the V.^tican Press and refraining from
encouraging Catholic clergy in Germany in their negative attltude towards National Socialism, banning provocative state

ments by the clergy abroad, and the adoption of » different

tone in the Vatican's statements, especially in connection
with Poland.

On 25 January 1940 WEIZSACCKER wrote Sergen concerning
improving relations with the Vatican and, as his personal

^

opinion, said "No general agreement" could be reached at
present; that this applied in particular to all questions
governed by the Concordats; that proceedings against the
Polish clergy could not be changed in essence, but mi^ht bo
brought to some kind of cono lusion and that the former proce
dure could certainly be improved;
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that the only present

was to avoid creating nny points of friction n.n^ grndually to improve relations by attcnc^lng to certraln in(?lvl{^ual

complaints.

He compl^tlnea about the "stinging" tone used by

the Vatican an(? Its members.

On 15 February 1940,VCS-I'1^N reported to •'•^IZSAllCKER

rcgr.rding a conference with the Nuncio, to whom he had given
Information concerning the Bishops of Flock o.nd Leplau

(Wloclawck), and that he told, the Nuncio In a gencrral way

that, In accordance with the wishes of the Security Police

'

rnd SD, the fulfillment of his wishes to have the Bishop of

Leslaw restored to his position would meet with difficulties
so long as Cardinal Hlond acted as Archbishop of Poland to

Rome and displayed an attitude hostile to G-ermany,
On harch 4, 1940, WEIZSAECKER reported that the Nuncio

had spoken of the large number of priests In the
Sechsenhauscn concentration c<~rap and his desire to snoak nnd

visit with them and the r. quest th^t he be p-^rmltted to bring
them •pr'^yer

books and hold

In the camp.

On 3 July 1940 WSIZSAECKER reported that the Nuncio

Inquired as to the reasons for Imprisoning th: Suf'fragon of
Lublin In a concentration camp and asked If be could not be
Interned elsewhere; and also Inquired as to the fate of the
80-yoar-old Bishop of Plock.

•^heee are examples of the complaints of the Catholic
Church and of the actions of the Foreign Office with regard
to them.

^e have referred to the persecution of Bishop Soroll
of Rothenburg,

These Incldonts occurred In 1958.
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The

Bishop was persecuted on both religious and political grounds.

It is our opinion that the persecution of Catholics, laj^men

and oricsts was a part and in aid of Hitler's program of
aggression, as by persecutions of this kind he expected to be
able to crush all resistance and to unit all G-ermans in an
unwavering and uncritical obedience to his wishes and thereby
enable him to carry out his olanned aggressions freed from
interna.1 resistance.

"j^he only connection which ^^EIZSAECKER and WOERMANN ha^d
with the matter arose from the f^ct thst the Minister of

Ecclesiastical Affairs requested the Foreign Office to ask

the ^atican to influence the Bishop to resign.

^his it did,

but the ^atican quite properly refused so to do, and there

upon a conference was had in the Office of the Minister for
Ecclesiastical Affairs in which WOERMANN took part and
reported that it was the unanimous opinion of those present
that if he did not resign he should be removed from his dio

cese by force, if necessary.

This report was signed and ini

tialled by WEIZSAECKER^

It is clear, however, that the Foreign Office were
neither the originators nor were they concerned as actors,
8:iders or abettors in this program.

fait accompli.

It was faced with a

The persecutir^n, outrageous as i t was, was

started and carried out by Party lr«:iders over whom none of

the Foreign Office defendants had any control.

In fact, the

whole matter lay outside their official competency,

8nd

was that of the Minister for Ecclesi^sticnl Affairs and the

loc^l authorities.
with

relations

of

It is only so far as the problem dealt
G-ermpny

with
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the

Vptican

that

they

could spep.k.

They could not orovide protection for the

Bishop,

It is iipparont that even' those responsible for this

outrage f^lt that they had succeeded in getting themselves in
an inextricable position whcr<. they could not proceed with

their pirn without encountering insurmountable difficulties
aaid where they could not afford to recant.

Ihe solution

which was agreed upon> while far from being either good or

wise, was perhaps the only one which, under the circumstances,
was open under Nazi policy; that if the Bishop did not resign

he Was to be requested to leave and, if necessary, removed
from his diocese by force but not placed under arreat*
To this solution WCERMANN ngrred.

It would, of course,

have been a preferable and more admirable t>^ing to have con
demned what had taken place and insisto,d that, as a matter of
foreign policy, the Bishop be permitted to remain in his dio
cese,

Nevertheless, when wo appreciate the •

realities of

the situation and. from what is disclosed, not only by testi
mony of representatives of the Vatican but from contemporan

eous, official documents regarding the actual policy and the

action taken by the defendants of the Foreign Office, we are
convinced that at the time they did t.he best, perhaps the

most, they could to prevent the persecution of the church, its
priests and. its communicants.

It is quite true that in one

or more cases WOEPUi^aNN suggested that the Concordats wore no

longer practicable in view of the political sltuqtlon, but
he did not rocommend that they be abrogated but that such
action be postponed.

His rooommondation evidently was

APP^o'^cd and the CQncordats rcma.ined in effect, a.lthough
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without question other =»gencies of the Nazi governniGnt uald
little or no attention to their terms,

"^hat t^is is the fact

is shown by numerous (documents offered on behalf of the defen^

dant -^^EIZSAECKSR and the affidavit of Father G-ohrmann who,

from 1925 to 1945, wa.s Secretary of the Apostolic Nuncio in
Berlin.

This is also shown by the W'OERMANN memorandum of 22

November 1959 and his memorandum of 21 April "1942 which ended
V/ith

the words;

"For thes« reasons I consider i t necessary
that all such measures directed against the church
be suspended or discontinued until the end of the
war."

See also the memorsJidum of du Moulin of 9 March 1959;

that of ^VEIZSAECKER of 16 August 1941; the memorandum of
%

WOERiyiANN and. Haidlon of 24 May 1959 and 4 March 1940; the
Haidlcn and 'JEIZSAECKER memoranda of 10 December 1940, 17

January 1941 and. 5 February 1941; the Kaidlen memoranda of
11 February and 6 March 1941; the Hoffmann mrmorandum with

WCEHIiANN'S note of 16 September 1942.

^

It is clear that the Foreign Offioe defendants were
not engaged in a program of persecution, but whenever and

c

wherever possible they sought to modify, gain as many excep

tions as they could, and mitigate those which could not bo
changed or modified.

""e must not forget that guilt is a personal matter;

that men are to be Judged not by theoretical, but by practi-

ca.1 standards; that we are here to define a standard of con-

<1

duct of responsibility, not only for Grermans as the vanquished
in war, not only with regard to past and present events, but
those which in the future can be reasonably and prouerly

applied to men and officials of every state and nation,,
those of the victors as well as those of the vanquished.

Any othor a,pproach would mn.ke a mockery of i n t e r n " l a w
anc? woulc^ result in wrongs quite as serious an(^ f"tal as
those which Wu'rc sought to be remedied.

"here, as In this case, the defenr'ants cb^rged were not

the originators of the unlawful policy, where they had no
power in themselves to chajige it, wherr they had no pprt in

implementing it or executing it, and were both in orinciplc
and in d.oed p.gainst it, no conclusion of guilt may be orooerly
reached,

^he defendants ¥EIZSAi:CKER and WOERl'MN should be and

are found NOT GUILTY of charges in Count Five relsting to
persecution of the church.

"''hert is no evidence that the defendant STEENGRACHT

participated in the persecution of the church, its priests or
communicants.

He is therefore exonerated in that matter.
BERGER

BERGER bccp.me Ohief of the Main Office SS (SB^A) on 1

April 1940.

In 1938 he established the Replacement Office of

the General SS in the S3 Main Office (3SHA).

On October 1,

19?9, he bt-came Chief of tbi s Replacement Bureau.

On 1

January 1940 the Replacement Office was transferred to the
Replacement Office of the Waffen SS,

Although

BERGER, in his Interrogations prior to trial,

said he began with the SSHA on January 1, 1940, he claims
that this Was an error and he actually became h"ad of it on

April 1, 1940, and we accept his statement with respect
thereto.
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In July 1942 he becrme Hlminler's Liaison Officer for
the Ministry for <biastern.^Territories and, although be was

slated to become State Secretary^ for-thf.t Ministry, this
never materialized, but he became chief of its reiitipal Dir

ecting Staff,

"^here is a dispute as to how long he held this'

position and he contends that he only gave it part-time

attention and signed no orders and was not responsible for
any dispositions made by that office.

On October 1, 1944 ho was appointed Chief of Prisoner

of War Affairs but not of the transient cflmps or those in

operational areas or in N^^rway.

Tr-nsient camps are tv^ose in

which enemy soldiers taken prisoners are•temporarily confined
^

until they can be transferred to permanent orisoner cf war

camps in the rear.

He was appointed commander of military

operations in Slovakia on 31 August 1944, stayed there for
two weeks crushing the revolt which had broken out in

g2.ovakia, was then recalled to the field, command staff of
I

Himmler and returned to Slovakia for five or six days, and
'

^

then was transferred back to Berlin.

BBRGLR'S attitude toward Jews is shown.in the agreement

^

which he made, acting for Himmler, with the Minister of the
Eastern Territories in Ms.roh 1943;

"The aim of this indoctrination is to convert
the non—'^crman members of the Indigenous Po3J.ce
Units to convinced co-fighters against Bolshevism
and for the All-European New Order., Special atten
tion is to be paid to the following points: * *

^

"2,

Tying up with the strong instinctive

anti-Semitism of the Eastern nations; the Jewish
face of Bolshevism; Jewry as motive power behind
Bolshevism as well as the capitalism of the wes

tern powers; Jewish aims for world domination

and the various ways toward it; world revolution

and capitalism; the nationalist disguises of Jewish
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w

•Bolshevism; Stalin s army as a power instrument

to g^in Jewish worlf' (domination with the bloo(d.
of other peoples,
II "7.
f

.

.

The Reich's 9.nd its Fuehrer's fight

ageinst world "^ewry.
"4,

Realization of the new European commun

ity of nations under the Reich as the leading,
protv-cting ancf' marshalling power;
and fight of the European nations
Jcwish pirns for world dominatir^n;
anc? underlying reasons of the war;
instigator of the first and

the common work
against the
causes, meaning
Jewry as the

second world wars;

G-ermrjiy' s and Europe's allies in a common front

in

fight against Jewish-capitalist and the Jewish
Bolshevist powers; the hard necessities of the
War; oommcn vrork, common Sr?.criflces and coTmon

fight for the new Europe."
As Chief pf the S3 Main Office BEP.GER prepared and dis•tributed.
tions.

"^Tjiidance Pamphlets" to be used by the gs organiza
Some pf them discussed anti-Semitism, both specifi

cally and in connection with other problems,
is ?

following

sample:

"We National ^oci^^lists beUeva the Fupi^rer
when he says that the annihilation of Jewry In
Europe stands at the end of the fight instigated

Jswish World Fgrasite against us '^s his
strongest enemy.
But until this annihilation is
completed, we must always remember that the Jew
is our absolute enemy,

stopping at nothing, who,
our com-

with respect to us, has only one goal,
plete annihilation.

"It is our task not to G-ermnnize the East

in the old sense, that is,

bring the G-erman

langua.ge and G-crman laws to the people living
there, but to take care that only people of

genuine G-ermanic blood, are living in the East."
(From the SS Main Office Pamphlet, "Snfegup.rd-

ing ijurope.")
fhe S3 also printed and published a pamphlet called

"The Sub-Huraan," from which the following is a quote:
"^he Sub-HUiiian, this apparently fully equal
creation of nature, when seen from a biological
viewpoint,
with hands,
br^in,
with- eyes
and

feet,
a
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mouth

and

a

sort of

nevertheless is quite different, p. drcp.dful orc.pture, is only nn imitation of man with man-r^^som-

"bling features, "but inferior to any animal as
regards intellect ard. soul.
In its interior, this
being is a cruel chaos of wild, unrestricted pas
sions,

with a naiiieless will to destruction,

most erimitive lust,

with a

and of unmasked depravity,

,

,

Now hcr^ they come again, the Huns, caricatures of
human faces, nightmares that have come true, a
blow in the face of everything good, allied with
nature and the scum of the whole world,

but

the suitable tools in the hand of the Vv'andoring
Jew,

that master of organized mass murder.

Only

for tht.; dumb e.re they camouflaged in the dress of

the bourgeois.

. .This time the Jew wanted to be

fully ccrta.in.
He appointed himself as officer,
as commiesar, as decisive loader of the sub-humans

•, . .The beasts in human form, the true leaders of
the underworld, sowed by Ahasucrus, who originates
from the dark, stinking gh'ttos of -^astern Cities."
BEHGER asserts th^^t he did not like

tv-is pamphlet and

that it was thrUvSt upon him by Himmler, an^^ th^t he did not
father its distribution.

How^^ver,

on ."^1 March 1942 he '-rote

Him.-.lcr reporting a visit to Hcioh Party Treasurer Bchwarz,
wher^' he showed him t>^is pamphlet and asked for his support,
stating that Schwarz liked i t very much and said that every
German family should h^ve i t and he would support its circu4

lation.

The following is an extract from a pamphlet prep^.red, by
*

the SS Main Office at BERGER'S orders for distribution to
Wehrmacht units in

the East:

"This war is the Jewish world fight against
the liberation of mankind from the spiritual and

material servility (sic.—servitude) of all Jewry
while, on O-ormany's side, it has become the fight
for the liberation and maintenance of mankind

against all attempts of Jewish world domination,

^

"For ue there exists only one decision:

fight against Bolshevism and fight ag<^.inst the
plutocracies. Our victory over both means the
annlMlatlon of Jewry and. therefore the pacifi
cation of the nations and securing a new world
order."
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Another example of the kind of material which was
found in this ideological training material is a letter
df an SS Untersturmfuehrer to his v;ife;

"Together with three other soldiers I
received an order tonight to shoot tv/o members

of the Ked Army, so that they cannot be of danger
to us any more. They were ragged and apathetic,
just like aninals. I give a spade to each of

them and they begin to dig their own graves and
I light a cigarette in order to calm down.
There is no sound -- Russians have no souls,

they are animals, they became animals during
the past years. They don''t beg for their
lives, they don^t laugh, they don't cry. Three
guns are pointed at them. All of a sudden one
of them starts to run, but he does not get far,
twenty meters, and he is dead. The other does
not move; he steps into his hole, and then he
is dead too.

Two minutes later the earth covers

everything — and vve light another cigarette. ,
BEhGEH admits that this Is an extract from one of his
pamphlets.

The ^Fitness von

dem Esch-Zelewski was called by the

prosecution and testified that he v/as a Higher GS and Folice

Leader assigned to Russia Center in 1941 and he held that

position up to 1942.

Early in 1943 he became a Commander of

First Motorized SS Brigade and Chief of the Anti-lartisan
Units.

This position he held, during the year 1943.
He testified to having heard Himmler's hinfamous

Fosen speech in 1943, and that BERGEK was there and that
Exhibit 2638 is that speech.

ViJ'ith regard to the Dirlevranger Unit he testified that
it was subordinated to him in 1942, and that a regiment of
the brigade was assigned to him in 1944 for approximately

six v\reeks; that Dirlewanger had an autL orization from Himmler
which made him ti'e competent judicial officer over his men,

and that there were special legal provisions in force for
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this one battalion, and Dirlewanger could himself pass the
death sentence which other SS officers in other SS units

could not do I that Dirlewanger had an identity card and

a Wehrmacht pass showing that he was a member of the SS
Main Office and that his competent judicial officer was

BERGER; that the Dirlewanger unit came to Russia fully

equipped v/ith equipment from the SS Main Office of BERGERj
that Dirlewanger reported to the ^vwitness whenever he went .
to see the Chief of the SS Main Office (BERGER) and shov/ed

him the correspondence between BERGER and Dirlewanger, and
also reported the results of the conferences and of tne
arrival of shipments of equipment and supplies;that Dirle

wanger was a close friend of BERGER*S who had procured his

position; that the official connections between the two
v/ere of an intimate nature.

HO testifies that after th©

notorious Kaminsky v^as executed, a deputy of BERGER* S from
the SSHA came and reorganized his brigade #iich was subor

dinate to BERGER; that Dirlewanger called BERGER by his

first name, which was most unusual; that the Vv'xtness and
other SS officers looked upon BERGER as Kimmler's mouthpiece,
and that BERGER was the power behind the throne so far as

Himraler "was concerned; that the Dirlewanger unit and other

anti-partisan units were under the witness's tactical com
mand; that in 1943 continual cojjiplaints v/ere made about
Dirlewanger's behavior and that J-it. Gen. Schwarzenneger
/

made complaints that Dirlewanger had shot a large number
of people in reprisal measiares.

He states that Kube*e staff preferred more serious

complaints against Dirlewanger, vdn.ich the witness reported
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to BERG-ER,

He admitted that

the subordination ol' Dirle-

vjanger to bEhGEh only referred to recruitine,,

equij^ping,

arming, and supplying everything that the troops needed,
except munitions vjhich the*^^ p'ot from the lehrm.scht and

that so far as combat v/as concerned, BERGER never had any
thing Vihatsoever to do with i t .

with regard to Himmler's Posen speech he does not
think that the v.*ord "extermination" was used with regard
to Jews.

He testifies that the Kaminsky Brigade v/as sub

ordinate to

the SSHA in the same manner as the Dirlev/anger

Brigade, but that BERGER v/as not responsible for the assign

ment of the Brigade to V/arsaw, out of v;hich rose the affair

^

v/hich led to his arresting Kaminsky, having him courtmartialled and shot.

Defense witness Y^alter Hemraings testified that r.EiiGEh
v/as the competent Judicial authority for oifenses against

the general penal code and against the military penal code

^

for the RFj

the Waffen SS, but he was not superior to the

Higher SS and lolice Leaders, who had their own Judicial

^

authority, but in these matters their Jurisdiction overlapped;

^•

that both before and after 1943 the sSHA Chief was merely
competent as Judicial authority over the members of the
office who v/ere in that office, and not those located in

other places, such as for instance, at the front.

He

admits that the uirlewanger unit was composed not only of

^

poachers, but also of purely criminal offenders, and if
Dirlewanger had committed any atrocities, it was BEPlGER'S
duty to have him investigated and conduct proceedings
against him.
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On 10 October 1943 the KSHA issued orders that in all

matters concerning ^'mainly the hast", tne Chiel" of the SSHA,

SS Gruppenfuehrer (Lieutenant General) of the Vsaffen SS
BERGER {vfho was appointed by Fi"nmler as Liaison Officer-.to

,the Ministry for the Eastern Territories), should receive-a
draft or be Informed in an appropriate way.

On 17 July 1942 BERGER reported to Himmler that after
discussions with Gauleiter Meyer he had been promised that

he, BERGER, would receive all files of the Eastern Ministry
for the personal, confidential information of Himmler.

It

thus appears that BERGER had obtained an informer in Piosenberg's confidential staff.
On 14 August 1943 BERGER received from Himmler, with

the request that he confidentially inform Rosenberg

concern

ing the same, the report of Obersturmbannfuehrer Strauch of
20 July Goncei'ning ueich Commissar RuDe who had strongly
objected to Strauch's arrest of Jev^s employed by Kube, asserting that it was a serious violation of '^^is

j-^risdiction,

and that neither Himmler nor Bach-ZelevJsl-ci had authority

to interfere v/ith that jurisdiction, and vjhile Kube could

not by force prevent the SD from carrying out tie arrests,
he Y/ould, in the future, refuse to cooperate and would no
longer permit the secret Police to enter his official

building.

In this conference Kube called attention to the

mistreatment of three Rhite Ruthenian women in a sadistic

^

v/ay by SS Officer Stark who, he claimed, had unlawfully taken

»

away a suitcase of jewels and valuables,
Kube that he had

investigated
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Strauch informed

the matter and that

there was no reason to instigate any proceedings against

Stark who had acted on Plimmler's orders; that Kube protested
that Himmler had no right to order them to take any valuables
'

avifay.

Strauch even complained that Kube had raised objecticns
because expert physicians had removed, in a proper way, the

gold teeth fillings from the mouths of the Jews who had been
designated for special treatment,

unworthy of a German man# of tho

and stated that this was

Germany of nant and Goethe,

and that the reputation of Germany was oeing luined in the

vrhole •'''•orld.

Strauch virtuously ob.^ected that "we", in addi- '

to having to perform this nasty job, "were also the tarsets of
'

mud-slinging"•
The second of these reports, dated 25 July, from Strauch

to Bach-Zelewski regarding Kube's attitude, states, namely,
that the latter had displayed an "absolutely impossible atti
tude towards the Jewish question.-and vms hostllely disposed

^

to the SS: that his Area Commissar, Hachmann, on the same
question was impossible and ho was being retained by the

^
^

Gauleiter despite all warning voices; that he had complained
about a V«achtmeister who had supposedly shot Jews as "swine".

u

Strauch proceeds to give a number of examples, and
states that Kube had gone so far as to thank a Jew \;no,

at the risk of nis lixe, had gone into

Durning garage

and saved tb^ latter's car; that ^^hen an action was planned
^

against the Jewp

Kinsk Ghetto (of "-bich Kube

b^cn

previously informed), and vh.ich was to be occomplisheri by
telling the Council of Elders that 5,000 Jews of ^that area
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were

to be resettled,

Kube disclosed the nctual intention of

the Secret Police and it was an 'established fact that he had
used his 3cnowledge to attempt to rescue the Jews;

that there

fore they had to be taken by force and the use of firearms,

at

which point of the operation Kube appeared and overwholmod the

commander with abuse concerning the unheard-of happenings

which allegedly occurred when the Jev;s were herded together;
that the G-auloiter used very rough language which consid.erably hurt the sensitive feelings of the commander; that Kube

was said to have gone so f^^r as to distribute c^.ndy to Jewish
children and that on 4 March 1942 he had threatened to accuse
SS Obersturmfuehrer Burckhardt of theft because the latter

had taken two typewriters from the ghetto without a regular
receipt; that Kube had evidently complained to Rosenberg
about mistreatment of Jews in Minsk;

that,while Kube made

anti-Jewish speeches,his actions belied his words and were
only made with the intention to cover himself for later days.

Strauch stated that apparently Kube assured the G-erman

Jews,who had arrived at the ghetto before Strauch's time,
that their lives and health would be preserved;

that he had

praised, the works of the Jewish poet Schmueckle, and the music
of Mendelssohn and Offenbach;

that he had reprimanded a police

officer who struck a Jew in the face who was in possession of

the Iron Cross; th«'t,ln the course of a large scale action in
the ghetto,

i t had been learned th^t the S'"curity service of

the G-erman Jews, consisting mainly of former participants in
the

war,

were

willing

to

oppose
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the action by force of arms, ancl to avoid the shedding
of Gernan blood it v/as explained to them that a fire had

broken out in the cit37" and they (the Jews) were needed
for fire fi3htin-': activity, and thus were loaded on trucks
-

and --iven

*

special tr-atment", and when this came to IZube's

ears he " ecame excited, saying it was brutal to annihilate
front-line soldiers and that the manner of execution was

unheard of.

This was the report of Stark,.,

To a ^^erson who held the views that BERGEK now claims

to have held, and v.ho knev^ nothin.w of ^"persecutions or mass
murders, these reports by a

leadinp Nazi Party man and a

Gauleiter vrould apparently have been a

shock and v/ould have

brought at,out investigation and action.

But on 18 Ai.iyust

BfBG.JB ?aeturnecl the files to Brandt, Hitler's Adjutant,
with the calm sta';ement that after reporting bo Rosenberg
he was assured that the la'aber v:ould,

in the next fev/ da^^'s,

send Gauleiter Iteyer to I'insk and pive Kube a serious warn-

inp.

The letter further stated that Bosenbery had api-proved

Jlimmlor's Proposal that in order to settle the Latvians en
bloc in Lettpallen the form r

0";ners p^'ould be evacuated.

It is to be remembered that ELaGBR testified that

he did not knov; onythiny a.bout plans for destroyrnp Jews
and that he first heard of the ''final solution" after

his arrest and ^p-b.en he ^'es in Ihirnbery and Dachau,

Never

theless, as app^ears in his letter of 19 April 1943 to
Pimmle'r p.'bere l e dis ussod the formation of the ^ roposed

";Niiro-"c n Conf eclera bion'"', ie commented u^on tlie Ilunparian
sitla.a t ion and. s ta ted f
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"In Hungo.rip.n G-ovornment circles there exists
a well founded fear that the accession to the con
federation will be tied .up with compulsion to
liquidate the Jews."
(Italics ours).
In view of these documents i t seems impossible to

believe BERG-SR'S testimony that he knew nothing sbout plans
to destroy Jews or that he never heard about the "final solu
tion"

until after the war.

He makes no attempt to explain Exhibit 8375, nor why
Kube, who had taken a manly stand for the- protection of

German ^ews at least, and who had attempted to save 5,000
German /Jews in the Minsk ghetto from murder, and who had

indignantly denounced the treacherous slaughter of Jews who
had served in the front lines for Germany, should be given a

a "serious warning," and this quite evidently at BERGER'S own
suggestion.

He attempts to explain the statements found in

Exhibit 2383 by saying that he w.^^s merely reporting what
\

Hungarian government circles said and not any ooinion of his

own.

This explanation must be rejected as well.

Undoubtedly

the Hungarians expressed fears that their entry into the

European Confederation would be followed by compulsion to

liquidate Jews, but it was BERGER the C"e.rman who was enthus
iastic for this plan of confederation which would give
Germany the hegemony of Europe and who further said that

these Hungarian fears were "well founded,"

It was his opinion a.nd it Wf>s based on his knowledge of
the plan with respect to the Jews,

BERGER reported on 14 July 1943 to Himmler regarding a
conference with Koch, Sauckel, Kube, Meyer and KOSRNER, in
which he said, among other things?
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"Ai'ter the partisan activity had a:^ain
been "broached, I rejected all accusations most
strongly and once and i'oi-' all stated I would
not tolerate any interference with the juris
diction of the KeicIisfuehi-'er-SS "by people who
don't understand* a thinp end who furthermore —

and this, I said, was the saddest thinp I
experienced — are deceived by any atrocity

tele from any sava •;e native and would put it
before the Reich Hast I-inictry with suitable
-luotations and added frill.
Koch supported

r.ie and pointed out that it v.'as quite ridiculous
to s"^eal: so much

.

.

.

''In the follov;ln:: points I ask for s deci
sion of the Reichsfuehrer 33 . . .

"3,

By order of the Reichsfuehrer 33 the

Jews in liinsl: must either

o resettled or turned

over to a concentration camp.
ilo'", Tluhe has in
his district a larpe Danje car factory with
4000 Jews and soys that he v/ould hove to close
down this factory imme ""lately if the Jews '-'ere
taken away,
I suqpeatcd to him to contact the
Reichsfuehrer 33 via the hi ;hcr 33 ond follce
Leader and perhaps to convert this factory into'
a concentration camp.
Ihas would mean, however,
that he "'ould lose them but since, as he says,

only car production is concerned, this vovild not
mean a sacrifice for him.''

On 20 Auqust 1943 Rrsndt informed DERGLR of Himmler's
answer.

"Re. :.i0. 3,
This decision is that by order
of the Reichsfuehrer 33 t\\e Jews are to be taken
out of I-inak and to Lublin or to another ploce.
The --resent production can be transferred to a
concentration camp."

RLROHR knew what ti'.at meant.

As early as 23 July 1242

%

Ilimmler wrote hlms

"I urgently request that no ordinance

repardinq the definition of the word 'Jcvr'
be issued.
V.'e are only tyinp our own hands by
©sta" llshliR these foolish cefinitlons.
The
occupied territories v/ill be pu-r'-^ed of Jews.
The Ruehrer has charpoo mo '"ith the execution

,

•

of nartisens

•

of tJ/iia very hard order,

ho one c;-.n release

rie from this res'aonsi"'ility in any case, and

I atronply resent all interference,

Lou ^ill

1

receive memorandum from 3h'J.id"!rI3 in a

short

I.

time."

v.
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ri

The Jev;3 of Germany vere hein^; deported to the .^ast
and nav the East v/as to be ''pur^GecS'' of Jev/s,

nen xlimmler

sneaks of the Puehrer Order as being a very hard one, it

takes no imagination to loaow v/hatv/as intended -- tney \/ere

to be done av;ay v/ith.

The v/orld laiov/s, to its horror, that

the "^rogram vas carried out and helpless men, vvomen and
children by the millions v/ere slaughtered in cold olood,
V/hile EEUGE' was not in one of the extermination camps, he

played an important part in crush5.ng the complaints of even

highly placed officials like -hube and Posenoerg so tnat bhe
ghastly scheme should proceed according to plan.

Pie was

present v^en Himmler delivered his Posen speech on 4 October
1943 at a meeting of hie S3 Gruppenfuehrers.

He there spoke

of the Russian PrisonerH of b'ars

"At that time we did not value the

mass of humanity as

raw material, as labor.

value it toda;/, as

v.hat, after all,

thinking in terms of generations, is not to
be regretted, but is now deploraole by
reason of the loos of labor, is uhat the

nrisoners died in tens and hrndrecs of
thousands of exhaustion and hunger . . .

"One basic principle must be the
absolute rule for the'33 men:
must oe

honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to

members of our own blood ana to nobody
else.' bliat happens to a Russian,

Czech, does not inuerest me in tne sli^n

est.

V.hat the nations can offer

^ne

way of good blood of our type we will take,
if necessary by kidnapping

and raising them here with us. hhether
nations live in prosperity or starve to
death interests me only in so

them as slaves for our Kultur; otherri ,
it is of no interest to me, bhether
Russian females fall <3own from exhaustion

while digging an anti-tank ditch interests
me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for
Germany is finished •

•

•
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-Till

•

Wl.'ti

"The other aide docsn^t make life

easy for us.

And. you must not for.^^et that

the • ^fortT-inate position in nhich v/e sr'e

placed "by occupying

of Europe

carries with it also the ciisadvanta ;e tnatin this i-arv;e I'lave- cmon:^ ourselves, and

thus a^:ainst us, raillions of people and dozens
of forelyn nationalities. Automatically
ive have against us all those vho are con

vinced communists; v/e have apainst us ^every
Pree-r,ason, every democrat, every convinced
Christian. These'are the ideological enemies
'ivhom ^ve have a
all over .^.jurcpe and

v/hom the enemy has totally for himself • . •

I

"I also want to talk to you, quite

frankly, 'on a very grave matter.^ Among
ourselves it should "00 mentioned luite

frankly, and yet ve will never speak of

it nubiicly.

Just as we did not hesitate

on June 30th, 1934, to do the duty we

v.^ere bidden, apid stand comrades who had

lapsed, up against the wall, and shoot^them,
so \'ie have never spoken about it and will

never speak of it. It \va3 that tact v:hich
is a matter of course, and which, I am glad
to say, is inherent in us, that made us
never discuss it smon"; ourselves, never speak
of it. It appalled everyone, and yet everyone

was certain that he would do it the^next

time if such oroers are is-sued and if it
is necessary.

"I mean the evacuation of the Jews, the
extermination of the Jov/lsh race.
It s one

of these things "hich is easy to talk about
'The Jewish race is being exterminated', says

one party member,

'That's quite clear, it's

in our nrogram -- elimination of tVie Je\7s, and
v;oke doing it; exterminating them. ' 'And then
they come, 8 0,000,000 worthy Cfermans, and
each one has his decent Jew.

Of course the

others ore vermin, but this one is an A-1 Jew.
Not one of all those v/ho talk this way has

v/ltnessed it; not one of them has been through
it, host of 7/ou must know what it means v/hen
100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or
1000.

To have studl; it out and fet the same time-

apart from exception cauced by human weakness
to have remained decent fellows, that is
T/hat has made us hard.
This is the page of

glory in our history vhich has never been
v/ritten and is never to be ivritten.

DUrGk

.

.

was present at this meeting, he heard this speech

but he denies that anything was said about the externu-nation
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of the Jev/S, aiid in this he is corrohorated by von hoyrsch.
The captured phonc^raphic text of the sp^^ech v;as played to
BnnG'Jn and some^vhat srudginsly he admitted that it soimded
like Ilimmler^s voice.

\t)n hoyrsch joined the 33 in 1930.
)

H© states tnat

after 1933 itwas considered a combat unit a-ainst Bol

shevists and Communists,

Jv

Ilev/as in command of H^torized

Police in the Polish Campaign, but he denies that hev.as
involved in cleaning out any Poles; denies that he encoun

tered any opposition from the Polish insurgents and from
-

the Polish Army,• and .that every^vhere the public turned tohim for help.

He also denies that Himiriler said anything

about extermination of Jov/s in his Posei speech.

But if

his recollection of what I-immler said in this speech is as

faulty as his" recollection of his ovm actions aid those of

I

his command in the Polish c/mpaijn, li^.tle credence ccn be"
,piven to his testinjony,

In3eptemh'er 1939 Lt. Col. I^uhousen rendered a report

of an inspection trip on 20 September 193S to Poland.

Regard-

iny von Tfoyrsch he stated:

•'1215-1400,

Conference at Rzeazov; with G-2
(IC-haj. Dehniel) ; G-2 (Idaj.
Schmidt-nichtberg.)

'I

"Bxnlain situation as well as military action.
'hland D70\7 for G-2 further reports about unresus

in that Army area arising
measures taken by SfoCial
satz,3;rur'^en) of Brigadier
hbyrsch (mass shootings -

^'
;;

•

from -artly illesal
Purpose Group (Ein- •
General (Oberfuehrer)
especially of Jews).

It was annoying to the troops that youn^ men,

•

Instead of fi^htin..; at the front", v/ere testing

their courage on defenseless people.

This was an official report made contemporaneously with

the affairs vrhich it described.
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There is no reason to doubt

its accuracy, and shortly arccr it v/as v:ritten von v;oyrsch
ceased to function in command of this unit.

In view of

this report we are unable to ^ive any weight to his asser
tion that he and the other Grupp'enfuehrers would have

objected if Kimmler had mentioned the extermination of the
'

Jews.

The transcript itself, which is a captured document,

and the phonograph records made of the speech leave little
or no doubt th^t it was rendered substantially in the form
claimed by the Prosecution.

The spontaneous corroboration of the contenoc of the

Posen speech was giv:n by the witness Ilil"" ebrandt, ^ho was
himself convicted.before one of thes.e Tribunals and wno

received a 25-year sentence.

^n cross-examii ation he w^as

asked a-)out a letter writ^'r.en by Himnler inAugust, 19di, in

^

v/hich it was proposed to make hxm the Hi'^er oS and -Police
Leader for Transylvania, and v.hich concluded witn tne com
ment s

"In casd'Ilildebrandt is not there, send
the most brutal man available to that re-^ion."
He admitted receiving the letter, but saidJ
"The letter is puite beside the point.

'

^

It has no practical background and it never

had any practical reculte.

ology is"^ nothing new,

Himmle; 's phrase-

I didn't get excited

about it and I didn't tcke it seriously.
After tl is Posen speech nothing could surprise

m^'any moro.^'

^

The we1hit to be ,xven che ciefenoant SERGjljH''s assertion

that the persecution of Jews v/as abhorrent to him can be

gained from the following exhibits s 2o81 and 2382,
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on 23 July 1942 BEilGin wrote Gruppenfuehrer I.Iueller
of tiie RSI-IA, an organisation and person for vrhora he now

eiqoreasca great contempt, that recruiting in Iiungary \;as

purely a question of rroducin'; family allowances; that
negotiations wi^di the Hungarian Economic Office led to

✓

nothing for the time being; that the Hungarians said that
if Hitler wanted anything more he must occupy the country;
that a certain Saron Collas proposed to get hold somehow
of the property situated in Hun-.ary belonging to the German
Jgws which he estimated to be -orth many million pengoa.

BHHGHR ashed to be informed as soon as possible if this
means was

acticablo.

On 19 Au-^ust an order v/as issued based on a rex-^ort

of 15 August, but tbese documents vrere not amons the cap
tured d o cument s,

On 24 Hovember 1942, the Office of the Chief of security

Police and SD reportrd to Ilimmler that due to certain circuniatonces, i t was nnt
nou nossihle, at least in the near future,

to roeXibo pengos for g,SRG-g"H purposes from this property,

but that permits to emigrate'could be sold to Elovahian Jews,
as had been done in the case of Dutch Jews, for appro::imately

100,000 Swiss francs per heed, and thus BEHG3R could realize
the required 30,000,000 pengos for the recruitment of volunteers for the "Vaffen 33 in —

DUriG'.] : insists iiiat this cvmo too late rnr he obtained

the necessary fimds in another manner. Unfortunately, there
are apparently no other records available to disclose the
final history of this happy plan. But even if the siv;3eatlon came too late, the corrocpondencc clearly discloses '
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BE?vG3?. IS thoughts, and intentions, and dissipates his
nresent claim that he-as not imbued -;ith any spirit
\

of persecution.

Gabon Vanja, a fonficr j.Iungarian hinister of tho
Interior under the Saalasi government (since executed for

his ovm part in-these matters) gave an affidavit on 28

August, 1945, He deposes that on order of Szalasi he visit
♦

ed Hiroi-.iler at his Headquarters and discussed with Mm and
l-nriGllH, •".'horn he sssumod was to be 4^immlcr s r-eputy, uhe de
portation to Germany of tie romaininq i-unparian Jci/s.
./e have discussed the sad i.'^istory of tnese Jews in
our considerations in the

case of

He further deposes that Himmler ordered that the de
tails of the evacuation bo discussed tho follovring day wii^h^
hEhGdd. and Ivaltenbrunncr in bcrlin;

that this conference

took place in bcrlin on 16 beccmbor 1944, and

con

firmed Himmler's request and ordered Haltenbrunnor to ne

gotiate the details and they ivcre aproed upon; that Haltcn
brunner forced the immediate and energetic delivery^ana said
that '"rinkelnionn and Hichmann, especially tho latter, would

supervise the action;

that Ib-chmann wanted to deport oven

the women, children and old men froriPucapcst ano vhon
Vanja •"•rotcstcd,

stated that .!-crmany v.'oulo doporb une

herself,

bhcro is no "lucstion but that the deportations .v^rc

carried out and that the majority of these unforuunate people
met their deaths in German extermination camps or in the
slave la'.'or enternrises conducted '.y the 33. .

Although the defend'^'nt, by reason of Vanja's execution,

could nob cross-examine this affiant, there is no reason to
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"believe that his affidavit is not su'^atantially correcb.

If the case against BUHGUI rested uron the affidavit alone

v/e v/ouid not feel justified in findin" him .guilty, "but it
is corrohorated "by evidence ."iven "by BERGBR himself, and

which already establishes that hev/as an active party in the
of the persecution, enslavement and muroer oj. the
lev/s.

*'

Slovahian Jev/s,

t'hile the v/^tness hastncr te- tifioO unat

it v;as on BERGlRiS rccomriiendction to Ilimralcr that the re-

^

maininp Jevs in Slovakia v/cre deported to exterminabion camps,
ICastner's testimony rests solely upon hearsay,

The source

of this hearsay, Becher, v/ae not produced as a v;itncss, nor
any reason ^ivon for the failure to do so,
'.!q therefore hold that t^:is charge has not been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt, and v;ith re^^ard to .^Icvckian Je\\3
t

.

,

,

BERGb L must be and is exonerateo,

Danish Jev/s;

The Prosecution relics upon a letter irom

Ilcitel to uie German >^rmy Commander in Denmark, stating, among

other thinas, that S3 Obergrup": ehfuehrcr BBRGbR, would be in^
•charge.of the deportation of the Danish Jo-s. Jhxs, however,
is the only evidence on this -'hase of ti.iC mabt.^r.
insists that Kelt el was :.n error and the operation wac in
r

>

charge of someone else.

There is no evidence other than

ircitol's,

•re hold that proof of girilt beyond a reasona^ae doubt
• has not been e.sta^-lished and we exonerate BERGh i of guilt
as to this particular chargo.
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special Commando - Dlrlev/anger.

Dirlev/an";;er v/aa .an old

comrade of 3ERG"_fi M from the first '"orld :7ar, and v/hile a

savage and aliillful fishtor, v/aa a man of unsavory characuer
in many respects, which hEhGhP. himself admits,

Dirlev/anper

had heen convicted of sexual crimes spainst a minor, hut
BERG-ER asserts that he w aa of t'\e opinion that the convic
tion v/aa the result of a personal quarrel whichDirle^/anper

had Y/ith one of the XTasi officials; that he ohtsined Dirle-

v/an^er'a release and had him sent to Spain as a memoer of the
German Condor Legion where he fought on "behalf of rranco,
^ that on his return he succeeded in having Dirlev^anper rein
stated in the 3S as Oberaturmhannfuehrer.

It was BERGSR'3 idea that for partisan fighting in

the East, a battalion of poachers be organized.

±-immler

approved this suggestion and BLPGLR'3 recommendation that
Diriewanger train and comimcnd this battalion.

It was assigned to the fast and immediately started on

a career of savagerg^, plunder and corruption, which brought
it to the unfavorable attention of German officials v.ho had
an opportunity to learn of its conduct,

fhe prosecution called T.onrad horgen, who had boen
conscripted into the

and in October 1940 sent to the oS

I'ain Court as a Judge,

lie v/as with the 33 Police Court VI at

Cracow;

in Pay 1942 was relieved of his duties and demoted

because of an acquittal he had -ranted and sent to the front
as an ordinary soldier;

he was recalled to the police

courts in June 1942 and v:a3 in charge of investigations at
concentration camps.

In passing, it may be stated that it

v/as he who was originally responsible for the investigation,
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trial, and subsequent executio'^ of the rt) torious Koch who was
Coaimandant of the Buchenwald concentration camp.

As Judge, his task was to investigate and prepare crim
inal cases and,when not in charge of investigations, he acted

as Presiding Judge.

His jurisdiction covereci all members of

the Waffen SS and Police Troops on active duty, but not mem
bers of the Wehrmacht.

In the beginning of 1942 he noticed that there had been

many convictions of the members of the Dlrlewanger unit for

plundering and mistreatment of the civilian population.

He

discovered that all the members of this battalion had been

previously convicted of offenses.

against Dirlewanger.

There were also complaints

This unit was not a part of the Waffen

SS but was a supplementary police unit.

AJ that time it con

sisted purely of poachers with previous convictions, but later
on inmates of concentration camps and other criminals were

transferred to the unit.
a

It finally reached the strength of

division.

His investigation at Lublin among German agencies and
the Security Police revealed that this unit was a pest and a

terror to the population; that Dirlewanger on repeated occa
sions plundered the ghettos in Lublin, would arrest Jews on

the charge of ritual murder, exact blackmail up to 15,000
zloty, and if the money was not forthcoming, have the victim

shot.

It was charged that he arrested young Jewesses, called

in a small circle of friends,

stripped the women of their

clothes, beat them, and finally geve them an injection of
strychnine and watched them die; that the testimony concern
ing these incidents was obtained by witnesses and th^ crim
inal police.
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The witness deemed it urgent to arrest Dirlev/angcr

and to investigate these frightful crimes.

He reported to

Ohergruppenfuehrer Eruegor at Cracow and asked for an order

of arrest,

Hrueger reported that there was nothing he could

do "because he was not competent and that the detachment was

subordinate exclusively to the orders of HSRG-jH.

Hjcueger

immodictoly phoned I3HHCHR at 'dorlin and after denouncing
1

Dirlewanger informed HGIiC-jH that upless this bunch ox crimi

nals disappeared from the Governncnt General vntnin a v/cek

I will go myself and lock them up''.

finall'^ •^•romisod

to do everything ho could and in approximately two v/ool:s the
unitwss transferred, but not as the v/itness thought to the

Reich, and Dirlewangor punished, but, to his svirprise, iu
v/as sent to Central Husslc, to llogilev.

However, cne witness

sent the files with the report to the Commander and the

Supreme Judicial Authority concerned, "but nothing was done and
Dirlcwrn ;or v;as rroraoted,

V/hile BHRGER violent3yfttacks the testimony and credi

bility of the T-itness, nevertheless his ovin report to -limmlcr
of 22 Juno 1C42 corroborates it in part?

"Nov/ it is peculiar that the surprise
attacks by partisans started all of a sudden
when Dr,Dirlewangor ' s oonderkomnando v;as
removed from the district by more or less
fair

moans.

"Perhaps this is also now a warningthat a savage country cannot
governed
in a

'decent manner' and that tVie Goncer--

kommando's policy 'to rather shoot two
Poles too many tlian one too few' was right,
"Considering the weakness of this
commando and referring to the follo^aing

data, I request pvormiscion to again comb
the penal institutions in close collabor
ation with 33-Gru-nponfuehrer Luoller and
after thoroughly examining them, to train
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all men sentenced for poaching and to use them
for reinforcing the old Sond'erkommando, and
for forming a nev; second one."

It v/as the practj.ce of the Dirlev/snger Brigade to seize

villages, shut the inhabitants in barns, set them afire, and
shoot dovrn the living torches vhen they tried to escape, and
to clear roads of mines with serried ranks of peasants i/ho
v/ould v/alk down the roads thus exploding the mines, v/ith the
result that thousands v/ere thus blown to pieces.

On 25 June, 1943, Bach-Zelewski rendered an official

report on Operation Cottbus, in which he stated that two
to three thousand local people lost their lives in cleaning

up mines, 3,709 v/ere liquidated, and 599 v/ounded; 4,900 men
and 600 v/omen v/ere assigned for labor, with German losses of
✓

only 83 killed, and 473 wounded, and non-German auxiliary
losses of 39 killed, 152 wovinded and 14 missing.

The disproportion in losses between the partisans
and the German troops indicate n6t v/arfare but massacre.

Further corroboration as to the true nature of Dirle-

v/anger's activities can be seen from the recitation of his
merits when, in August, 1943> he ^v/as awarded the German Cross

of Gold, - that his battalion had wiped out 15,000 guerrillas
at a loss to itself of 92 dead, 218 wounded and 8 missing.

In July 1943, defense witness Bramtigan submitted to
BERG3R a series of reports of murder and outrages comraitted

against the helpless inhabitants of "^ hite Ruthenia which, as
the Reich Commissioner for tliat territory stated, "Supplies
the answer to the puzzle why even after large scale operations
the number of partisans would not decrease but actually
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increase, and why food supplies for the home front and
the front line from the embattled areas grew scantier

instead of going up.

furthermore, reports show tliat any

propaganda moves after such operations have ended, opera
tions v;hich are terminated by mass shootings of the entire

population, are completely useless," and, "if the treat
ment of t he indigenous population in the Occupied fastern
Territories is continued in the same manner which has been

used up^oviT, not only by the police but also by the O.T.
(Organiv:ation Todt), then in the coming v/inter we may
expect not partisans but the revolt of the whole country.

• • • » • • The Regiment jjirlewanger is particularly promi
nent in that type of operation.

It is composed almost

exclusively of previously convicted criminals of Germany."
gfRGSR'S reaction is shovm by his letter of 13 July
1-943, where he says £

"I deenly regret that reports of this sort
are being relayed unchecked, that much confusion
is being stirred up and above all things that the^
confidence in close cooperation is being destroyed.
In the case at hand it is my opinion that it would

have been the dut^^ of Commissar General Kube to^

ascertain the accuracy of the reports to his satis
faction on the spot and then to get in touch with

the competent 33 and Police Leader, SS-3rigadefuehrer

von Gottberg, or with the chief in charge of
fighting partisans, S3 Obergruppenfuehrer von dem
Bach.

We can alter nothing here in any case, for you

cannot give orders to a troop v/'jthout personally
having exect insight into the situation. Loreover, perhaps Herr Kube's attention can still be
called to the fact thct for the most part these

'criminals' are former Party members v.ho were forra-

erly punished for poaching or for some stupid action,
are now taken out and allo^''ed to prove themselves,

and this they do wit'., an incredible percentage of
bloody losses."

On 16 July 1943 B. .aGBPi received an order from himmler
to inform the Reich Linistsr for the —ast that the campaign
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against the partisans v;as ^oing -uite according oo schedule
and "Jolhynia and Podolien vfould he the next on the lisu.
On d r.ay 1944
v/rote :1randt, head of liimniler' s
Personal otaffJ

"In the case of the Dirlewanger reginent
and the whipping scene at i-insh^ a letter^j.roni
I?eichsleiter Kosenher;;. was seiit to the Reichsfuehrer SS» Since t.ie j.weichsxuehrer has not^

yet ap''~rocched tue on this sujject I assume unat

•^ou have Icent this leo'cer hacli for tne time

fDein-^.

i^ike other letters it did not go through

m"^ hands, or I v/ould^jiay^e^ changed it.*' (Italics ours)

'

"As is """ell Imown, there are a number of
peor^le in the hast hinistry who do not want
to act as I do and are pleased when conflicts^

gpj^3g, hiudly suggest to tne Rei ens fuehrer
to address the following or a similar letter to

Jloichsleiter Rosenberg

'Dear Party Ilembcr Rosenberg?

»0n p?incr-^le I share your view, and I
am not at all pleased 'hien an incident such
as one in IlinsV: occurs, .^owever 1 am convincea
that wou can fully understand it if I cannot at
wresent involve gg-3tandartenfuehrer Dr.Dirle-

1

wanger in an invest! ;ation as I need him most

badly for the safeguarding of that area,'"

T^he manner in which these operations againsu vartisans

were conducted is clearly disclosed hy Dxhihit 2370, in which

it appears that in the four months' period of August,

SepteniDer', October and ITovember, 1942, 1,337 bandits were
counted dead after engagements, 737 prisoners immediately
executed, 7,828 executed after questioning, and thac ox

>

accomplices and guerrilla suspects, 14,257 were executed,
and 365,211 Jev/s were executed,

j

linRGhR'o personal interest and sense of propietorship
in Dirlewanger and his -:rigadc is shown hy his communication
of 1. October 1943v wherein he stated?
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''This chanje of opinion is probably cue 'to
the unnualixiecl' conduct of my special unit "Dr.
birlewanper v;ho, so far as
can ascertain, h.as
behaved in a most unsatisfactory manner in

everj'" respect."
'•.'hile

in the field

the imit vas not under his tactical

direction, it '."/as or^anii^cd by him, trained by the man vhom
he selected, the idea r'3s his, he hept it and j.ts commander
under his protection, \ig was repeatedly informed of its

aavape and uncivilized behavior, which he not only permitted

to continue, but attempted to justify; he foupht every effort
to have J.t transferred or dispersed, re'commended its commander
for promotion and covered him with the mantle of his protection.

That one of the purposes for \7hich the '"rl^ade was or33niEed
was to comTiit crimes apainst humanity and that it did so to
an e;:t3nt which horrified and shocked even IJazi Commissars,

and Ptosenberp's Linistry for the Pastern Territories, who can
hardly be justly accused of leniency tcr'ards the Jews and people

of the Jastern territories, is shown beyond a doubt.

bjPiGPu'o

responsibility is quite as clear.

re is GUILTY with respect to the matters chsrpcd apainst

him re^ardinp the actions of the Dirlev.'anper Unit and 're so
find,

^ecial Trea^ent__of h'creipn nationals.

The term ''special

treatment"' had a well-rcco'':niaed meaninp in Hazi Germany.
It meant execution or at beet confinement in a

concentration

camp, ti/.e latter beinp, in most instances, the substitution
of a lin-jerinp death for a ^ulch one.
if any, part

and the SGI!A played in the treatment of

foreipn nationals.
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'Ve will consider - hst,

nimmler v/aa infected with the idea that German olood

must not he contam5-neted by hein.-"^, mingled v/ith that of v/hat
he termed to be inferior "peonies, and that those v;ho violated

his decree on this subject should and v;ould be subject to
"s''"'Gcial treatment" unless "it was shown that they wore of

suitable Aryan groups or outstanding individuals v/hose blood
might be valuable to German^-,

hildebrandt, one of hhhGDh^G witnesses and head of the

Gi rain Office hsce and Settlement, having engaged in one of

the usual jurisdictlonal disputes with the head of tAe Security
and Police Office, reached an agreement, under the date of 20

August, 1013, that the tasl: of negatively eliminating the un
desirables was that of the Security Police and that of aclect-

In"; those raciallp" qualified belonged to tbe Ofilce -lace and
Settloraont (T^uGrA).

The prosecution alleges that examiners of g-gfiGfh ^b SS

I'ain Office undertook to make jsacial examinations in cases
of tliis kind and that he bears criminal responsibility there
t

for.

That these examiners made sv.ch examinations is estab

lished by the evidence, but there is serious doubt whether
SfhGhh or b.i3 ham Office are rosponsrble for their actions.
The eecaminers v/ere detaj.loc; "i^o .ignG-iP by che

physic. 1 examinations of rccru'les for tne ''.axfen

eo conouct

-'-ne

weight of the. evidence is, hcvevcr, that in mal-in , uie socalled racial examinations, 'ulicso men were not subjoco to

3hRG-,gi3 control, but to that of the bureau from vhich they
were detailed,

he have no doinbt that .ibnG^il'S o_j.lce Imew

of the latter activity, but there is a reasonable doubt that,
when acting in that capacity, he had jurisdiction over them.
Therefore, v.-e find him HOT 'rJILTY with respect thereto.

-366-

necruitin^ of Ccncenl:rai:ion Camp Ouards, It is unnecessary
/

for us to elaborate v/bat has lon':^ since been established

re^arclinc; German concentration comrs,

They rere conceived

in sin and born l.n ininuity, and the subsequent consequences
were the natural result of both their parentage and environ
ment ,

Although it is clainod the^'" were first used for the
imprisonment of communists and convicted criminals, it is

clear beyond question that from the be^lnniny they were

utilirad for the imprisonment of those who disagreed with
ITazl policy or became the objects of Nazi persecution.
In time their inmates included those persecuted for relig

ious beliefs, such as Catholic Priests, Protestant pastors,

as well as political opponents, Jews and foreigners who
rebelled against their lot or who transgressed against

the cruel conditions under which they were compelled to

v;ork.

Peoples of ever^'" country who fell under German domina

tion and control were num".')ered among the victims of this
system.

It is one of t!ie main insignia of German terrorism.

Although in this case every defendant disclaims knowledge of
what actually went on in them, each looked upon them as
places of !iorror from w'^lch he sought to protect those in
whom he hoc
^

an interest.

After the outbreak of the ^-ar and during its progress

they were t!:e means of terror used to keep both German and
other populations under coriurol,

BSPiGAR does not deny that he and his agency recruited
the guards of these ccm^s at loast imtil 1942, ksny of
these guards were recruited from the SS,
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There are strong

.

•>

inaications that this was lihev/ise true as late as 1944,
"but it is immaterial whether his aetivities ended in

1942 or continued thereafter.

His defense is ihat his re

cruits v/ere only used as exterior guards and had nothing
\

to do v/ith v/hot v/ent on in the interior of the camys .

The evidence shows tho.t amon^ the records in this
'case there are exhibits showing he furriished -uards for

luchemvala, Auschwitz and Oranienours, and for'camps hold#

•

ing Jews v/orking as slave laborers for Organisation lodt.
BHHCrhR claims that it seems incredible that a man

'

holding the high rank in the 33,that he did not know
of the atrocities committed in these camfs, "but that

nevertheless he did not l:nov7.

'.''e do not "believe him.

His

close official and personal relations with Himmler,.the hi.-ph

positions which he held under Ilimiuler, the fact that he v;as

j

present and Vieard Ilimmler's Pcsen speech i-reclude the claim .
of ignorance v/hl'ch he now maizes.

/

iTor are v/e impressed with the defense t'jst taese
recruits were used for er.terior s^ard duty only, and
therefore were not responsible for the atrocities com

mitted v>hthin the camps.

On direct examination he testi

fied'.

''1 hrw, of course, it may be possible
to SET'a iri^ihf, but still there is a possibility

that these puards tool: part in maltreatment of

Inmates which v,'ere perpetrated outs ice the con

centration camp.

ilie innumerable Dachau trials prove

that such thin~3 did actually occur.
me continue.

But^let

^

It was only the most insipnii ican.u

cart of these atrocities that were committed oy
members of the S3. That was done by -eople whom
I had essia;ned to that job at one time or anooaer,
but over 90 » wa-s werpetrated by tne so—calleo

members of tb.e Lsndschutcen battalions vho were

assi'^ned after 1942 by Polil from the Army, from
the Luftwaffe and t^-.c xTavy, for -uard purposes
in the camr."
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If we are to assume that his statements were true,

nevertheless he is not thereby relieved of responsibility'".

These car.ips were an intef^ral part of the Nazi program of

oppression, slave labor, terrorism and extermination.

They

were the means whereby the ITazi Party maintained its power
over the CJerman people and over the peoples, of nations

occupied or controlled by it,

'To maintain and administer

them obviously required both e::terior and exterior puards.
The defendant furnished the exterior yuards and if, as we

find to be the fact, these camps were of liie character just
described and the defendant Imev" of it, wbich we also find

to be the fact, he ;^articipated in the crime.

The fact, if it be a fact, that neither he nor the
,(guards participated in shcotinps, beatinps, starvations

and other maltreatment can only be considered if at all

in miti ;auion of the o:'fen3e^,

h'e find the dei'endant h.lHGPR

GUILTY of the crimes against humanity as a conscious parti
cipant in the concentration camp program.

£onscjri;ption_of_lT^^^

,9.f pther_^^Cqunj:jrie^

3YRGYR, in

1930, set. up the Recruitinp Office of the Waff en 33 and
on 1 July lOoC he become the' official chief of that office,
a position v.''..:.ch he- retained until 31 December 1939.

Upou

the reorsanization of the 33 i;:ain Office on 1 January 1940
%L

he became its chief and was thereafter responsible for the
recruitment of the Waffen O".' until thd close of the v:ar.

In t'le enrly part of the '-'ar there were undoubtedly
a larpe number of foreipn volunteers to the ^"affen S" .
Such recruitment is, of course, perfectly lef^al.

The Prose

cution alleped, ho^^ever, that durinp the war larpe numbers
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of fore 1311 nationals were conscripted into the V/affen 33
contrary to the principles of international law and that
these cri'.UGS constitute a crime apainst humanity.

If> as

has been often held, it is a -crime to conscript foreign

nationals to slave labor, it is a crime of equal rank to

conscript them into the Army to fi^ht, "bleed ana die.
As the war progressed Germany suffered severe losses
of mannover.

It adopted conscription as to its own nationals

and in many instances of foreign nationals livinp within its
borders,

^"e hold that it is not illegal to recruit prisoners

of war who volunteer to fight against their own country, but

pressure or coercion to compel such persons to enter into
the armed services obviously violates international law.

On 24 January 1945 33nG3?t, as Commander of the Reserve

Army and Chief of Prisoner of V.ar Affairs, issued an order
which, after reciting that many applications had been received
from Russian prisoners of war to join General V/lassow^s Army
of Liberation, added that as a result, negative elemencs
/

among the Russian "^^r is oners had become more active^ thac in
order to remove these unfavorable influences ano to insure
the success of further recruiting, it y/ as ordered *uhat pris

oners of war who v/ere known to be ring leaders for suoversive

propaganda were to be immediately removed from the laoor unit
and transferred to the 3D and those subversive elements who

were not active ring leaders v/ere to be listed for remo/al

at c moment's notice;

that the isolation of these subversive

elements v/as not possible at the time because of t .le work
to be done.
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It is unnecessary to aiain explain what was uieant

h^r-'transfer to the 3D=', In most instances it meant
death.

Such an order clearly violates the rules o^ v.'ar

and that its issuance had a marhed stimulation of recruila
ment of fussian prisoners of v.'ar requires no proof.

j-he

safe way to avoid heinj classified as an a ctive or posicive
subversive element would oe to volunteer.

prisoner of

war who endeavored to persuade his comrades not to fijhu

against his "brothers thereby violated no rule of war and
such conduct would, under no possibility, subject him oo

legal punishment, or would.justify his being turned over
to the SD.

fhat these measures were effective and tnau in many

cases the so-colled Russian ''volunteers

conscri''"^tec is clear.

were in fact

Pegelein reported to xiimmler,

apparently in February 1945, th.ot tne volunteers

had

stated that they would on no account fight against their
compatriots".

Ris report further stateds
"2,

A large number had already deserted

to the other side.

"3. Several members of the lerman Leader
Personnel had already been killed by the volun
teers, and finally that the Leader Personnel
are afraid of being killed by the volunteers
in contact ""''ith the ene'.iy ond are anxious as

to liOw they can get away."
"fhile we do not overlook t'":e possibility that

Russian prisoners of war may have volunteerec. * itli the express
intention of desertin , at the earliesi: practicaole momeno,

-571

-'k;
,1"r.l

nevertheless when re^elein^s rc-ort is considere'in
connection with BSRGIiiR'S CRDhR ahove referred to, the

conclusion is inescapaole that more than ordinary per

suasion v/as used hy

Oj-flce to induce Russian

prisoners of v/ar to enter tne llassov' Army ox Libera
tion.

On 8 September, 1044, C-reiser wrote Himnler
relative to the' conscription of sll able-bodied Germans from

Russia, Includln- those not yet nr-turaliaed, and ashed
that certain exemptions be Granted covorlny certain

or.G^nisa 'ions of hxs ov/n.

lie SuS aeo uha t ^jjxRG-jR some

months nrevlously had a.Gi'eed to this reservation.

fhe

persons thus to be considered v;cre not German nationals but
were people of German blood who were citizens of Russia. Ghe
action was wholly without sanction of law and in patent
violation of international law.

On 16 June, 1940, LBRGGR -wrote Brandt, Himmler^a

Adjutant, with remand to recruitment of the Rrinz ^.u^en
Division in Croatian

'*The Reichsfuehrer 33 has pro

claimed

compulsory service for

the racial proup in the Serbian territory,
i.e.. Dr. Janho — Ibie Serbian territory
is under German sovereignty since^it is

occupied by Germany.

Rrom the point of

nublic law there can be no objection,

leavlnp apart the puestion that really
nobody'cares what we do down there wi.h
oiiT racial iermana

.

•

•

-t;yo ^reclaim compulsory service for
Croatia and Serbia is impossible under

public, law.

And' it as not at all necessary
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either, for -when a racial group is under
moderately good leadership, everybody
volunteers, alright, and those vh o do
not volunteer get their houses broken to

pieces.

(Such cases have occ\irred in the

Rumanian Banat dur Ing the last few days)."
The SS Main Legal Office, on 12 J'anuary 1943, wrote
to BERGER'S Main Office that the Division Prinz Eugen was

no longer an organization of volunteers but that on the
contrary, the Ethnic .Germans from the Serbian Banat were

drafted, to a large extent, under threat of punishment by

the local German leadership, a nd later by the nei'lacement
•Agencies

(BLKGLh ' S) .

Kasche of the P'oreign Office, in his report of June
25, 1943, llV-ev;isc complained of the r uthless reomitlnp:
methods used in Croatia,

d'he defense that these measures were taken under

agreement between Germany and the sovereign state of
Croatia is v/lthout merit.

Croatia v/as a puppet created

by Germany, existed under and only so long as It wa.s
backed up by Germa n arms.
a state.

It was neither sovereign nor

The so-callcd Internal agreements v;ere suggostod

and Imposed by Germany and accepted by Croatia because it

was without power to do anything else and

Its government

existed only when backed up by German bayonets.

Nor is

there any substance to the contention tl:iat those drafted

and conscripted were ethnic Germans a nd ttierefore subject

to German lav; of conscription.

The German government had

no more jurisdiction over ethnic Germans in Europe than It
had over ethnic Germans in the United States.
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They are

not German nationals but citi'-.cns of their respective
nations»

Under the

ilimmler decree,

''persons of Germanic origin v/ho do not apply
for . . . repatristion are to be turned over
to the German State Police and if they do
not chance their minds within eij^t days
are taken into protective custody for trans
fer into concentration cam^s,''

An act of naturalisation under auch circumstances is not
voluntary.

fhe program carried out in Serbia, Croatia, and the
Protectorate was likewise carried out in Latvia, Lithuania,

Poland, llussio, Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine.

Seyond

question, of doubt, the defendant LLnGLR is -^.uilty of a
crime apcinst humanity v;hen he and '.is agencies took part

in a program v/hic'n subjected citisens of those countries
b^'" forced ' ermanization or other ways, to be conscripted
into the German armed forces,

fhe defense has attempted to picture BERGJR as a man

of humane and kindly instincts, ^averse to persecutions of

anj kind.

But this ^ictui'^e fades in the face of a letter

found in the Party files in Stuttyart, written on 4 Lay 1953
This was after tiae seizure of "701 er, and 'le said?

"dho Special Gom;-.:.issars are to be
instructed that they nov; have to discontinue
arrests and that applications for release
are to be considered favorably.
A balance
has to remain on t''.c Ileubery# fverythiny

unnecessary only eabs U". our money and v/e
will afterv/ardha e nothinp left i or the

training. Lejp th£"n c\v'l a/ld^lpT they resist
^hqqt them down. A r.iu.ch simp1er so 1ution
and dn^~v^rcir""I's more favorable to us.
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I t woul'^ be

t'~

conceive of a more callous

brutal ~)o llcy aimef^ ?.t tb«^t time,

oppp.rently,

to

SA

funf^s so that tbey coul'^. be use"^ for training- ourp'^ses.
BERCtSR explains that he ^lees not remember or rec^cnize t^e
letter but i t came from the h''uerttenberff Party files of

Stuttgart anc' it bears the typeh. signature "Chief of Branch

G-roup Wuerttenberg, " signed,

"G. 3IRGSR, Oberfuehrer. "

Wo have no loubt as to its genuineness anc^ i t is

significo.nt to note that he does not deny that he wrote it.
We find, the defendant isbRGER GUXLTX under Count Five
of the Indictment.

During the concluding months of the war,

the record,

shows thet the defendant BLHGER was the means of saving the

lives of American, British grid Allied Officers and men whnse

safety was gravely imperiled by orders of Hitler that thoy be
liquidated or held as hostages,

3BRGER disobeyed orders and.

intervened on their behalf, and in so doing place'^' himself
*

in a position of hazard.

These are matters of extenuation

which the Tribunal will take into consideration in fixing: his

^

sentence.

/
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botil::-:

Berendsnt ERITo'I" "ILrijLI

BOEIZi) joined the ITazi

Party on I'arch 1, 1932, received the Golden Party Badye
in 1937, and also received t'le C-olden Hitler Youth Badye.

on Ila^r G, 1933, he hccaae Chief of the Party's Auslsnds
Organization (AO) v;hlch had jurisdiction over German
nationals liviny outsi* e Germany,

Jle held this la'c aer

office until 1 Hay 1945,

BOIILE oecsnie the Gauleiter of

the AO in October, 1933,

On 30 January 1937 fOIILt became

Chief of AO in the Foreign Office and in December of that

year he received the rank of State Secretary.

He remained

in the Forei~^n Office until 14 ITovember 1941, but: kept his
title without pay until the collapse.

DOl'ILE v/as a protege of y.ess, or at least vas looked
upon as such, and v/hen tlxe latter fled to Fn-sland in 1941

BOHL:'] fell from po\''er and v/as relieved of his duty and
re3ponsibilit3'- in the Foroiyn Of;'ice.

Although a Gauleiter, he had no povernmental --owers

over any territor^^", but his organization was the sole a ;ency
competent for th^ entire activity'' of the Party abroad,

in so far as German nationals residins abroad v;ere concerned,

and he

the s:me jurisdiction over them as the Gauleiters,
V

in t'n.eir territorial sovereiGioity, had over "fee populations
of their territories or Gaus,

• In October, 1940, the Voreicn Office received a

telegram fromAbetz, German Av.bessad-or to the Vichy Govern
ment, in v/hich he su-pested a collective expatriation

procedure for Jews in the occupied portions of Prance as
shown by lists made in an agreement by Abetz with the hiyh

party leaders.

Ihis ^-roposed procedure included Austrian
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Hews who had not chsn'jed their Austrian rass^orus for

German passports heforc 31 Decsnher 1933, and Heich j-ernian
jev/3 v/ho had not resistered "before 3 February 19^8.
was on the distribution list but out attention has nou oeen

directed to any document or otlier evidence indicabin^ Traether

he or any of his representatives were amonf t-ie '*hi_.h arcy
leaders''' to whom Abets made reference.

In attemptiny to conn-ect nOHLf v/ith the offenses

charged in Count five, the Prosecution relies on fOIILi'S
speech', on 7 or 8 November 1938 on the occasion of the
funeral services of von iiath, a Poreiyn Office of.Lici3l

attached to the German iilribaEsy in ^-aris, assassinabOd oy

Gruenspan, a Jev, in which f O'ilL"; opeeks of von Hatn as uhe
eirrhth victim of Jewiah-'^-olshevist murder schemes and thv t
o

'

t,ie Jew wanted, accordlnf to Gruenspan's testimony,

hit C-ormany.

Gut we find nothing in Unis speech sufficiently

concrete and e,xpliclt to connect

OHL„. v/ith any of the

offenses charged in Gotant five.

In the early part of ISbV, and continuously at least
until I.-arch 193G, the Def ondsnt. GOHhG and the AO urged the
cancellation of the Paavara Agreement by vhich Jevs cesir-

ing to emigrate to Palestine, or ^'ho had emigrated to that
/

land, ' ere enabled to realise their ierman assObS, in irnole
f

or in part, by making purchases of German commodities for
ahipmont 'here, and 'laving the amount thereof charged
against their blocked credits in the 3eich.

After much

correspondence and several conferences, and after consioerablo opposition from other departments or sections
in the :''oreign Office and from the i-inistry of .economy

apparently they succeeded.

fhe object, ho?/ever, was not
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to prevont the emisration of Jews, "but to prevent their
ertil:Si'atin3 to Palestine ancl sottin- up a Jewish State there,
and that hy these transactions German commodities were trans
ported without Germany receivln3 forei-n exchange in return,
and third, that thereby Jev;s were being enaoled to take
their assets out of the country.

V:e are unable to see, however, that these transac

tions v.hich started in 19S7, and were concluded about Larch,
1938 were so connected with the aggressive war and crimes

against -e ace as to render it reasonably ceytain that the
measures had this in view.

It is, of course, a part of the un-

holy program of oppression of the Jews by the i.asi Paroy,
but, however much such measures may shock one^s moral sense,
it is not an offense which comes vjithin the jurisdiction of
the Court unless the proof clearly'* shows that it was con

nected with crimes against peace.

That link is missing.

In August 1943, the AO endeavored to compel the
discharge of Jews employed- in Rumania by German firms, but
this took place long after hOULR^S activity in public
bf-flceg.

The Prosecution asserts, that . he Foreign Office

correspondence regarding its plane to have BOHLC testify
in the Gruenspan trial indicates BOIIIE'S criminal responsi
bility under Count Five. The trial never took place, and,
of course, POKLE did not testify and such facts do,
not constitute a basis for conviction.

In support of its contention that BOHLE v/as a guilty
participant in the so-called resettlement of Germans on
lands confiscated from Poles and Jev/s in the incorporated

gastern territories and Government General, the Prosecution
cites himmler's decree viiich implemented Ritler s defree

of 7 October 1939, by vhich he was constituteo Reich
Comr.isr.ar of germandom.

Ihe .-imr.iler decree charged tie
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PO and VClcn

the taak of bringing in the German? a.nd

the ethnic Germans for purposes of resettlement.

Various

other duties were a-signed to other departments and agencies
of the Heioh.

The defendant T^^'"L5!R a-^oointed one George Christians,

one of BOfTEVS subordinates, as a member of the Aufsichtsrat
of the DUT (German Hesettlement Trusteeship, Ltd., Liability
Comoany), ivhich nomination

enproved by Rimmler.

Christif^ns thereafter acted, in that capacity.

But here the

evidence stops. There ir no evidence that Christif^ns, in

this capacity, acted for BOFTE and no evidence of Christians*
activity in the DUT.

The DUT was a part of the infamous plot

for depriving ^oles end Jews of their property and turning it
over for resettlement t® Reich and ethnic Germans.

However,

our attention has not be-n called to, and we have been unable
to find, Pny evidence th^^t BCKIU*U organization took any part
in the so-called Germanization or resettlement ^rogr^m.

Jnust, therefore, be ejronereted with respect

He

to this phase

of the oa.se,

acts and those of his department in persuad

ing German business firms to discharge Jewish employees

working for them abrcad, while reprehensible from a morel
standreint, do not oom.e within the scope of either Count
Five of the Indictment or of the crimes defined by the
/

London Charter "^nd

Control Council law No.

10.

The same

is true with resr^eot to his efforts to have the Haavara

ii,greement abrogated.

••re,

yi', ;•

.y-

••'

therefore, Ji.CQUIT him under Count Five.

•

..

-
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R^J±d
I •

•DAHIffi, as early as August, 1930, became Iiitler's
advisor on agricultural questions.

He became a member of

the Party in the same year, and of the SO in 1951, and rasa yoichsleiter for A irarian Policy from 1933 until hev/as
deprived of official functions in 1940.

T'ewas a

ncmbor of

the 3S and "became a Gturmbannfuehrer, and throu'ih inter-

mejdia"".e promotions rose to the '^rade of Cher^ruppenfuelirer

in ITovembe , 1934. He v^as elected to the Reichstay in 1932
and was Reichminister for 7oocl and Agriculture, and Heich
Peasant Leader from 1933 to 1945, but ras relieved of his
duties from 12 i:ay 1942.,

He v/as Ch: ef of the

Race and

Settlement Office from 1931 to 1933, and received the

Golden Party badpe in 1935,

He also held other offices,

all of v/nichverc connected v/ith a^Rricultural affairs*

.

He had interes cd himseIf in problems of apr icu,lture and

hereditar*^'" land ovmersbi^ and -"'blood and soil", vhich

activities probably first attracted Hitler's attention and
he utilised DARRL in the Party's drive to interest farmers
and acsrictiltural norlrers in the Hazi Party,
Some of his ideas v;ere novel and sonevhat bizarre,
but

it

is not a

crime to evolve and advocate nerr or

unsoimd social and economic

theories.

.

even

This Tribuaaal is

only interested in 1f;hat he did and what he advocated v/hich

Qorneswithin the scope of the Indictment, the. London Charter
and Control Council Lav/ Ho.

10, .

Anti-Semitism. A careful examination of DARRH'S speeches
found larr^ely in Books 102 and 103, reveals a

Jewish feolin;^.

stronp anti-

His statements are intolerant, "rejudiced,

and disclose a profound i^pioronce of history, economics,
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and religious philosophy. Thus, for example, is his
theor^r that the foundations of democratic government

are solely the product of Semitic philosophy, v.hich,

of course, altogether overlooks the fact that one of
the earliest forms of complete clcmocracj'- v;as the politicol organization of the early Germanic trihes where

the chief v/aa elected by the members of the tribe, held •
office only so long as the tribe or council approved of
his actions, and whose- office was not hereditary, and
where the laws were enacted not by him but by the tribal
council,

-

all of this before the Germanic tribes had-

been converted to Christianity and in a coiontry v-here a
Jew v/as an unknown as the dodo.
/

DAKRE*S speeches attack the Jev/s and Democracy,
but he also attacked the Prussians and Prussianisnio

But

this is a phenomenon laiown to all societies and nations.

Individuals and groups arc rronc to blame ills in the body
politic and economy to groups, - bankers, capitalists,
labor rnions, convervativcs and radicals, - all depending
upon the indivldvial point of vlo'-.

Such criticism is

often the result of ignorance and instability, but, except
in an authoritarian state, it has not yet been auggostod,
as a matter of lav;, that to hold and express such vio^vs
is criminal.

It Is true that in one of his speeches he expressed
approval of the Burnberg Laws, but a fair reru-sal of his
speeches and written articles reveals that they seek to

glorify the peasant and agricultiare and, as window drcssing, refer to Prussians, Jevrs oiid Jewish ideas.

We do

not find in them any attempt to incite- or justify murder,
or exterminations, and boliovo '!
of one obsessed with an idee flx^,
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they arc the expressions

utilization of Jev/iah A/^ric-ultural Property,

The Prosecu

tion rely upon the Decree of 26 April 1953 requiring all
Je^73 to register their property, v;hich was signed "by

Goering as Plenipotentiary for the Pour-Year Plan, and
Prick as •'"inlster

of the Interior, and. the decree of 3

Deceipbcr 1933, signed by Funk and i^'rick of the Ministries
of Dconony and the Interior,

concerning the utilization of

Jewish •'"ropei'ty.
One of the provisions of the last-named Decree pro

vided that a Jew may be ordered to sell his agricultural
or forest enterprises or properties, in whole on in part,
v/ithin

a

definite

time.

On 25 December, 1953, 'Villikens, as DARRE'S deputy,
issued a decree implementing the decree of 3 December 1958,
which provided, among other things, that the i-rice to be
paid to Jews for theiragricultural property should not
exceed the settlement utilization valixe, and even i f the

property is not used for settlement, the Jew is only to

receive from the purchaser the price corresponding to
the so-called settlement utilisation value.

In such a

case, in accordance with Section 15, Paragraph 1, of the

decree, the buyer v;aa required to pay over to the Reich
the difference betv;een the settlement utilisation value

and the adequate market value.

It recommended that, in

administration, trustees be appolnted In all cases where

difficulties were expected to arise and that they could
be appointed as soon as the Jev; had received his notifica

tion without v/aiting for the result thereof.

It further

provided tliat in all cases where sixty-five hectares or
more of land was thus to be sold, DARRE was to bo informed
prior to the sale.
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This Drc^rsm v/as carried out under DARRE'S orders

"by agencies organised and controlled by him.

For instance,

on 16 February 1959 the Bavarian I.Iinistry of Econoiny,

Department of Agriculturo, issued a decree implementing
DARRE'S decree, and the report of the Bavarian Peasant
Settlement Company, Ltd., of 12 December. 1940 discloses
that in Franconla the agricultural property of 276 Jev/s,

amounting to 606,345 hectares (Approximately 1,200,000 acres)
had been thus Aryanized.
It is clear from the first

of the

decrees that it

was intended not only to bar Jev/s from agriculture, but

also to rob them of a large part of the value of their
property/.

These decrees were enacted at about the same

time as the infamous Crystal b'Sek and the levy of a billionmark fine against Jev/s for alleged complicity in the assassin
ation of von Rath.

Unquestionably the proceeds of the Aryanlzatlon of

farms and other Jewish property were in aid of and utilized

in the program of rearmament and subsequent aggression.
An instance of hov/ the law was administered is

detailed by Justin Steinhausor, a Jewish cattle dealer
and farmer.

On I.'arch 8, 1950, he received an order to

sell his farm buildings, inventory and livestock, at a

price 01 10,400 RI.; he v/as told, in this order, that non-

compliance would be punished, and that if he did not obey
tne order, a trustee would be appointed to bring about a
sale to the Bavarian Peasant Settlement Company, Ltd.,
pormission to. sell els eviiere was denied.

5,275 Rli of the

purchase price was deducted as his share of the billion-

mark fine, and after minor property deductions, tiio net
of 4,413.20 RI,: was placed in a blocked account to be
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disposed of only with the i^ermission of the Finance Presi

dent of the Foreign Exchan3e Office, Nurnberg.

He was

permitted to draw from this balance 300 FOi per taonth.

The property was, at the time of the sale, insured by the

Bavarian State Insurance Administration for 23,230 RII and
v/ithout doubt, the enforced purchase price was less than
half of what the property v/as actually v/orth.
At" the time these decrees were

issued and while

/

theywere being enforced, DARRS v;as Minister of Food and

Agriculture and vhiilo he may never have origlnate-d the
plan to thus rob German Jev^s, he fully implemented and
enforced it without objection and without attempt to modify
or otherwise alleviate i'bs unjust provisions. Vie hold that

ho v/as a Imoiving and conscious participant in this plan.
This v/as only a few months* before the commencement of the

war, and was of imdoubted assistance in financing aggres
sive plans, and constitutes a violation of International

Law within the Jurisdiction of "this Tribunal.
Discrimination Against Jewsjh Pood Rationing.

Between

December, 1939, and 11 March, 1940, DARRE'S department issued
several decrees depriving Jews of special rations of food
to which other German citizens were entitled.

Nevertheless, the Jews wore insured the normal

rations, the sick, invalid, pregnant women, nursing mothers

and v/omcn in child bod, and Jews employed in heavy labor

were given the same special rations allowed German citizens.
The Prosecution concedes that these decrees were
not in themselves so severe or their effects so harsh as

to cause sickness or exposuiro to sickness and death, but
asserts that they led to the more drastic cuts which

finally led to the denial of foddstuffs necessary in

life, such as wheat, fat and eggs..

However., no testimony

or.documents tending to prove this assertion have been
-384-

cited and the Court has been able to fine) none.

While these decrees show rank discrimination between

Jews and others and evidence a cf^llous social sense, the evi

dence does not substantiate that they are acts which come

within the crimes charged'^-in Count Five and the defendant is
exonerated respecting them.

Resettlement,

Several years prior to 1939 a Rn.ce and Settle

ment Office had been set up in the SS under the Jurisdiction
primarily, of Himmler, and DARRE had undertaken, in addition

to his other duties, to act as its chief.

At that time and

until the beginning of the war its functions consisted of pro

curing lands for and furnishing financial support, machinery,
and other facilities, to those G'ermans, either national or

Ethnic, who were displaced either by reason of treaties, such
as that made with Italy, whereby Germanic inhabitants were
compelled to leave their homes within areas such as had

belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire orior to the Treaty
of Versailles, and had been ceded to Italy, or because of the
condemnation and appropriation by the Reich of agricultural
lands for airfields, drin g rounds, roads and other oublic
works. Fxcept insofar as the lands used for resettlement were
unjustly and illegally expropriated from Jews, the exercise of
these functions, of course, do not constitute any breach of

International Law and then only insofar as they are in execu

tion of or in connection with the planning, preparation, ini
tiation and waging of aggressive wa3?s,

We cannot say that it has been proven beyond a reason
able

doubt

that

during

that
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period

acts

of

defendant as Chief of the Race and Settlement Office

were such as to constitute a crime v/ithin our jurisdic
tion.

Ono of the main purposes of the aggressive wars
v/agcd by the Nazi government against Poland and later

against Russia v/aa to gain Lcbensraum for Germany; it v/as

proposed and planned to confiscate their land and nropsrty

from Poles and Jews, and property vjhichvas statc-ov/ned,
and to utilize the same for resettlement of Reich Germans

and Rtlinic Germans from the Baltic States who might be
compelled to leave their farms in compliance vdth the
agreement of the Russian Treaty of August 23, 1939,

Later it included Ethnic Germans from other countries.
Shortly prior to 4 October 1939 Ilimmler and DARRE

fell out and the former obtained a draft decree from

Hitler by vdiich the Reichsfuehrer SS and the SS was

entrusted with the settlement of the German pe asantry

in the "nov/ly acquired (or) occupied Eastern territories",
(wording to depend on date decree issued) which at that
time included that part of Poland,

This aroused DARRENS

ire and he v/rote first to LAIII.IER3, then to Kimmlcr, and
finally, on 27 October 1939, to Goering,

In the first

communication he stated inter alia,

"The settling of German peasants in the
conquered Polish territories, or special

parts of these territories can, as it is

certain, only bo a question of the re-

Germanization of these territories, i.e.,

tho safeguarding of those territories by

populating them with volunteer German sett

lors or industrious peasants,

I suppose I

may take it for granted that the Germaniza-

tion of the Polish population is not intended,
only the Gormanlzation of the nev/ly acquired
soil."

He referred to the fact that the requirements of the

West V/all caused much property which vrould otherwise
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have been used for resettlement,

to

be c^evotec? to (defense pro

jects anc industrial purposes; that boun^ up with the settle

ment of the Eastern territories was the question of the pos
sible reparation of damages occasioned by the Polish Agrarian
Reforms, and stated that dealing with this difficult problem

presupposer an extensive knowledge of the Polish Agrarian
Legislation anc^ settlement activities.
"All these are tasks for wbich the necessary

planning an^"* preliminary work were done carefully
a

long time ago in my Ministry on<^ in close coop

eration with the Reich Fon^ Ssta.te^ and for which,
besides the officials of my ministry, I have at
my disposal my settlement and land economy author
ities with their trained staffs of officials,
likewise the settlement companies subordinated to
me. "

I t is difficult to reconcile the statement underlined.,

namely, that these plans had been prepared a "long time ago"
✓

with DARRiii'S testimony that he had no knowledge and took no
part with any pla.ns for aggressive war,

and particularly that

against Poland, for this letter was written on 4 October 19'^9,
within 35 days after the invasion of Polp.nd..

It is wholly

unlikely that a man, in writing a letter on 4 October 1939,

would speak: of plans prepared a "long time ago" if they had,in fact, been prepared between September 1 and October 4, 1939.
After claiming that these matters of resettlement called

for technical knowledge and. experience, he said:

"Therefore, in the interest of t^e great
settlement task, it is my urgent desire that this,
my very own task from the outset, should not be

.ha.mpered by special orders or given any other

authority.

Of course, in selecting settlers,

applicants from the armed forces, the SS and the

SA will be considered, in addition to the appli

cants from the ranks of the farmers, second and
subsequent to agricultural workers, farmers dig-

placed by public projects and Rthnic German refugees.
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"The very variety of these applicants should

prohibit the transfer of the problem of settling
the Eastern territories to an organization only
in charge of one of these groups of applicants,
especially since this organization is materially

not in a position to

rform this task."

In closing, he requested LAI'lISRS to pass his report to
Hitler with these additional statements of the '"competent Reich
/•

Minister
»

(DARRE)t

His letter of October 5, to Himmler, although addressed

to "Dear Eeini", said that it was one of the greatest disap
pointments of DARRENS life to be officially informed that
the task of tha nev/ settlement of German peasantry in
Poland was to be taken av/ay from him and handed over to

the SS;

he complained that Himmler had not answered his

various communications on the subject and that he had been

kept in ignorance of Himmler's Polish plans.
On 7 October, Hitler's Decree v:as issued putting
Himmler in charge of the scheme (Paragraph III of which
defined DARRE*3 duties), and on 27 October DARPiE wrote

Goering enclosing copies of two express letters to
LAIilHlRo describing meetings at which the draft of the
7 October decree was discussed with LiUIIERS and Himmler

where he produced the draft decree and demanded to Imow

v/hether, by virtue of his rights as Food and Agriculture
Minister, he was still permitted to settle on the basis

of a "gracious decree" of Himmler's.

lie stated that

Himmler finally agreed to concede the carrying out of
this settlement to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture

and that thereupon. Ministerial Director Harmoning

v/ho

was jpresent at the conference, formulated this concession

which was newly incorporated in the proposed decree,
without which DAPiRE*3 department w ould never have had
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tho right to utilize the experienced machinery of the
rinistry unless DARRE earned the good ivill of Himmler
andv/as permitted to do so as a special favor,
liarmening deposes that he attended the conference
of 7 October to which DARRE had made reference in-his

letter to Gooring, and that DARRE there obtained the
insertion of Article III in the decree v/hich the

deponent formulated at t he

conference, as a result of

which DARRE, for his department and settlement agencies
obtained jurisdiction over the new settlement of Gorman

peasantry in the incorporated Eastern territories.
On 24 November, 1939, Kimmler decreed that the

employment of agricultural managers for ell confiscated

land and property in the Eastern territories v/as to be

handled exclusively by DARrS and that no such persons
v/ero to be directly appointed through the office of the

Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom (Kimmler
I

himsolf).

On 17 January, 1940, DARRE, through his d eputy

V/illikens, issued orders addressed to some 24 officials

and groups of officers, (apparently to everyone who had
any interest in the matter of resettlement), reciting the

situation arising from the decree of 7 October 1939, and •

that he had been commissioned v;ith carrying out the new
settlement of formation of German peasantry under the
general instructions of Ilimmler, - that ho would make
use of the settlement agencies and settlement companies
to be newly establishedi that the "Central Land Office,
Inc.", in the future, v/ould get hold of and assess the

entire f'olish and Jewish agricultural property at the dis
posal of the Reich Commissar, and later issue transfers.
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etc.;

that the SS Race and Settlement Office would partici

pate in the selection of settlers and work with the Reich"
Food Estate,

On 12 February, 1940, Goerins decreed that all agri
cultural and forest enterprises and property in the incor

porated Eastern territories which on I.September, 1939, v/ere
not in the possession of Ethnic Germans would be placed

under public management, v;hich also applied to such enter
prises and rroperties which v/ere requisitioned by the
Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom, - that

for carrying out thu.s public management the Eefenoant
DARRE, as Minister of Food and Agriculture, v;ould appoint
an Administrator General v;ho would be buund by DARRENS

directives, - that all administrative authorities and

courts were ordered to supply official help to the Ministry

of Food and Agriculture and his agencies, and that the
defendant, in accord with Himmler, would issue directives

to carry out the provisions of Goering s decree, and
DARRE could decide, by administrative measures, any ques
tions of doubt in individual cases.

On 28 February> 1940, DARRE, through his a epuoy

Backe, set up the Bast Geriuan band I-anagement Company,

Ltd,, and appointed an Administrator General for aigrioul-tural and forest enterprises which were to be placed under _

public management in accordance with the provisions of
Goering's decree.

On May 9, 1940, DARRE announced the location of thehead and branch offices of this company.

On 10 November, 1940, the Minister of Pood and

Agriculture promulgated regulations for the selection
of. Polish farms for purposes of resettlement by Ethnic
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German farm owners and German owners of farms

in the

Reich; thct when these applications had been approved,

the Polish property was to be taken out of the hands of
the Public Administrator and, if necessary, out of tiiG
hands of its then owners and the applicant could move in.

Such was the organizational form of the so-called re
settlement of Polish farms.

In the .latter part cf November, 1940, Himmler

prepared a memorandum entitled, "Reflections on the Treat
ment of People of Alien Races in the East".

He proposed

that they be split up into as many individual Ethnic groups
as possible; that Germany was not interested in unifying,

but in breaking them up into as many parts and fragments
as possible; that only by dissolving the fifteen millions

•of people in the Government General and the eight millions

of people in the Eastern provinces, could Germany carry
out the racial sifting necessary to select individual and
racially valuable elements and bring them into Germany and

there assimilate them; that no schools higher than

elementary fourth grade v;ould be permitted and that they
must be taught that it is a divine law to obey the Germans
and to be honest and industrious, - that reading should

,

not be required; that if a i^arent desired his children to

receive better schooling, and they were considered racially
perfect, they should be sent to school in Germany and

remain there permanently; that cruel and tragic as this
might be it was still the best method if one accepted as

un-Gorman and impossible the Bolshevist method of physical
e:ctermination of the people.
Himmler said that this practice might discourage
people of good blood from producing any more children.

•391-

which, however, would bo advantageous; that there would
be an annual

sifting of children, of four to ten years,

of whom the racially valuable v/ould be sent permanently

to G-erraany; that the remaining population v/ould be used as

people of labor without leaders and would be at Germany*s
disposal and fUrnish it annually v/ith migrant v/orkers, and
those fitted for heavy v/ork would bo called upon to help
work on the everlasting cultural tasks of the German
people.

On 28 March, 1940, Himmler made a file note or
memorandum that on the 25th he had handed in his report on

the Treatment of Peoples of

-lien Races in the East to

Hitler, who considered it "very good and correct", but
ordered "fchat only a very fev/ copies should be issued and
that it should be treated v/ith the utmost secrecy and

be regarded as a Hitler directive.

Among those to whom

Hitler directed it should be distributed was DARrS.
The defense denies tfaAt Exhibit 1314 is the

report mentioned in Exhibit 1313 and further denies that
DARRI] ever received it.

The proof is not conclusive on

this subject but v/e believe that c ven if the report sub
mitted to Hitler v/as not precisdly identical v/ith Exhibit

1314, it no doubt followed the same line.

On 7 June, 1940, Director Hugo Berger, Ministerial-

rat in the Ministry of Pood and Agriculture and who,
incidentally, had been appointed by DARRE as Deputy Minis
ter of the East G©rman Land Company, published an article

in the ITatienai Socialist Landpost describing what had taken

place in PoTahd and how, immediately behind the advancing
Army, the entire occupied area became dotted with farmers
from the Reich after their applications and qualifications

hr.c3 "been approved and d etorniinod in Berlin; that in the
'"'arthc^au and the district of ICattov;itz and the area

constituting the Government General, they were directly

supplied with agricultural workers from the Reich "by the

Reich Pood Kinistry; that thoy v/ero furnished v/i th tractors,
steam plows, threshing implements, etc.; that these thou
sands of German farmers were settled in the incorporated

Eastern .territcrio3 on the lands of nearly 5000 large
Polish farms and hundreds of thousands of small Polish

farms covering an area of nearly one-fifth of the agricul

tural area of Germany as it v/as up to DGcemoGr, 1957»
DARRE'S dofonso is that hisd cpartmcnt and agencies

had nothing to do with the matter other than to furnish

agricultural machinery, supplies ond equipmont; that ho had
no Imowlodge of the criminal nature of Hitler's plans and
actions, and finally that the East German Land Company,
Inc., acted as a trustee for the c::propriatcd polish lands
for "tho benefit of future ov/ners, and that it was merely
an agency of economic supervision.
/

C

^

1

•

It is further urged that DARRENS settlement conipanios
did not themselves confiscate land, but that this was done

by the Lain Trustee Office East,, and they only administered

the lands so confiscated; • that whatever DARRfl did was only
as tho ercecutive organ of Hitler.
y

*

This defense overlooks, hov/evor, the fact that all
of these organizations v;ere integral parts of the common

"*

plan to unlawfully deprive Jews and Poles of their land
and reduce them to serfdom, and to settle them v;ith

Germans and f inally, to btirn tho title thereto over to
those new settlers.

DARRS and his agencies played an

essential part in this unlawful and crue1 scheme.
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while i t is true that Himmler wag the chief of the

so-callod nesettlement and v/as BARRELS superior, in most
particulars, the fact remains that DARRE strongly endeav

ored to get complete authority for himself and that he
fought for and kept as much power as hevns alole, while,
on the other hand, Himmler sought for and kept all the
power he could and surrendered as l i t t l e to DARRE as he
✓

was compelled to.
be considered a

Under these circumstances DARRE cannot

mere avitomaton.

Notwithstanding the assertions of the defense,

trusteeships were not for the benefit of t he Polish and
L

Jewish landowners.

Their function was

to insure an order

ly administration and division of expropriated land for the

benefit of Germany and Germans, and not of Poles or Jews.

DARRE knew vAiat the plan was, |jnd in his letters to LAI.!I,'IERS
he speaks of having "long ago" prepared it;

his objections

0

.

%

were not to the scheme itself, but to the fact that himmler
and not DARfffi! was to be put in charge of it.

^

^^Dcien he

failed to get complete control, nevertheless by repeated
Objectionsand remonstrances he succeeded in having the
proposed decree changed, giving him a large measure of

authority, although Himmler was the over-all head;

DARRE
¥

selected those who wore to become settlers, subject,

of

course, to the right of Himmler and the SS to pass upon

the political and racial acceptability of the applicant;
his administration furnished a largo percentage of the
new settlers.

The struggle between himself and Himmler was one
for pov/er and authority, and not one of difference in
ideology or plan.

This particular contest w as sympto

matic of the Nazi government,

^ach little Hitler was

Jealous of his proro^otives and ooOh, to the best of his
ability and influence, attcmptc-d.to increase his Juris

diction, generally at the expense of one or another of his
associates.

That, in this instance, Himmler succeeded and
I

DARRH] in part failed, does not redound to the latter's
credit, but merely demonstrates that Klmmler was closer
to the source of pov/er and v;as best able to assert his

claims.

Those expropriations and resettlements took

place while Poland and her allies were still valiantly

fighting in the field to regain her occupied territories.
The acts here outlined violated the provisions of

The Hague Convention (Article 45) and were a plain and
outrageous breach of International Law,
✓

DARRH was a conscious and willing' participant in
robbing hundreds of

thousandc of Polish and Jewish

farmers of their property v/hlch subjected them to serf
dom and finally consigned thorn to slave labor either in
Poland or cormany.
)

^

/•

'.70 do not believe the Defendant DARRR to 'have boon
an unimaginable monster like Himmler, but his own letters

show him to have been cruelly callous of the rights of
others and utterly indifrerc3at to the human suffering which

the measures in which he willingly participated inflicted
upon the unfortunate people of Poland.
Bach-Selewski, called for the defense, testified'
among other things, that DARRL was one of the loading
anti-,Semites in Cormany, but not comparable v;ith
Strcicher and his associates; that hevas responsible
for the anti-3emltism in agriculture, and, as a result
of his methods, all Jews wore removed from the Reich
Food .estate and

as handlers of food

and of food
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cnter-

prises; that agriculture t;as the first section in
v/hich the elimination of 'llio Jew v«is attempted; that it

was DArJl5h3 theory that Jews v/ere never to own landed
property, and as head of the Race and Settlement Main
Office until 1938, he carried out this concept by pro

hibiting ovaiership of property by Jews; that in the newly
annexed territories, resettlement took place by forco and

racial matters, although-.later on the execution of these
plans

was not placed in his hands'.

In the pr.rticulars heretofore stated, DA.^3 must be .
and is found GUILTY under Count Five.
DIETRICE

DISTRICH hold various important positions in the

Party and in the Third Reich. On August 1, 1931, Hitler
appointed him Director of the Press Office of the Party.
On 28 February, 1934, ho appointed DIETRICH Reich
Press Chiof of the ITSDilP with the following pov/erss

"He directs in my name (in meincm Auftragc)

the guiding principles for the entire editorial

v;ork of the'Party press. In addition, as my

press chief, ho is the highest authority for
all the press publications of ohc Party and
of all its agencies."

The defendant insists that the proper translation

of hie term "in meinem Auftrago" is "by my order" rather

than "in my name". Apparently, however, either transla
tion is proper. In view of tho facts shown by the evidence
it makes no substantial difference v/hich translation is
. adopted.
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In 1933 ho v/as appointed one of the Reichsleitors
(Reich Leaders),a small ^roup which constituted the. lead
ers of the Party ranking next to Hitler himself.
In ITovemher, 1937, he v; as appointed Press Chief of

the Reich Government, taking office at the beginning of

1938 as State Secretary of the Ministry of Public Enlight
enment and Propaganda under Goebbols, and remained in this
position until 30 llarch, 194-5, a fcv; weeks before the

final collapse.

He was a "convinced Nazi" and was one of

Hitler^s trusted lieutenants in the fight for powcrj

his

own witnesses describe him as being "moderately" antiSemitic. No offort was made to satisfactorily define what

was meant by this t erm other than that he^as not a

'Radical" anti-Semite. The degree of his moderation is
shovaa by his speeches and by his. press directives which
will bo hereafter alluded to.
As Reich Press Chief ho had at

least the

ostensible

control over the press so far a s to what it should afid
should not publish.

There was a continual rivalry and

contest betweenGocbbeIs and himself.

The former attempted

to seize and exert power v^hiTe DIETRICH strenuously re
sisted those attempts.

The contest did not end

until 30 Harch 1945 when Goobbels succeeded in having

DIETRICH dismissed from office,

DIETRICH was, during all

the Important jcara of the Nazi regime, a member of

Hitler s personal entourage and snent most of his time

at the Euohrer Headquarters,

lie supervised and deter

mined what material of foreign and political neivs should

be submitted to Hitler and used his position and presence

in Hitler's entourage to maintain his position and pov/ers,
"^/hile liGTOS unsuccessful in his efforts to separate the
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Reich Press Office from the Ilinistry of Propaganda, never\

theless Goebbels v/as unsuccessful until the very end in

seriously disturbing DISTRICPI*s status and control over the
Press,

In view of the attempts made by the defense to
minimize his influence and his power and authority, we

quote from the diary of Goebbels' personal referent,
Semmler, where, under date of ijovcmbor 30, 1943, the
fo11owing is found;

"The endless quarrel between Goebbels and
the Reich Press Chief has boon dormant for

K

a while, only to flare up again and rage the
fiercer.
Their struggle to dictate the tone of
the press has begun again.
It v/as a trifle
that started i t , but Goebbels is raging, as
much because of his poworlessncss to control
Dietrich as because of the

issue a t stake.

"Although Dietrich is State Secretary in

the Propaganda I-^inistry ho refuses to take
orders ot< advice from Goebbels.

He shelters

himself safely behind liitler, vhose chief
press officer he is,
"The press section in the Ministry, which
'

took over the functions of the former press
department of the Reich Government, is formal
ly not under Goebbels at a l l , but under Die
trich as Press Director of the

^

Reich Govern-

ment.
The headquarters of this department is
the famous Room 24, v/hich is staffed day and
night.
Prom here are issued all political
directives to the GermCn press, all requests

passed down from above, from Hitler, from
Goebbels, from the Foreign Office and from
the Chancellory have to go through his office,

"I myself pass to Room 24, the press, in
structions which I receive, dictated by Goebbels,
so that they can be pssscd from there to the news
papers.

%
^

"How if there is some'important nev/s material,
like a speech by Churchill, it can happen, - or
rather it is the rule, - that at least three or
four different pages of polic^^ directives are
produced. They are supposed to assist our editors
in their v/ork.

But i t is obvious to me that they

deprive writers of the last vestiges of intellec
tual independence.
These directives often contra
dict one another sometimes only on a few points,
but more often completely and utterly.In such

cases there are only tv/o courses of a ction open to
the vn?etchcd official in Ro»om 24, who is almost
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continually talking on two telephones at
once.
Either he can forbid any mention or
discussion of the Churchill speech for 24
hours, - in which case the British newspapers
say the speech has .pivcn the Cermans such a

shock that they don't know whot to say, - or

he v; ill take directive points from the ilitlcrDietrich document and ignore the suggestions

of Goebbels a nd Iiibbentrop.
"Then on the next day Goobbcls is furious
when he roads the nowspapor and f inds that no
attention has been paid to his

instructions.

Often I am suspected of having not passed them

on, and lean only save myself by producing
the original copy of the directives,

'"'Oddl:/ enough, Dietrich's authority ex
tends only to the press, while Goebbcls has
exclusive control

over the radio and over

its

news services." (Emphasis supplied).
Entry of ITovember 30, 1945:

^

"One result of the latest quarrel with
Dietrich is that

Goebbols has

decided to

intensify the political use of the radio.
He is going to give special attention to

the developments of its news services."
Again on IJarch 15, 1945, Sommlor noted:

"Of course ho (GoGbbels) controls public
opinion with his powers over radio, films,

'

and to a certain extent over the press.

I

soy to a

certain extent because he has to

share at

least half

the work vdth the

Reich

u

Press Director (as spoliosnian of the Fuehrer's
Ileadquartors), with the Foreign Office and
v/ith the High Command. Hrny of the directives

^

which I pass to the press in Gocbbels' name arc

i

useless because at the same moment

the

Fuehrer's

Headquarters (that is to say Dietrich) is putting
out the opposite diroctlvc on the same theme.
And in cases of doubt anything that comes from
the Fuc-hror's Headquarters has Hitler's 'personal

authority and takes priority, however trivial
the matter ..."

Gocbbels told Fritschc in Hovcmbcr, 1942:
"I shall never be able to take the press from

L

Or.Dietrich and Hitler will never permit mo that

the press will bo completely eliminated from the

Ministry of Propaganda."
These statements agree with the oral testimony
of the witness Karl Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Office

,

and of 'VernGr Stephen, Hoinz Lorcnz and Fritscho.
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We

believe

that the

statements made

in

these

affidavits

lie closer to the facts than the attempts made in the
oral testimony of the affiants to minimize DIETFJOH*S
power and authority,

DIETRICH established the so-called "Tagesparole"
which were daily instructions to the press.

This step

was to prevent either Goebbels or other IVIinisters or

agencies from exercising control over the press releases,
DIETRICH appointed his ov/n subordinates, v/ho had immediate

charge of these releases, and his personal ^proval was
required for each release, including the directives and
statements of policy desired to be issued by other agenV

cies, including Goeboels himself,
the

the foreign Office,

OCT.

It is true th^^t the viev/s and opinions and desires

of many of the ministers were quite generally included in
the releases, but the final authority lay in DIETRICH.

*

Each morning before the Tagesparole was issued to the
press conference, the Foreign Office and other ministries

and agencies, including the Ministry of Propaganda, furb

^

nished material for the press releases.

Here again Goebbels

interfered and to some degree was successful, until the
advent of Sundermann,

Prom that time on DIETRICH regained

c ontrol,

The press department also issued weekly directives
and various kinds of material for periodicals and maga-

^

zines.

The defense has offered testimony that DIETRICH

had no control over this material; that Bade, who was

chief of the periodical division, was Goebbels* man and

not DIETRICHES.

This, however, is denied by the witness

Gensert who was employed in a responsible position in
that division and who was a member
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of

opposition

•ri,UP>lH HTT

to the Nazi Party and was himself finally arrested by the
Gestapo; also by the affidavit of Lcrenz^
Lorenz there deposes that betv/een DIETKIGH and Bade,

chief of the periodical press department, there was a

close personal relationship; that DIEThlCH protected
Bade strongly and brought about his promotion to Minis
terial Dirigent; that Bade deputized for Stephan in his

capacity as personal expert (personal referent) and that
DIETRICH asked Bade frequently to visit him in the Fuehrer*s
Headquarters, where the latter assisted him in drafting his

speeches and articles; that upon DiETRlGii'S suggestion bade
had been appointed to the department as chief where pre

viously he had only been in charge of one main section of
the department.
In vie?; of DIETf.ICH'S determination to have and main-,

tain power and authority, in view of the powers conferred
upon him as press chief of the Nazi Party and press chief
of the Reich Government, and the fact that when any member
of his department followed Goebbels' wishes rather than those

of DIETRICH, he was disciplined or removed, we have no doubt
that whenever Goebbels' desires, or those of any other

Minister, differed from the press policy v/hich DIETRICH
wished, DIETRICH'S policy prevailed.

Press propaganda was one of the bases of Hitler's
rise to power and one of the supports to his continuation
in power,

he so states in Meln Kampfs
"The v^bole art consists in doing this

so skillfully that everyone ^r-lll be convinced
that tbe fact is real, the process necessary,
the necessity correct, etc.
But since propa

ganda is not and cannot be the necessity in
itself, since its function, like the poster,
consists in attracting the attention of the
crov/d,
and not in educating those v/ho are
already educated or \^ho are striving after
education and knov/ledge, Its effect for the

-401-

'

most part must be aimed at the emotions and
only to a very limited degree at the socalled intellect.

.

.

•

.But if, as in propaganda for

sticking out a -war, the aim is to influence
a whole people, we must avoid excessive in
tellectual demands on our public, and too
much caution cannot be exerted in this di
rection.

,

.The receptivity of the great

masses is very limited,'their intelligence
is small, but their pov\fer of forgetting is
enormous.

In consequence or these facts,

all effective propaganda must be limited to
a very fev/ points and must harp on these
in slogans until the last member of the
public understands what you want him to

understand by your slogan."

".

•

.Its task is not' to make an

objective study of the truth, insofar as it
favors the enemy, and then set it before the
masses vdth academic fairness; its task is

to serve our ov/n right, always and unflinch

ingly."

"The purpose of propaganda is not to
provide interesting distraction for blase
young gentlemen, but to convince, and what
I

mean is to convince the masses.

But the

masses are slov;-moving, and they always

require a certain time before theyaxe ready

I

even to notice a thing, and only after the

simplefet ideas are repeated thousands of
times v/ill the masses finally remember them."
loint 25 of the Party program states:
"a)

All writers and employees of the

newspapers appearing in the German language
be members

of the race.

"b)

Non-German newspapers be required

Vc)

Non-Germans are forbidden by law,

tb have the express permission of the State
to be published. They may not be printed in
the German language•
any financial interest in German publications,
or any influence on them, and as punishment
for such violations the closing of such a pub
lication as well as the immediate expulsion
from the Reich of the non-'^erman concerned.
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